

THE
PERSONALIST
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of Philosophy, Religion, and Literature*

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Published Quarterly by
THE SCHOOL OF PHILOSOPHY
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
Los Angeles, California

Printed at THE WARD RITCHIE PRESS

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Entered as second-class matter July 3, 1933, at P. O. at L. A.
Under act of March 3, 1879.

Address orders to
FLORENCE H. SMITH, Circulation Secretary
3518 University Ave., Los Angeles 7, Calif.

SINGLE COPIES 50 CENTS : YEARLY SUBSCRIPTION \$2.00

Our Contributors' Page

Dr. *Werkmeister*, recently called to the Professorship of Philosophy and later appointed to succeed Dr. Robinson in the Directorship of the School of Philosophy at the University of Southern California next September, contends that mechanism cannot account for the facts in the life sciences. He writes under the title *Some Philosophical Implications of the Life Sciences*.

Professor *Larson* of Stephens College, Missouri, gives a discriminating discussion of the strangely paradoxical relation between *Kierkegaard* and *Sartre*.

Dr. *Edith Watson Schipper*, wife of the head of the Philosophy Department at Miami University, writes in *The Antinomy of Poetic Truth* of the poetic insights which must be a coherent part of conceptual truth, yet not dependent upon the reasoned explanations of philosophy or science.

The verse *Spring* is contributed by *Enola Chamberlin* of Los Alamitos and well known among California authors.

The Personalist has frequently veered too far away from London's *Punch*, but the extracts from freshman papers furnished by *Carl Hamburg*, assistant professor of philosophy at Tulane, and his wife, *Maxine*, will help to balance the score in *A Freshman's Philosophy*.

Dr. *Donald Heiney*, a recent graduate from the University of Southern California, and now Professor at the University of Utah, describes the Greek sense of sin as based on *hubris*, "the-too-much," a divergence from normality. His theme is *Mythos and Ethos*.

Contributions to *The Personalist* do not necessarily express the sentiments of the Editors. In the interest of freedom of discussion views dissident from those of personalism are welcomed if strongly written. Manuscripts should follow the format of *The Personalist* and should be typewritten (double-spaced). Carbon copies will not be considered. Self-addressed, stamped envelopes should accompany all manuscripts.

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
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THE LANTERN OF DIOGENES

THE "PROJECT" OF CRASSUS

¶ The project of Crassus the Sophist might have been an unwritten chapter in the life of Diogenes, or simply the dream of the writer.

¶ Dissatisfied with Diogenes' dictum that happiness is the absence of desire, the sophist set out to prove that success alone could bring happiness and to show how this could be achieved.

¶ The discussion was extended on the part of Crassus, for the elite minds of Athens had gathered beside the famous tub to witness the discomfiture of the great Cynic.

¶ It was said that the argument had been laboriously thought out during a whole year of sabbatic study, and it required an hour and a half for delivery.

¶ The theme, as I have hinted, was success and its discovered principles were, like the four winds, the four points of the compass, the four Gospels, and the four elements, found to be four.

¶ These were industry, perseverance, interest, and belief in the project.

¶ Such perspicacity astonished some of the hearers, who hastened to congratulate Crassus on his "success."

¶ All present awaited the reaction of Diogenes, who stirred painfully in his tub, and was heard to remark: "I heard the mountain laboring, but where is the mouse?"

¶ Then I awoke.

R. T. F.

Some Philosophical Implications of the Life Sciences

BY

W. H. WERKMEISTER

OURS is pre-eminently an age of science; and it is so in several respects. Even a cursory glance at the material side of contemporary civilization discloses comforts and conveniences which were undreamed of only a few decades ago, and which are the concrete fruits of our sciences. Telephone and television, electric refrigerators and air conditioning, airplanes and motor cars—these are but a few of the more obvious examples of scientific achievements which have deeply affected our pattern of living, our mores, the very standards in terms of which we evaluate cultural existence. Medical science, in collaboration with bacteriology, chemistry, and modern physics, has conquered or checked some of our deadliest diseases and has extended the life expectancy of the average man and woman far beyond anything hoped for only a generation or so ago. The facts are so obvious and well known that it is unnecessary to do more here than allude to them.

However, the achievements of modern science, great as they are, are not necessarily an unmixed blessing, for our knowledge of the laws of nature is, as knowledge, indifferent to the use which we make of it. The very science which places at the disposal of modern medicine X-rays and radioactive isotopes for the fight against cancer, has placed within our reach weapons of destruction which are potentially capable of destroying the human race. And modern science, which could provide even greater comforts, more abundant goods, and greater security than anything we have seen so far, has also contributed its share to a tense world situation which is fraught with fear

and a basic insecurity in the midst of our material comforts. But these facts, too, are so obvious and so well known that I need not belabor the point.

In yet a third and more subtle way has modern science effected a change in our culture, for it has deeply affected our general world view. Not only has contemporary science given us a new and vastly enlarged picture of the world in which we live; not only has it revealed a universe so incomprehensibly large in its space-time dimensions and so dramatically dynamic in its smallest particles that we can stand but in awe before such a picture; it has also challenged or discarded basic categories of interpretation. Matter, for example, is no longer the inert "stuff," the ultimate something of which all things are made, but, being transformable into energy, it seems to be only one phase of a reality which, as matter-energy, is the substratum of the physical world described by the basic law of conservation and the principle of entropy. No wonder, therefore, that in quantum physics the elementary particle—electron, positron, or whatever it may be—loses all discernible individuality as *this* particle here and now. And no wonder, perhaps, that in view of Heisenberg's principle of uncertainty the very idea of causality seems meaningless and useless in the micro-regions of subatomic events. In all these matters we are forced to a reconsideration and perhaps to far-reaching modifications of our long-established ways of interpreting the world. Here, more than anywhere else, do we, as philosophers, become aware of the subtle but fundamental changes which modern science entails.

One final point deserves emphasis. The history of science shows that at all times our most exact natural sciences have served as the prototype of science in general. Today, however, this tendency toward a unified science or, better, toward a universalistic physics is stronger than ever; and the material achievements of our physical sciences give added weight to this tendency. What, we may be asked, has philosophy contributed that is in any way comparable to the amazing success in our most advanced sciences? Are not philosophers still debating the age-old questions of the true, the beautiful, and the

good without having discovered a final answer to any of them? And do not current tendencies within the field of philosophy itself reduce this "queen of the sciences" to linguistic analysis and a branch of semantics? What momentous conclusions can be expected from investigations and discussions which pertain only too often to trivialities of language and linguistic usage?

I have a certain sympathy with this indictment of some phases of contemporary philosophy, although I believe that the criticism overshoots its mark. It is, and always has been, the first task of the philosopher to be critically analytical and to examine and re-examine not only the problems which recur in the long history of philosophy, but also the assumptions, presuppositions, and basic categories of the very sciences which today tend to usurp the place of philosophy itself. And it is my basic conviction that the increasingly scientific world-view of today is in urgent need of a corrective which only philosophy can provide.

I am not opposed to scientific procedures and methods or to the full practical exploitation of whatever knowledge these methods and procedures may yield; nor am I opposed to an integrative interpretation of the sciences which contributes to a better understanding of the world as a whole. But the methods and procedures must be appropriate to the subject matter investigated, and the integrative interpretation must reflect due consideration for all relevant facts. I find, however, that this critical requirement is not always observed by modern advocates of a so-called scientific world-view. Borderline transgressions are only too frequent.

It is within this general context of present-day tendencies and with special reference to what I should like to call "physicalistic reductionism" that I want to consider here certain crucial problems of philosophical significance which arise in the biological or life sciences. In order to clarify my point further I shall discuss the most basic problem in its broadest philosophical setting. The problem itself is not new; but I believe we can now state it more clearly than ever before, can understand better its implications and ramifications,

and can at least indicate the direction in which an ultimate solution may be found.

Intelligibility, so I believe, is in all respects and at all times proportioned to our human existence. There is no truth and there is no knowledge which, in the end, is not a human truth and a human knowledge, and which is not elucidated and rendered intelligible by the categories of human understanding. There is available to us no other approach to reality, no other comprehension of truth, than our human experience, reflected and integrated as it is in categories of understanding which are disclosed within the experience itself. Revelation no less than any other form of knowledge must conform to these categories or remain inaccessible to human comprehension. Perhaps this is all that Protagoras meant when he said: "Man is the measure of all things."

But man's nature is complex, each facet—be it physical, rational, or spiritual—reflecting a realm of impressions which, together, constitute our contact with the real, and which, when defined and integrated in cognition, constitute our intelligible world.

Two categories in particular emerge as the anchorage of this intelligibility, and both are patterned after man's modes of existence. One is descriptive of our bodily existence in space-time. Its form of determination is causality: the action of one spatial thing upon another in time. The other is descriptive of human aspiration and action. Its form of determination is purposive striving, the deliberate pursuit of a consciously chosen goal. Causal determination and purposive striving—these, I believe, are the crucial categories of intelligibility in terms of which we understand the world around us. Science stands committed to the former. Religion and, for the most part, metaphysics are aligned with the latter, although a materialistic metaphysic discards purposive striving as an ultimate category of the real.

My interest for the moment is not metaphysical or religious. I am concerned, rather, with the adequacy or inadequacy of causality and of purposive striving as categories descriptive of all experience.

It is my contention that, by itself, neither of these categories is sufficient to render intelligible the facts of human experience; for causality, as such, hardly explains man's deliberate pursuit of consciously chosen goals, and purposive striving can be attributed to purely physical processes only when we completely disregard the meaning of purposive. A reduction of the facts of experience to one category or the other inevitably entails a falsification of those facts. The question is, will the categories causality and purposive striving be adequate when they are taken together and are applied in their respective spheres of origination? My thesis is that even then they are inadequate, and that there exists a large realm of indisputable facts which can be subsumed under neither or both of them. It is at this point and in this context that the biological or life sciences attain their philosophical significance. First, however, let us consider briefly a few of the relevant facts.

There are, to begin with, the rather obvious facts of structural adaptations to specific organic functions. The bird's wing, the mammalian eye, the human hand—they are structurally adapted to the functions which they perform, and they are prenatally developed prior to any occasion for proper functioning. The roots, stems, leaves, and blossoms of a flowering plant all serve functions which are subordinate not only to the existence of the plant itself but to that of the species as well. There are, secondly, the less obvious but experimentally discernible regulatory processes which preserve or re-establish the constancy of the optimum conditions of life in the internal environment—processes which may involve the brain and the nerves, the heart and the lungs, the kidneys and the spleen, and various lymphatic glands, all working together co-operatively to achieve homeostatic controls of the water and salt content of the blood, of the protein, fat, calcium, and sugar content, of our body temperature, and of various other balances indispensable to the proper functioning of the organism as a whole. Constant adjustments in all of these controls are necessary. Various materials must be absorbed, transformed, stored, or made available as occasion demands. Even a

brief lapse in the co-ordinating functions of some of these multiple processes may result in a breakdown of organic tissues so complete that it endangers the existence of the whole organism. Whether the controls are effected through enzymes or hormones or in some other manner is immaterial; for the enzymes and hormones and other controls are produced by the organism itself and, under normal conditions, are produced in strict harmony with the needs and requirements of the organism as a whole. There is nothing in these internal adjustments which does not bear the stamp of the whole. And it is this wholeness of the living organism which I want to stress.

There are, in the third place, the facts of ontogenetic development—the facts, that is, of an epigenetic emergence of a well-differentiated, articulate, and functionally integrated organism from a unitary egg cell. To be sure, all differentiations of the organism are derived from the first egg cell. The potentialities of the first egg cell, therefore, include the whole and integrated organism. This must not be misunderstood, however, to mean that ontogenesis is but the gradual unfolding of a structure which is there from the beginning. The well-known separation and fusion experiments with the eggs of sea urchins, frogs, and salamanders prove that the facts are otherwise, for they show that even parts of an egg are capable of developing into a whole and normal organism; that the various blastomeres of a developing egg are equipotential as well as differentially potential; and that ontogenetic development is epigenetic. Something “new” appears at various stages.

Whether an explanation of these facts is attempted in terms of gradient fields or in terms of organizers of a chemical nature, the truth is that gradient fields and organizers are themselves progressively differentiated under the control of the living whole which is the emergent organism itself. Even the determinants of heredity are subject to such control. To be sure, the mystery of the developing organism is definitely linked up with the chemistry of the living cell. But the protein molecules which might be regarded as the agents responsible for the progressive differentiation in ontogenetic develop-

ment, are themselves in a state of constant flux. Individual atoms are replaced in these molecules with extraordinary speed; and the molecules, no less than the cell structure of which they are parts, form patterns the material components of which freely participate in the various metabolic exchanges. But the form of the whole persists despite such interchanges. Only when the cell is dead do its material components become subject to a purely chemical interpretation.

The facts to which reference has just been made are well established; their interpretation, however, is a different matter. But one thing seems clear at once: It is not possible to interpret the facts under consideration in terms of purposive striving, if by purposive striving we mean the deliberate pursuit of consciously chosen goals. The processes and adjustments of organic growth and functional adaptation are unconscious and can hardly be said to be deliberate. Kant suggested in his *Kritik der Urteilkraft* that in the interpretation of the phenomena of biological existence the idea of purpose be employed as a heuristic principle; that we approach the facts under consideration *as if* they were under the guidance of a purposive agency, but that nevertheless, we accept in the end only a causal explanation as fully adequate. There is merit in Kant's suggestion, for the *as-if* approach may readily lead to the discovery of interconnections of processes and structures which are not so obvious otherwise. Still, Kant's suggestion is at best but a compromise which evades rather than solves the question of ultimate categories and which does not do justice to the facts themselves.

The solution offered by the vitalists is even less acceptable, for it is no solution in any sense. When Driesch, for example, introduces a special vital factor, called Entelechy, which is neither a force, nor an energy, nor a constant; which is not in space, not in time, but which is—"Entelechy, a factor *sui generis* in Nature," he indulges in spurious science and in equally spurious metaphysics. A factor which is neither this nor that nor the other can hardly be said to be intelligible in its own right—unless, of course, it can be brought before us for direct inspection. And when Driesch maintains that Entelechy is a

special "whole-making" factor which transforms the mere aggregate of materials in the first egg cell into the wholeness of a living organism, he overlooks the crucial fact that even the first egg cell is already a functioning whole and not a mere aggregate; that, in other words, recourse to a "whole-making" Entelechy is superfluous—and this the more so since it can easily be shown that references to an Entelechy, far from providing a solution for the problems of organic existence and growth, merely transfer these problems from the space-time world which is accessible to experimental investigation to a realm beyond space and time which remains shrouded in the mysteries of purely negative definitions. Vitalism, I am sure, must be repudiated.

Does not this leave us then with nothing but physics and chemistry and the category of causality which is central to them? I believe that it does not. I believe that the initial alternative—either purposive striving or causality—is not exhaustive. I believe that at least one, and possibly several, additional forms of determination may be discerned when we analyze carefully the phenomena of observation. If this should turn out to be true, then the philosophical implications of our discovery are immense; for we are then in a position to develop an analysis of categories as a first approach to metaphysics which does not commit us in advance to a speculative reductionism—be that reductionism downwards or, as is traditionally more often the case, upwards. We have then broken through all monism of single principles and have attained the freedom of an over-all integrative system in which can be preserved in full autonomy the diverse levels or strata of actual existence. As a result, we shall have gained for philosophy a measure of analytic freedom and speculative integrity impossible of attainment in any other way. We shall have freed a proposed analysis of categories from the worst features of traditional metaphysics: the misapplication of categories through transgressions of clearly demarcated boundary lines. Here is a challenge to our philosophical acumen and a field of great promise for our philosophy of the future.

But let me come to the point.

The facts disclosed in the experiments pertinent to our problem show (1) that at the beginning of ontogeny there exists an egg which, in its totipotent nature, is an integrated "whole"; (2) that this "whole" contains all the "directing forces"—if such we want to call them—necessary for the development of a differentiated individual; (3) that this primary "whole" is not rigidly predetermined as to the actual fate of its constituent parts; (4) that the development which culminates in the mature organism is epigenetic and occurs in such a way that the actual fate of each plasmic region depends upon the position of that region within the developing "whole"; (5) that normally this position itself is a function of the developmental "field" associated with the original egg cell; (6) that, to the extent to which this "field" determines the specific fate of the various regions of the egg, every embryonic achievement is the product of an organismic "whole"; (7) that this "whole" is existentially real and, as a "whole," is more than the sum of its parts; and (8) that this "whole," which is the living organism, is harmoniously integrated and functionally adjusted in an uninterrupted process of "equilibration." It is my contention that this "wholeness" of the organism requires an explanatory category which is neither that of purposive striving, nor that of mere causal determination. I shall speak of it as "biotic" determination.

I have already indicated why I regard the category "purposive striving" as inapplicable: it suggests the deliberate pursuit of consciously chosen goals; and there is no evidence of such purposive activity at the level of organismic existence. And metaphysical interpolations remain unacceptable in the realms of science.

Our immediate problem is to differentiate "biotic" determination from causal determination as encountered in physics and chemistry. I submit that whatever else causal determination may be, it at least does not assume the existence of a goal which must be reached. A sequence under causal determination is at all times an "open" sequence and may be deflected from its course by the introduction of additional determinants or by experimental interference. "Biotic" determination, on the other hand, is not "open" in this sense. A cer-

tain end result is predetermined from the beginning. If obstacles are introduced into the normal course of events, the organism is capable to an amazing degree of overcoming them and of reaching the predetermined end result by readjusting to the abnormal conditions. A sea urchin egg, for example, will develop into a sea urchin, or into two, or four, or eight, or will die in the process of readjustment—depending upon the experimental conditions—but it will develop into sea urchins, not into frogs or salamanders or whales.

If the distinction here indicated be granted—and I believe that it signifies a genuine difference in the levels of existence—then we can oppose to all physicalistic reductionism a philosophico-scientific approach to the basic facts disclosed in the biological or life sciences which takes full cognizance of the categorial uniquenesses of the living organism, which preserves biology as an independent science without destroying the ideal of a unified and all-inclusive science, and which prepares the way for an analysis of categories more adequate (because more closely related) to the facts of existence than the usual brand of speculative metaphysics.

But let me be more specific. Physicalistic reductionism is the thesis that ultimately all phenomena of life must be explicable in terms of physics and chemistry. Admittedly, the laws of physics and chemistry which we now accept are as yet inadequate for such a task. In time, however—such is the hope of the reductionists—laws typified by the present laws will be found which are adequate. It is my belief that this is a forlorn hope.

If the organism is a determinative “whole,” then any law descriptive of this “whole” must of necessity be uniquely, *i.e.*, not additively, complex. A law of the living organism as such, therefore, is not simply a sum of physico-chemical laws dealing with isolated and determinatively “open” physico-chemical processes. Just as the more complex laws of Einstein’s theory of relativity, for example, cannot be logically derived from, or explained in terms of, the simpler Newtonian laws, so the more complex laws of the living “whole” cannot be derived from, or explained in terms of, the

simpler laws of physics and chemistry. But if we accept "biotic" determination as basic, and formulate laws adequate to the peculiar and unitary complexity of the living "whole," then it is at least logically conceivable that these complex laws will contain the simpler laws of physics and chemistry as "boundary conditions" when, at the death of the organism, "biotic" determination as such is canceled out. The case would parallel on a new plane the true relation of Newtonian mechanics to Einstein's theory of relativity.

To be sure, I have here indicated only a goal, a direction in which our interpretation of the facts of biological existence may profitably move. I have not formulated a specific "biotic" law. Such a formulation cannot be accomplished overnight. The intensive work of specialists in the field is here indispensable. But the task is not impossible of fulfilment. Firmly convinced that the difficulties inherent in the problem—great as they may be—will in time be overcome, I propose, as philosopher, to develop that system of categories within the framework of which the new approach to the facts of organic existence will find deserved and adequate recognition. The development of this system is at least part of the task which I myself cheerfully accept.

Kierkegaard and Sartre

BY

CURTIS W. R. LARSON

CERTAINLY one of the curiosities of philosophy is that one can have two persons start with contradictory presuppositions and yet have a large part of their respective writings express similar points of view. Kierkegaard repeatedly says that his task is to reintroduce Christianity into Christendom. And back of that task lies the assumption of the existence of God, conceived in Christian terms. Sartre, on the other hand, gives a clue to his task when he says, "Existentialism¹ is nothing else than an attempt to draw all the consequences of a coherent atheistic position."²

The first question raised by this assertion is: how is it possible for these fundamental differences to give rise to similar emphases?

It is possible, first of all, because neither Kierkegaard nor Sartre argues his presuppositions. Both agree that their respective starting points are not rationally grounded. This is not to say that either allows that his position is irrational. Rather, they see that no definitive reasons can be given for taking one view or the other; hence, both exist as possibilities between which a man must will some choice.

Secondly, the greater part of what each has to say is to persons who already have taken one or the other of these positions, and their major work is to trace out the implications of a stand previously made. In this respect both of them operate by the customary method of the theologian. Yet neither is unconcerned about those who have chosen differently from themselves. Regarding them, since they hold that reason cannot catapult one out of atheism into theism and vice versa, they search for other means of speaking to them.

¹I shall use the term "existentialism" in this paper, unless specifically otherwise designated, to refer to the French atheistic existentialism exemplified particularly in Jean-Paul Sartre, Simone de Beauvoir, and Albert Camus.

²*Existentialism*, New York, Philosophical Library, 1945 (written), 1947 (pub.), pp. 60-61.

Hence the third reason: each is conducting an evangelism that will *assume* the erring into the fold. This is particularly true of Sartre. He says,

Existentialism isn't so atheistic that it wears itself out showing that God doesn't exist. Rather, it declares that even if God did exist, that would change nothing. There you've got our point of view. Not that we believe that God exists, but we think that his existence is not the issue.³

On the face of it, here is indifference to the question of God's existence. But when you couple this with the frequent assertion that choosing to believe God exists (and so is related to a man's finding meaning for himself) is one way in which men evade the responsibility of constructing values for themselves, then that statement becomes a part of a militant atheism, which, however, works through infiltration and cold warfare.

With Kierkegaard this evangelism is conducted through depicting the frustration and self-destruction that is the end of the man only aesthetically or ethically grounded. Each of them preaches by trying to show that ultimate satisfaction is possible only within the framework each draws.

Now, what about the resemblances and differences? Something of them already has been indicated. A closer examination confirms the first impression that the similarities are primarily in method, mood and tone, rather than content, although there are analogies here too.

Each of them addresses his contemporaries, speaking to a particular historical situation. Although Kierkegaard understands that his work will be better received after he is dead, when the scholars inherit him, this does not alter the fact that he is mainly addressing the then "present age." One of the reasons that he may be appreciated after his death is that his particular criticism is not pointed at posterity, and the later born will be enabled by the falsifying aid of hindsight to second his analysis of Christendom, especially in Denmark in the 1840's and 50's.

³*Existentialism*, p. 61.

The fact that the audiences for which they write are different ones does not alter the fact of this similarity in method. Kierkegaard, himself of the bourgeoisie, writes for the learned who find their intellectual appetite unsatisfied by the soft diet of Christianity and for those sophisticated ones who hasten to buttress it with their reasons. Sartre's particular concern is to reach the proletariat in a secularistic milieu. But neither of them is writing "epistles to be left in the earth."

A distinctive thing about all existentialisms is the mood. They are catalysts, which system, according to Kierkegaard, never could become one of well-articulated content. So here you have Kierkegaard and Sartre akin. Each writes with an urgency uncommon in philosophy but typical of the religious man, if not of theological writings. As Henri Peyré puts it, existentialists are "Puritans after a manner, the repressed or inverted Sunday-school teacher lurks behind them."⁴ The fact that neither puts the mass of his work into philosophical treatises but in aesthetic forms suggests this. For them the unforgivable sin is indifference to life. Kierkegaard constantly charged his contemporaries with a lack of passion. In Sartre's play *Dirty Hands* the dying words of Hoederer are, "What a damn waste!" And this intensity is consonant with, flows from the fact that both of them wish to see changed lives as a result of their works. Neither sought intellectual agreement of others *per se*. Persons, not ideas, are the ends for them. Hence the same Hoederer criticizes Hugo for loving ideas rather than men. Of course, they are not misologists. But reason is only a tool for helping men gouge out significant existence. For both, evil is the offspring of perverted will rather than error.

Thus both of them point to and seek to occupy a middle ground between two extremes, each of which hamstring a human being's maintaining a constantly serious attitude. In Kierkegaard these extremes are the devil-may-care of aestheticism (for example, of a Don Juan) and the too easy solutions of systems, notably the Hegelian.

⁴ *Yale French Studies*, "Existentialism—A Literature of Despair?" I:1, p. 23, Spring-summer, 1948.

For Sartre the two-edged polemic is against the nihilistic irresponsibility embodied particularly in surrealism and the freedom-frustrating machinery of Marxism. If Sartre refuses to offer prayers to God, he also declines to join in a litany to Satan.

And it is just this seriousness, this insistence that life is always in the making, which has led their respective critics to accuse them of pessimism. Christian liberals especially have resented Kierkegaard's conception of faith as a repeated leap, at the antipodes from a step once-for-all taken, bringing one to a stand in which he could rest assured. The Sartrean parallel is the notion that "man must be invented each day."⁵ It is complained that he makes human life unbearably difficult. To be sure, life as he sees it is a difficult course. But it is not impossible for a man to master it.⁶ Sartre vigorously resists the conclusion of Baudelaire that the end of man is futility.

When Earth becomes a dungeon, where the timid bat
Called confidence, against the damp slippery walls
Goes beating his blind wings . . .

And a long line of hearses, with neither dirge nor drums
Begins to cross my soul. Weeping, with steps that lag,
Hope walks in chains; and anguish after long wars becomes
Tyrant at last, and plants on me his inky flag.⁷

This he will not accept as a picture of human destiny.

Both writers have as home base the analysis of the human situation, although for different reasons. Kierkegaard starts there because that is where he can make contact with the persons he wishes to reach. He starts within the parenthesis of human existence in order to show that living within it depends upon facing questions about what lies outside the parenthesis and, as he thinks, constituted it. Thus, his definition of the self in *Sickness Unto Death* as ". . . the conscious synthesis of infinitude [spirit] and finitude [body] which relates itself to itself, whose task is to become itself, a task which can be performed only by means of a relationship to God [who consti-

⁵*What Is Literature?* Philosophical Library, New York, 1949, p. 293.

⁶Cf. Peyré, *op. cit.*, p. 23.

⁷*Flowers of Evil*, tr. by Dillon and Millay, New York, Harper's, 1936, p. 157.

tuted it]”⁸ Sartre, however, starts there because he has no other possibility, because man (and the writer is a man) cannot get out of that parenthesis. His problem as man is to erect meanings and values within that realm.

In this analysis of the human situation both Kierkegaard and the contemporary atheistic existentialists evince a consummate awareness of the extreme variety of qualifications which constitute human life. A part of their task as writers is to alert men to this complexity. It is from the resources of it and from their sympathetic warmth toward persons as such that Kierkegaard and Albert Camus renovate the reputations of Abraham and Caligula respectively. Each of the latter stands as an enigma to the reasoning man. But by blocking in the context of what might have been the conditions and alternatives facing them, Kierkegaard and Camus make the actions of the hero of faith and the beast of Rome not only plausible, but, especially for Caligula, noble. Hence it is possible to assimilate these strangers into the community of men, so that they need no longer rest as undigested lumps in the maw of reason.

For both, the motivation for man's digging into the means for living is the glimpse of the possibility of freedom beside the awareness that one nevertheless acts most often as if controlled by chance or external design. The centrality of the problem of freedom in Sartre is obvious; he constantly speaks of it, and the title of his trilogy *Paths of Freedom* accents that. But with Kierkegaard this is not self-evident. Only as one sees his analysis of the root human problem in *Sickness Unto Death* does one see that man's impetus is the search for freedom.

In relation to their treatment of this area they have been subjected to analogous criticisms. It is said that each buys freedom with irresponsibility. Kierkegaard appears to hide man from the judgment of his fellows behind a shield of faith which may command a teleological suspension of the ethical.⁹ True, faith for Kierkegaard is a rela-

⁸Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1943, p. 44.

⁹See *Fear and Trembling*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1940.

tionship between God and man in which the rationale for the latter's acts may be hidden from anyone else. But this is far from saying he is exempt from scrutiny and can pertly flaunt the reason of mankind! A man may act from purposes open only to him in faith, but one of the prices he must pay for this faith is to accept the fact that he must remain subject to the criticism of men. And the most poignant suffering of the man of faith rests just in this inability to communicate, this loss of community because the most important part of him remains hidden. Kierkegaard makes no claim to extraterritoriality for his strangers. They live amid, partly live by, and suffer under, reason.

When Sartre hears the criticism that according to his conception every man becomes a law unto himself (since each erects his own values), he replies that this indictment can be made only if one ignores three fundamental items of the existentialists. First, a man can be judged by his peers on whether he really wants his own freedom. If he does not, if he sells out to some external agent who will decide for him, then Sartre is ready to call him a coward or stinker.¹⁰ Secondly, one must ask about one's own and others' acts whether they rest upon truth or error. Third, for the existentialist, the freedom of one man cannot be realized apart from the freedom of all men. To will oneself free is to will others so. One of our younger poets expresses the inner attitude of the existentialist man:

Freezings felt, winds and thaw
 In downtown streets the crowd with dissonant aim
 Blown by importunate gusts of need.
 Walking often, often
 After such years I turn

 Turn to no ghost or girl
 No private peace.¹¹

Neither of them offers an easy refuge to tired pilgrims.

What of the differences between the two? Many of these already

¹⁰*Existentialism*, pp. 52-53.

¹¹Ray Smith in *More Hamline Poems*, St. Paul, Hamline, 1938, p. 14.

have been touched, especially the crucial difference in milieu. The other major ones can be summed up through the two terms Sartre uses to describe existentialism. It is, he says, a rationalism and a humanism. Kierkegaard's outlook is in neither of the senses that Sartre uses those terms. It is a rationalism because reason guiding the will is man's only hope in his ambiguous, contingent situation. The foundation stone quarried from his exhaustive reflection is, I act, therefore I am, therefore I am free, and therefore I am what I do. This is solid enough for men to raise meanings and values upon it.

It is not enough for Kierkegaard. To choose between the horns of alternatives each of which by its plausible presence cancels the other's claim to satisfy man's hunger is both arbitrary and futile. One had better suspend both and walk into the arms of absolute paradox, believing that God became man at a particular time and place and therein set the light for man's will.

The existentialists in turn refuse this. If, they say, you have a formidable task in pulling yourself by your bootstraps out of ambiguity into meaning, how much greater, how impossibly greater is the task if man has to pull himself through absurdity into the supernatural. Man has few enough reliable checks on his perception of human existence; how then dare he fly to the supernatural where he has none at all?

And existentialism is humanism. Since God is gone, someone has to make values and facilitate their realization. That is now man's job. There is no pre-fixed telos. This reverses Kierkegaard's view, in which "man's highest perfection is his need of God" in both these respects. The difference is sharply focused in the fact of Sartre's silence about human pride and the rebellion it begets. This motif, found both in the Hebrews and the Greeks (especially in the latter's conception of *hubris*), cannot continue when men are and ought to be gods.

It needs to be constantly emphasized, however, in fairness to the existentialists, as indeed it is by them and their sympathetic interpreters, that this situation is no invitation to irresponsibility. Sartre

and Simone de Beauvoir refer repeatedly to the statement of one of Dostoevski's characters in *The Possessed* (and again in *The Brothers Karamazov*) that if God does not exist, everything is permitted. They insist that the latter does not follow at all. Rather, if God does not exist, then a greater responsibility hangs on man's shoulders. No one can easily forgive him, acts done are irreparable.¹²

What shall one say about these two literatures regarding their adequacy of analysis and expression of human experience? I should like to mention just one basic point on which I find Kierkegaard's analysis the more comprehensive and penetrating. Sartre's picture is one-sidedly heavy. Here man's chief virtue would seem to be plodding doggedness. Man with God's responsibilities becomes not only a dull boy, but, more important, becomes a stranger to the ingenious and resilient creature who bedevils us in the long trek toward peace with history. To insist that men cannot expiate their wrongs is to blink at the fact that they repeatedly act as if they had, and I think that no cry of hypocrisy or illusion can explain away that datum.

This may be said in another way. There is a want of proportion in Sartre that prevents his giving an essentially sound portrayal of man. That he lacks the genius, humor, artistry, virtuosity of Kierkegaard is patent and one ought not to complain of his philosophy because of these. But his ideas themselves, even expressed with the greatest genius, could not yield satisfaction; for by them the extraordinary and the ordinary are mashed together and covered with the dark brown gravy of ambiguity. The existentialists have produced a literature of extreme situations.¹³ Hence all human commerce must be carried on in superlatives, and the result is that language and literature lose their effectiveness as well as veracity. One feels after reading much Sartre as one did on seeing the theater-marquee advertisement of the current feature as "colossal in a big way."

And I see no way of avoiding this result if suffering is just another datum, another opportunity for crucial choice, and if death

¹²*Existentialism*, pp. 26-27. Beauvoir, *Ethics of Ambiguity*, New York, 1948, pp. 15-16.

¹³*Existentialism*, pp. 221-223.

is just the second terminus of a parenthesis—neither the grim specter nor the idyllic, lovely undulating mistress of Walt Whitman.

On the campus these days a bit of jargon refers to the fellow who is absolutely, irretrievably hopeless. He is there and clinging; that is all that can be said for him. Such a one is said to be “strictly from hunger.” It seems to me that the atheistic existentialism of Sartre leaves one with something of this impression of mankind. My criticism here is not that Sartre is pessimistic but that he is inaccurate by reason of emphasis which probably has been straitened by the experience of occupation in France during the recent war. And this too is inevitable on Sartre’s basis of engagement in his particular world. Perhaps, finally, what I wish to say is that his world is not mine, or, so far as I can tell, that of large numbers of other men.

The Antinomy of Poetic Truth

BY

EDITH WATSON SCHIPPER

A POEM, through the rhythmic flow of its sounds, sings an infinite variety of songs, melancholy, meditative, gay, triumphant. It must be heard—at least inwardly—if its meaning, with all its emotional overtones, is felt and understood. For the words of a poem are sounds with tone color, interwoven in a more or less regular rhythmic pattern. Whether or not a poem may be set to music, it has its own verbal music.

Through this verbal music the meaning of the words is brought out and completed. For words, besides being sounds to be heard, have a significance to be understood. They are means of communication, of conveying ideas; and the meaning to be conveyed, to which the sound is subservient, may range over all subject matters, religious, philosophical, moral, cosmological, scientific, whether natural or social. Yet these poetic views are brought home to us and felt with an immediacy which is all their own.

To explain what is meant by poetic views, let us illustrate from Shakespeare's familiar but always lovely song:

Fear no more the heat o' the sun
Nor the furious winter's rages;
Thou thy worldly task hast done,
Home art gone and ta'en thy wages.
Golden lads and girls all must,
As chimney-sweepers, come to dust.

The song holds us; the monosyllabic flow of the mournful vowels through the rhythm which is too light to be quite a dirge, and the finality of the closing couplet all bring home to us the poignant sense of the mortality of men. This insight is there; we feel it in all its sincerity, along with a vivid envisagement of what death frees

us from—burning heat, biting cold, worldly rewards. We feel it all the more deeply as the remaining lines of the poem add their vivid and complete catalog of the cares of life left behind, and come back again with a certain relief to a variant of the final couplet with its reiteration of the inevitable end.

Let us take a more serious and far-reaching example from the same great author, his *Antony and Cleopatra*. Cleopatra is dynamic, magnificent, enchanting, of “fire and air.” We can understand how in Antony’s eyes she was the whole world. But we see her, not only as spirited and scintillating, but also as vain and wilful and blind. We see her, not through the dazzled eyes of Antony, but through the clear eyes of Shakespeare, as an element in the tragic disintegration of herself and the man enthralled by her. We see what Shakespeare meant by the “expense of spirit” wasted by passion, and yet we see what is admirable about the capacity for such feeling. And we who sympathize with the characters and live through their fortunes see and feel the powerful impact of the play as an artistic and dramatic whole, infused with Shakespeare’s views.

As we consider these examples, two conclusions emerge; and they are contradictory. The first is that the insights into life and experience expressed with such suasive immediacy by the poet are true—true in the sense of describing the real laws of life, and of harmonizing and fitting in with what other intellectually acceptable and conceptual systems formulate. (*Conceptual knowledge* will be used in this paper in its broad meaning of the justified and reasoned explanations of the universe contained in our systems of philosophy, cosmology, and natural and social sciences.) With this conceptual truth poetic insights must be a coherent part. They are the poet’s profoundest reflections on experience; and cannot be divorced from views which are systematically worked out. They must be as adequate, harmonious and illuminating as these conceptual views; they cannot be meretricious, shallow, confused, or otherwise false. On their truth depends much of the power and eloquence of the poetry they infuse.

Our second conclusion, contradictory to the first, is that the poet's views are not conceptually true. We have an entirely different attitude toward them from that toward conceptual truth. They are irresistible expressions of the poet's experience, and we are enchanted into accepting them as expressions of our own experience as well. But nowhere are they explained or justified, and their acceptance is not on reasoned grounds. They are neither tested nor measured by conceptual standards. They are not conceptually true.

We find ourselves with what philosophers since Kant have liked to call an antinomy. On one hand, we conclude that poetic insights must be true by conceptual standards, being significant parts of the whole intellectual enterprise of explaining and interpreting experience. But, on the other hand, our analysis has led us to the conclusion that poetic insights are not conceptually true. We seem to have arrived at the intolerable position that poetic insights both are and are not true.

In the hope of resolving this antinomy, let us consider some views of poetic truth. The extreme formalistic view is that poetic truth, though conceptual, is irrelevant to poetry as art. According to this view, the artistic merit of poetry would lie in the verbal music, in the rhythmic pattern of its tones; and any added significance would be information which might be important or interesting but which would be incidental to the poem as art. But to this view we may object that the significance of poetry, itself brought out by the sound of the words, in turn gives them much of their force. Moreover, if the insights contained in poetry are not relevant to it, what place and importance do they have? For they would seem not to be conceptual knowledge. They would therefore be left unexplained. Hence the formalist view will be rejected here.

That literary art, and its most concentrated form, poetry, is not the same as scientific or conceptual knowledge has been agreed on from earliest times. Many differences have been noted, especially the difference in emotional content. But let us stress here the difference suggested above—that of approach. All conceptual knowledge

must be justified. It must be based on sound arguments showing why it is advanced as true. No scientist or philosopher merely states a theory without its verification or reasons for accepting it; such an unjustified theory would be a mere guess or opinion. Rather, a scientific theory must be shown to be consistent with itself and others, and adequately explanatory of the data. Objections to it should be met. Only if it is thus shown to be intellectually acceptable is it called true. On the other hand, poetic insights need not be thus justified. Their complete statement, even, is left to their hearers' imagination. They are vividly presented, in their musical medium, with all their emotional import and force; and this vivid presentation suffices to make them ring "true" to their hearers. But, since they are not argued and justified, they are not true conceptual knowledge.

Since poetry and literature are not philosophy or science, philosophy remains philosophy, no matter how poetic the medium in which it is presented. The verse of *De Rerum Natura* may be artistically polished; yet a complete system of materialism with its arguments is set forth in it, and the poem makes a philosophic rather than a poetic appeal. No matter how dramatic and literary the dialogue of *The Republic*, it is a complete exposition of what Plato envisaged as the nature of social justice, backed by penetrating analysis and precise argumentation. Thus it is generally studied as philosophic knowledge. That it is vivid and dramatic adds to its charm and influence on countless readers, but not to the argued validity of its conclusions. Nor is philosophic knowledge any the less true for having an unappealing and unpolished form. That Aristotle's *Metaphysics* is largely composed of unartfully collected lecture notes does not make the reasoning less thorough, precise, and comprehensive.

Obversely, views which are not systematically set forth and argued—however suggestive and prophetic—are not philosophy. They may be literature, if they come up to its standards. For instance, perhaps much of Nietzsche's flaming and rhythmically expressed thoughts in *Thus Spake Zarathustra* should be classed as more literary

than philosophic. And of course most of our poetry, even Donne's, would not be classified as philosophy.

Some thinkers—notably Schopenhauer, Croce, and Bergson—recognizing that poetic insights are not scientific knowledge, have claimed that the poetic truth which is not scientific is intuitive, and has a profounder significance, penetrating to a reality which cannot be conceptually grasped. But various difficulties with this claim leap to the mind. Can there be an intuitive truth which is not tested by usual intellectual requirements? If so, how do we know it to be true and not false? Moreover, the insights of poetry may approximate any views of experience, philosophic, moral, cosmological, sociological. If these insights should conflict with views which are as reasonably and adequately worked out as possible, which views are to be accepted as true? Or must we abandon logical criteria, and accept both of conflicting views? Because of these difficulties, the theory that poetic truth is intuitive will not be accepted here.

Croce himself includes much in the immediate intuitions of poetry which would seem to overlap with what we might call philosophical views. For instance, he says:

Hence the basis of all poetry is human personality; and, since human personality finds its completion in morality, the basis of all poetry is the moral consciousness. Of course, this does not mean that the artist must be a profound thinker or an acute critic; nor that he must be a pattern of virtue or a hero; but he must have a share in the world of thought and action which will enable him, either in his own person or by sympathy with others, to live the whole drama of human life . . . he must have a keen sense of purity and impurity, righteousness and sin, good and evil. He may not be endowed with great practical courage, . . . but he must feel the dignity of courage.¹

Yet this "sense" of good and evil, for Croce, is not conceptually justified; its conceptual truth is irrelevant to poetry; and the poet need not be "a profound thinker." Hence we are still confronted

¹Croce, article on *Aesthetics*, Encyclopaedia Britannica, 15th ed.

with the difficulty of intuitionism, of how views which overlap with conceptual views need have no grounds of acceptance. If the poetic and conceptual views should clash, which are to be accepted?

Carritt defends the Crocean view by saying that poetic intuitions are significant of or "true to" our feelings, sentiments, and moods when we find them expressed in the feelings expressed by the poet. In this truth to feeling lies the nonconceptual intuition of poetry. But we may question this solution also. For, important though it be that we find the poem an expression of our own feelings, the poem must show these feelings as concerned with situations, and as revealing character. In these feelings must be shown the laws of life and human personality which Croce himself calls the basis of all poetry. These laws are interpreted by the poet in views which overlap those of philosophy and science. It is these insights, and not merely feelings, which are expressed by the poet.

Similar difficulties beset all theories, such as Suzanne Langer's, that poetry is a "language of the emotions" and composes a different kind of knowledge from conceptual knowledge. She explains: "'Artistic truth,' so called, is the truth of a symbol to the forms of feeling—nameless forms, but recognizable when they appear in sensuous replica."² For we demand from poetic views more than a description of our feelings—endless, confused, and blind as they often are—but the laws of their development, of what they can be, and of the character they reveal. And these laws are not divorced from conceptual knowledge.

Our analysis of views of poetic truth still leaves us with our antinomy. On one hand, poetic truth is not the truth of conceptual knowledge. For our attitude toward it, far from being the critical, examining and judging attitude toward scientific knowledge, is one of entering into the work and accepting its viewpoint as an expression of our own experience. On the other hand, poetic truth must also be conceptual. For many of the views expressed in poetry may be elsewhere philosophically or scientifically developed, with their

²*Philosophy in a New Key*, Penguin Books, p. 213.

arguments and reasons. Poetic insights cannot conflict with these conceptual views.

But is there no way in which we examine poetic insights into character and the laws of life and feeling, and judge them to be true? To be sure, we take them to be true in the aesthetic experience; but do we know that we are not deluded by the poet's magic into accepting what is false? Must we be uncritical about what the poet says?

There is, we remember finally, an attitude toward poetry which must be critical. For literary critics, and we as critics judge a poem not only in respect to purely artistic qualities, but also in respect to truth. We as critics judge whether the views illuminate experience, experience of real people; and so we demand that the experience be convincing and conformable to experience as it might occur. We as critics must do what this paper has tried to do in these examples from Shakespeare; we must try to state what the poet himself has not stated and has left to our imagination to complete. We must judge these statements not to be merely subjective or superficial or inapplicable, but to be true and conformable to what is called true by conceptual standards. We must demand that they harmonize with what can be conceptually established—though there, too, are rival views of the universe. Indeed, in some poems, the critic may link the poet's insights with those of Plato or Spinoza or Kant or some other philosopher. The critic must be able to supply the arguments and reasons which the poet himself ignores as foreign to the poem's emotional force.

Moreover, our critical attitude is never wholly divorced from our aesthetic attitude toward a poem. We cannot wholly enter into a poem whose views, so vital to the work, we judge to be false. We are no longer held by a poem which, on later estimation, we see to contain only sentimentalities and insincerities. For we cannot accept what we judge to be meretricious or shallow or inadequate as an interpretation of experience.

Thus, the antinomy of poetic truth is resolved. Poetic insights

should be true conceptually. They do not constitute a different kind of knowledge with its own criteria. They must be assimilable with the other views which constitute our interpretation of the world. And they must be judged intellectually acceptable by us as critics. But the ascertainment of their conceptual fitness is not an intrinsic part of the aesthetic attitude of us who enter into a poem and find it an irresistible expression of our own experience.

Spring

By ENOLA CHAMBERLIN

Nights rush after the turquoise days
On black stallions
Shod with cold.
The modest-appearing violet
Wraps herself in a veil of grass
And sends an imperious messenger of fragrance
To tell us where she is.
Tulips throw calico-colored scarves
Across the earth's breast,
Hiding the scrawny neck of winter
Summer extends a testing finger,
Plunges it into the stream,
The tempting stream of time,
And has it immediately nipped
By frost.

A Freshman's Philosophy

BY

CARL AND MAXINE HAMBURG

EVER SINCE Diogenes gave up his fruitless search for the "one honest man" and, instead, settled down in his famous barrel to search out the "Lives of the Philosophers," many a "history of philosophy" has been written. This is a synthetic *a posteriori* statement, easily confirmed by inspection of private and public libraries. What has escaped detection, however, is the existence of a "secret doctrine," an underground tradition in the writing of "histories of philosophy" which is quite original and distinct from all the many published volumes to which scholars turn for historical reference. True, many a philosopher during the last few centuries has come into shocking contact with sporadic manifestations of this unconventional tradition in his unavoidable acquaintance with students' term papers. Still, a published account of what may be called "Freshman Philosophy" (as contrasted with "Teacher Philosophy") is as yet a desideratum. There is under way at the present time an intensive research project, having as its prime objective the compilation of diligently culled manuscripts (often referred to as "quizzes," "exams," etc.) which will at last bring into the open the secret and popular (*docta vulgaris*) version of the history of philosophy. In the belief that professional philosophers may welcome the opportunity of having an advance idea about what to expect, permission has been granted to this editor to make public for the first time (in this or any other language) a number of selections which may be taken as representative of the more significant areas of disagreement between the professional and the vulgar traditions:

Selections from "History of Future Philosophy" (From Thales to Whitehead), Chapter I. [Note misspellings and grammar.]

Philosophy starts with the Pre-Socratics, although it is doubtful that this term was current among them. While they all came up with different answers, they agreed in that they wanted to reflect on the "common stuff" of the world. Depending on whether they chose water, air, slime, fish, fire, or rivers, we have Anaximander, Anaximenes, Thales, or Herakleitus. Thales, for instance, thought about the moon and thus helped us to tell correct time and therefore was often referred to as one of the Seven Wonders. (The remaining six are largely architecture, not the other Pre-Socratics) Anaximander was a member of the Miletian School (at Milet, Italy—but he was a Greek philosopher) and a follower of Thales who is famed for having maintained that "All is wet" which, with qualifications, has struck a responsive chord with many people. Having a logical head on his shoulders, Anaximander immediately perceived that, if this is so, then man must come from the fish. This idea had an enormous influence ever since Charles Darwin, the founder of Evolution, said that this was so. The evolutionary idea really was a revolutionary idea and overthrew the old class-system which had been deeply ingrained since Aristotle. He was followed by Herakleitus who, unlike many lesser thinkers, *is* famous for his obscurity. Diogenes called him "the deep one from Ephesus" (that is where he lived). Herakleitus was obsessed with rivers. Among his deep sayings: "The wet soul cannot step twice into the same river," a statement upon which more recent philosophers have enlarged by insisting that one cannot even step once into the same river. Interpretations have differed as to whether this is a realization of the "never-sameness" of the ever-changing river or the inadvisability of stepping into it even once.

Opposed to Herakleitus was the great Parmenides whose fragments have mostly been lost. He was not so deep, but his belief that all existing beings think and all thoughts exist vice versa, is also obscure. Obviously, there are objections and exceptions to the "being is thinking" rule! He preferred the metaphor of an indivisible, all-containing "ball" to Herakleitus' "river" metaphor. Anyway, for Parmenides change is not real because—he says in a fragment

which is not preserved—one cannot think about it. Yet, if he had not thought about it, how could he know that it was not real? His views were defended by Zeno who is famous even today for his oft-quoted parodies of the arrow and the tortoise. But this does not belong to philosophy. The Pythagoreans also do not really belong to philosophy because they are renowned for several very interesting theorems which nowadays are studies in mathematics classes. Russell is impressed by the fact that they did not like beans: philosophically it is perhaps more important that to them numbers are the key to reality; everything had a number and the wise man was he who had everything's number. This idea is still alive in popular conception for which to "get somebody's number" means "to know."

After the Pre-Socratic philosophers (and just before the Post-Socratics) comes Socrates whose mother was a midwife. His ambition was to be the same thing to young men and help them to give birth to their ideas. He also calls himself a "gadfly" because without his "sting" (which refers to his ironical questions) his disputants could not be delivered of their intellectual fruit. Paradoxically, Socrates is famous because he did not know anything—but this did not keep him from talking to everybody on the marketplace. His wife, the well-known Xantippe, was not too happy about all this, but Socrates did not spend much time at home, probably to escape many unnecessary dialogues with her. While Socrates was condemned for the seduction of young men in Athens by his contemporaries, posterity praises him for having invented and practiced induction, which is going from one individual to another. He is credited with the "Knowledge is Virtue" equation, which can mean many things: either that it is good to know or that knowing itself is the highest good. This Aristotle believed. But it could also mean: knowing the good is doing the good—which is palpably wrong; or again: to do the good one must know the good. If this is what he meant, he may be right but Plato also is right for reproaching him that he did not tell us exactly what we must know in order to do the good. It's all very confusing; still, Socrates was honest—he said he did not know!

This brings us up to Plato who, some historians say, did not exist. But his "Dialogues" do exist which he named after well-known Sophists of his time, even though he was against them. The "Dialogues" have a high literary value because they abound in stories and myths, particularly in passages where Socrates (through whose mouth Plato writes) is pressed for an answer to the important problems he raises. Among his most famous myths is the "Great Beast (the public) in the Cave" and others. Plato is most famous for his "Republic," which also did not exist, and his "Dogma of the Ideas." The "Republic" is the idyll of a just society in which nobody has anything to say but very few guards (the philosophical kings) who live in a communistic way. They take residence at some distance from the rest of the normal people who do not have to share their wives and valuables. Plato's "ideas" are called forms, which distinguishes them from Berkeley's subjective "ideas." Forms are objective ideas that are not in anybody's mind. Since Plato wrote more than any previous philosopher, his pupil Aristotle took twenty years to study him and consequently was known as "the great reader." He educated Alexander the Great who later proceeded to conquer all of the known, and much of the then unknown world, and died very young. Aristotle opposed Plato's "dogma of the ideas" which he called "universals." In his "Metaphysics" (so-called because it comes before the book called "Physics," as being more "universal") he was very particular about universals, of which he distinguished two kinds: those of first intention (Callias) and those of second intention (man). His chief intention was to bring Plato's "ideas" out of their transcendent heaven and back to concrete existence in which we encounter them as "substances" (first intention). For Aristotle everything was either actual or potential—which has as a rule been admitted ever since. Aristotle also distinguished between a mortal and an immortal part of the soul. The mortal part involved the vegetable—and animal-body—and therefore had to perish; the immortal part was always alive and Aristotle was more interested in its survival.

Between the Greeks and modern philosophy are the Middle

Ages or Dark Ages which lasted for over a thousand years and were also known as the "age of faith." This was not time for great philosophers even though there were some famous Patristic and Scholastic philosophers. They were either realists or nominalists with respect to Aristotle's "universals" but, as Whitehead says, they all followed the "footprints of Plato." Between the end of the dark ages and the beginning of the light, modern age stood William of Occam, a nominalist, who maintained "unnecessary things should not be multiplied without necessity," a motto about which the famous Malthus had his own ideas and which some modern philosophers take very seriously. But Occam was mainly concerned with "apparitiones" (the appearance of things). He is famous for his invention of the "Occam razor" which he is said to have used in protest against the multiplication of unnecessary hair-splitting (of the Scholastics).

Modern philosophy really starts with Renée Descartes who, dissatisfied with what he could learn at school, went to Paris and other countries to "study the great book of life." Since in those times (like in ours) this spelled mostly troubles and war, he soon went back to books of mathematics which he read avidly. He said he got the inspiration for his reasonable, deductive method while sitting in a big stove in Bavaria. He is uncontestably the "father of modern philosophy" (*le père de la philosophie moderne*) because of two things: for one, he was a very doubtful man who did not like to take things on authority, and also because he thought that there was not any more knowledge in any science than there was mathematics in it. Actually these two beliefs hang together because Descartes thinks that certainty comes only at the end of consistent doubting. In his "Meditations," Descartes, as has been said, begins by doubting everything and ends up believing even more. This is no contradiction because he finds that he cannot doubt that he doubts—ergo: he exists and therefore everything that is just as clear to him as his own existence must also exist: that includes God and all the ideas that He put into his head. But that does not seem so modern. Descartes' philosophy is dualistic—for him the world has two aspects, one is intensive (like thinking and doubting) and the other is expensive

(like the things out in space). Science is only about space or mathematical. This is modern.

Descartes influenced Spinoza who lived in Holland in the seventeenth century, and offended religious groups of all faiths. He was called an "intoxicated man" even though it was only with God. He was a lens-grinder who was constantly trying to see things "under the aspect of eternity." But his business was very poor and so he lived mainly on contributions by his admiring friends. Very early in life, Spinoza became opposed to theology. He said "a rolling stone does not know where it falls" which went against the teleological beliefs of his time. Because of this, he was excommunicated by the teleologists. He is most famous for his "Ethics" which deals largely with other matters such as substance which he also calls "Deus" or "Sive" or "Natura" and which he opposed to Descartes' two substances. To Spinoza, extension and intention, space and thinking are not substantial but only different aspects of eternity.

Of the sensationalist tradition, we mention only Bishop Berkeley who (like his countrymen Bacon and Locke) disagreed with lens-grinder Spinoza's rationalism and instead came up with his own "Theory of Vision" of which nobody, however, seems to have taken any notice until he destroyed matter in his "Principles." Being a bishop, Berkeley was not as intoxicated with God as Spinoza, but he too thought that everything existed in God's or his own mind. Berkeley was the first philosopher to make a trip to America. He was convinced that things began to disappear every time he turned around—which got some of his friends quite angry; among them was Dr. Johnson who got mad enough at this nonsense to kick stones around. But this proved nothing to Berkeley who stoutheartedly kept asking Johnson how he knew about stones unless he kicked them. The being (of stones), in other words, depends upon (kicking) perceptions. Hence the famous sensational equation: "esse est perkicki."

The hot arguments between rationalists and sensationalists were reconciled by the great Immanuel Kant who was born and died in

Koenigsberg, Prussia. His early interests were in physics and astronomy and even though many credit him with the "Copernican Revolution," his fame was made by *Die Kritik der reinen Vernunft* which was written in German and is conceded by non-German philosophers to be very difficult to read. There is agreement, however, in that Kant agrees both with thinkers of the Descartes type and with thinkers of the Berkeley type; but he is very categorical about the possibility of all *Erfahrung* depending upon both *Vorstellungen* and *Verstandesformen*, unified in the *transcendentalen Einheitsfunktion der reinen Apperzeption*. He also discovered the "synthetic judgment (*a priori*) *a posteriori*," which means that we know objects only *after* we experience them. His "synthetic object" is considered by philosophers to be more useful than the "thing in itself."

Among the contemporary philosophers, A. North Whitehead is usually listed to be the greatest, even though he died several years ago. He is an Englishman whose mind took a philosophical turn once he came to America, already an old man. In his book *Process and Reality*, he raised eternal objections against the vicious bifurcation of nature. These eternal objectives affect nature in a most ingressive manner. Otherwise, Whitehead is not aggressive at all; he agrees with almost all the philosophers on one point or other, except perhaps with the Frenchman Descartes who started this whole bifurcation. Whitehead, like most philosophers since Kant (and, of course, Herakleitus) is very difficult to understand. He is against all kinds of simplifications as, for instance, "simple location" which, while obvious to us all, is palpably false to him, namely, that things should only be where they are. No, says Whitehead, they are exactly where they are not, *i.e.*, wherever anything or anybody else is who can perceive them. This is puzzling but true. Anyway, for Whitehead "life" is a more profound aspect of reality than the "unfeeling bodies" of Descartes and Newton. His is an orgiastic philosophy. As Gertrude Stein said: "Only a genius could have conceived it."

Mythos and Ethos

BY

DONALD HEINEY

TO THE MODERN MIND there is a curious childishness about Greek mythology. The idea of divinity is firmly fixed in our minds to the concept of good and evil, and we are accustomed to think of religious narrative as a source of moral allegory. The story of the sacrifice of Isaac or the parable of the Good Samaritan are more than narrative; their purpose is to instruct and ennoble rather than to entertain. This moral content is often disconcertingly absent in Greek mythology. When Narcissus is changed into a flower we do not conclude that it is dangerous and unwise to gaze into pools, nor are we made particularly conscious of the evils of self-admiration. When Theseus slays the Minotaur he does so because he happens to have the right equipment at hand, and not because his victory represents a triumph of virtue over vice. In the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* the Olympians are as petty, as immoral, and as quarrelsome as the mortals; in fact the squabbles of the gods often serve as comic relief to the more serious conflicts of men. In the fourteenth book of the *Iliad*, Hera distracts her husband Zeus with a love potion while her confederate Poseidon seizes the occasion to inflict harm on the Trojan army. When Zeus awakens and discovers the deception, he threatens to hang Hera up by the heels to punish her as he has done on a previous occasion. In the same poem Ares, pierced by the spear of Diomedes, runs off bellowing "as if nine or ten thousand men should simultaneously raise their battle-cry." This is humorous to us, and presumably it was so to the Greeks. But it is difficult to see what it has to do with divinity, or what moral conclusion we can draw from it. It is pure story and nothing more, and it might just as easily have happened to Tyl Eulenspiegel or Paul Bunyan.

It is difficult to fit these japeries into the noble picture generally presented of Greek culture; but we must first of all remember that the Greeks were a highly literary people who thought and created in literary terms. At this Homeric stage in their culture they were suspicious of abstractions; they preferred to represent the forces of nature as anthropomorphic gods. Their polytheism sprang, not from any basic childishness in their culture, but from their deeply rooted literary temperament. To them the forces of the sea, the recurrence of spring, the exhilaration of wine, or the exigency of human passion were beings about whom tales could be related, beings who loved, quarreled, created, and destroyed like the men in whose image they were made. A literary theology is necessarily a polytheistic theology; a Good whose will is inexorable and unopposed makes fine metaphysics but dull story-telling. Consequently the genealogy of the gods, first conceived as an explanation of nature, became in time a literary storehouse from which endless tales could be drawn for the entertainment and delight of humanity.

This literary theology, however, involved the Greeks in a curious philosophical predicament. The gods, deprived of their transcendent qualities, became mere superhumans, and could no longer serve as moral abstractions. In gaining personality they had lost sublimity. Greek theology, therefore, at some unknown point in its evolution began to split into two systems which we may call mythology and metaphysics. The first of these systems became successively more anthropomorphic until it reached the height of irreverence in the comedies of Aristophanes, and the second grew in profundity until it found its highest expression in the Attic tragedy of the fifth century. The fact that these two systems were distinct, that the Greeks themselves thought of them in separate terms, is often misunderstood in our own age; but this concept is essential to a comprehension of the meaning of Attic tragedy.

The dichotomy is already apparent at the opening of the fifth century. Pindar pays lip service to the official polytheism, but his cosmology is essentially a monotheistic one; he gives Zeus a pre-

dominance far surpassing the other gods, and he uses the term *Theos* in the singular. "Whatsoever purpose God conceives he accomplishes; none his intent may defy." He takes a skeptical and quite modern attitude toward the alleged anthropomorphic qualities of the Olympians:

One God there is, greatest of gods and mortals,
Not like to men in body or in mind.
All of him sees and hears and thinks.
We men have made our gods in our own image.
I think that horses, lions, oxen too,
Had they but hands, would make their gods like them.
Horse-gods for horses, oxen-gods for oxen.

He vehemently denies the "slander," as he calls it, that Tantalus induced the gods to eat the flesh of his own son; this superstition is incompatible with the exalted view he holds of divinity. He regards Homer's mountebank Olympians with skepticism, if not with horror. "Now do I believe," he says, "that the sweet words of Homer make great beyond the fact the story of Odysseus. . . . His art deceives us," When he occasionally makes use of polytheistic concepts, he does it for a metaphorical or allegorical effect; he is fond of saying that an unhappy lover is "disowned, dishonoured, and denied by Aphrodite," or that the hands of Artemis have guided the feet of racing horses to victory. The metaphor over, however, he returns to the metaphysical level. The Second Pythian ode ends with an admonition not to strive against God, "who exalts at his pleasure now one, now sets another on high," but to seek after righteousness and accept the destiny granted by the divine will.

It is in the tragedies of Aeschylus and Sophocles that the highest expression of this ethic is to be found. Again we must be careful to distinguish between the mythology, the theological *dramatis personae* of the tragedy, and the higher metaphysics around which the ethical message is constructed. When Sophocles speaks of "this fierce Ares, who, not now with brazen shields but with the blasting of his fiery breath, wakes worse than din of battle in our midst," he is ob-

viously using Ares as a personification of calamity; the meaning is allegorical rather than metaphysical. Aeschylus, describing the signal fires which carried the news of Troy's defeat to Argos, says, "From Ida's top Hephaestus, lord of fire, sent forth his sign." We are not to conclude from this that Aeschylus thinks the fires have been lighted by any act of divine will, but merely that fire, personified as the fire-god, has served as a convenient means of communication. This is the same sort of nature metaphor used by the modern poet when he tells us that the hounds of spring are on winter's traces, or that the sea is hungry for the bones of sailors. It would be a grave mistake to imagine that Aeschylus believes in the real existence of this primitive polytheism. Lest the matter remain in doubt, he makes his viewpoint clear in the first choral ode of the *Agamemnon*:

Zeus—if to The Unknown
That name of many names seems good—
Zeus, upon Thee I call.
Through the mind's every road
I passed, but vain are all,
Save that which names thee Zeus, the Highest One.

This passage sounds curiously familiar. "Ye men of Athens," said St. Paul, "I perceive that in all things ye are too superstitious, for as I passed by and beheld your devotions I found an altar with this inscription, *To the Unknown God*." The Greeks were reluctant to personify the primal Force of the universe; Aeschylus, in the passage quoted above, rather apologetically names him "Zeus." We must not be influenced by the superficial and purely literary polytheism of the tragedy to imagine that a higher metaphysics is not present.

Once the distinction between mythology and metaphysics is established, it helps to explain a great deal which has before seemed mysterious. Why is Agamemnon wrong in sacrificing his daughter in accordance with a divine command? Why is Orestes guilty of the murder of his father, when this murder was committed at the express instigation of Apollo? What crime has Oedipus committed to merit such a ghastly divine vengeance, and why is Antigone punished for

undertaking what is apparently a pious and commendable burial? In each case the answer is that these persons have observed the formalities of conventional religion, as they conceived them, but in doing so have nevertheless come into conflict with the higher moral order of the universe.

Let us take the case of Orestes as he is portrayed in the tragic cycle of Aeschylus. Reluctant at first to revenge the murder of his father, he is finally urged by an oracle of Apollo to kill Aegisthus and Clytemnestra, and he does so in the sincere conviction that his act is justified. "In this deed does Loxias bear part," he argues reasonably. But the Furies who pursue him in the *Eumenides* do not accept this plea; they maintain that Orestes, in obeying the criminal command of Apollo, has transgressed against a higher and more fundamental moral order. His ignorance of this higher law is no excuse. Every human being is responsible for his acts no matter what his mental condition at the time, or what coercion has been brought to bear upon him. The modern soldier who is called upon to kill his fellow man would like to think, "I have been ordered by my nation to take up arms, and the blood is not on my hands. Since my free will is suspended, I am no longer responsible for my acts." But this is only a legal justification; in the metaphysical sense the soldier has violated the ultimate moral order just as surely as if he had committed a deliberate and premeditated murder. Orestes has not acted under conditions of philosophical freedom, but he must accept the responsibility for his act. He is horribly tormented by the Furies; he flees to Delphi and is released from his torment only after Apollo has confessed his part in the crime and Athena has appealed to the higher level of divinity for remission of the blood-guilt.

The transgression of Antigone is similar. She is from the beginning motivated by loyalty and piety; she throws her handful of earth over the corpse of Polynices out of a sincere desire to carry out the rites of religion. "What law of heaven have I transgressed?" she asks. "Why should I, hapless one, look to the gods any more, what ally should I invoke, when by piety I have earned the name of im-

pious?" The sin of Antigone is not an external and physical crime as in the case of Orestes; it is a sin of attitude. Antigone, like Orestes, has fulfilled the exigencies of conventional religion and in doing so has firmly believed herself to be carrying out the will of God, but she has nevertheless violated a higher moral law. And what is this law? Her guilt lies, not in her act, but in her wanton and fanatic zeal. The chorus tells her, "You have rushed forward to the utmost verge of daring; and against that throne where Justice sits on high you have fallen, my daughter, with a grievous fall. . . . Your self-willed temper has wrought your ruin." To understand the guilt of both Antigone and Orestes we must go beyond the mere physical act which served as its outward manifestation. The essence of this guilt is *hybris*, an excessive and fanatic self-confidence, an arrogance which leads them to imagine that their will is equivalent to the will of God. The chorus in the *Eumenides*, using the monotheistic *Theos*, argues that any deviation from the golden mean is displeasing to God:

Praise not, O man, the life beyond control,
Nor that which bows unto a tyrant's sway.
Know that the middle way
Is dearest to God, and they thereon who wend,
They shall achieve the end;
But they who wander or to left or right
Are sinners in His sight.
Take to thy heart this one, this soothfast word—
Of wantonness impiety is sire;
Only from calm control and sanity unstirred
Cometh true weal, the goal of every man's desire.

Moderation to the Greeks meant not only temperance in living habits, but moderation in zeal, in ambition, in confidence, moderation in piety itself. The piety of Antigone, which threatened to destroy the tranquillity of the state, was no piety to Sophocles. It is true that he has little sympathy with the opportunism of Creon, or with the doctrine of expediency which Creon offers in opposition to Antigone's idealism. But Antigone is the protagonist of the drama, and in the end it is Antigone who stands condemned of *hybris*. What

she wanted was commendable, but she wanted it too passionately and savagely.

The metaphysical content of Greek tragedy, essentially monotheistic and ethical, is in many respects comparable to the ethical element in Christianity. In each case the problem of evil is presented in the same form. Man, living in a state of freedom, is led into sin because he capitulates to the impulses of nature: "the desires of the flesh" in the case of Christianity, and the intervention of the nature-gods in the case of the Greeks. Instead of submitting to the higher moral order—the will of God, in the Christian vernacular—the sinner is distracted by what he believes to be an imperative command of a lower form of nature. Paolo and Francesca, unwittingly obeying the call of love which condemned them to eternal suffering in Dante's *Inferno*, are equivalent to Orestes blindly carrying out the command of Apollo which he believed to be the will of the highest divinity. In each case the sinner has obeyed a finite compulsion and in doing so has broken an infinite moral law. The concept that *hybris* leads to *nemesis* is precisely equivalent to the statement that the wages of sin are death.

In the process of the remission of sin, however, Christianity and the Greek tragedy differ fundamentally. To the Greeks the blood-curse which poisoned a family through the generations could be removed only by individual suffering; Antigone is told by the chorus that her ordeal will pay for her father's sin. It is not through any mystical or transcendent process of expiation that suffering removes sin; it is rather that suffering brings wisdom, and from wisdom comes *sophrosyne*, the equilibrium, moderation, and restraint which are the opposite of *hybris*. The chorus in the *Agamemnon* remarks, "It was Zeus who set man on the path to thought and wisdom, and fixed with full authority the law that man shall learn through suffering." Each human being is responsible for his transgressions, deliberate or not, and each human being must bear his allotted portion of punishment. Oedipus, in his rash and unwitting *hybris*, commits a sin of a ghastly magnitude, and is treated to an ordeal of suffering such as few men

have survived; nevertheless the taint is transmitted to Antigone, where it takes the form of a *hybris* in every way similar to that of Oedipus. Although Antigone acquires this taint through her heredity and not through any conscious act on her part, it is none the less fatal to her moral balance; her fanatic piety leads her into the same abyss of catastrophe as her father. In the end neither Oedipus nor Antigone has committed a consciously sinful act, but each has violated the divine order and paid for it in full.

It is the distinctive feature of Christianity that, although it retains the doctrine that sin produces suffering, it offers a transcendent and various means of expiating this suffering. The doctrine of the Atonement interjects a new factor into the problem of evil; the suffering which proceeds from human sin is remitted in advance by an infinite and divine suffering, and the individual sinner need only place his destiny in the hands of God. In the end this has the effect of making the Christian dependent upon God, where the Greek hero was dependent only upon himself. The hero of Greek tragedy was infinitely responsible for his own acts; there was no escape from the inevitable blow of *nemesis*. It was futile for the hero of tragedy to cry, "Lord, forgive me, for I loved much," or "Forgive me, for I did not know." His sin was on his head, and he could only accept his punishment with whatever dignity he was able to muster. "Lead me from the land, friends, lead me hence," says Oedipus, "the utterly lost, the thrice accursed, yea, the mortal most abhorred of heaven!" The man to whom hope is denied finds his only consolation in acceptance.

Notes and Discussions

LIKES LIPPINCOTT'S ARTICLES

Under date of December 10, Dr. Daniel A. Poling, editor of the *Christian Herald*, writes:

Mr. dear Dr. Flewelling:

Through the thoughtfulness of a friend, I had placed in my hands recently "Stace and the Cosmic Darkness" and "Stace—Revealing Admissions," articles appearing in the two issues of *The Personalist*, Summer and Fall of 1953.

These are impressive and perhaps unique articles and I wish to express my appreciation to you for carrying them. I have shared them with my editorial associates here.

With every good wish,

Sincerely,

Daniel A. Poling

* * *

JAMES D. PHELAN AWARDS IN LITERATURE AND ART

The awards competition for native Californians between the ages of twenty and forty provides three prizes of \$500, \$400, and \$300, respectively, to writers of biography. Applicants must submit a book, or chapters from a book they are writing. Competition closes March 15, 1954. Applications and information may be obtained from the James D. Phelan Award in Literature and Art, 629 Phelan Building, San Francisco 2.

Along the Bookshelf

STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY

STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY. REINHOLD FRIEDRICH ALFRED HOERNLÉ. Edited and with a Memoir by *Daniel S. Robinson*. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1952. pp. xvii-333. \$5.00.

The publication of any book that gives fresh assurance of idealism must always be a welcome event. If, moreover, the presentation of the technical aspects of the doctrine are set forth with lucidness and humbleness, the publication must be doubly welcome. Such is the case with Hoernlé's *Studies in Philosophy*, edited with tender regard and a masterly touch by Dr. Daniel S. Robinson, director of the School of Philosophy of the University of Southern California.

The brief but sagely written memoir by Dr. Robinson, who sat at Hoernlé's feet at Harvard, is a fitting cadre for a philosopher who seems to have distilled the best of German and English scholarship, learned the art of limpid discourse from America, and used his African sojourn to perfect the largeness of his vision.

There are two parts to these studies, all of them clustering around the central theme of truth and reality, one consisting of essays hitherto unpublished, the other of nine already published in journal literature, all deftly arranged by the editor and provided with a good index. We are glad for the chance to reread some of these essays for strength in allaying misconceptions about the Absolute current since William James with his quixotic charge of staleness and blockishness. Hoernlé exhibits the Absolute in these pages as revealing itself in error as in doubt and truth, in mind equally with "matter," and certainly no less in persons also, though pluralists may chide him for such overweening generosity.

But let us turn to the group of essays new to us all, "Theory of Knowledge," "Truth and Error," "Fact and Value," "Knowledge and Faith," the notes on Truth, the meanings of "mind," the philosophy of language, the expert discussions of the correspondence and coherence theories of Truth, and the theory of error in Bertrand Russell's *Problems of Philosophy*.

Hoernlé's observations will doubtless retain their value though discussions have recently taken some novel turns. What must evoke admiration in the reader is the utter candor of the author about his own indebtedness, his refusal to claim originality for restatements of what his teachers, Kant, Hegel, Bradley, Bosanquet, and Royce, have taught him, his deference when the problem becomes temporarily unsolvable. I doubt whether the *veritas norma sui et falsi* has ever been intoned with such winning piousness; I doubt whether philosophy can be more intimately wedded to science than in "the self-correcting nature of knowing as the self-revelation of the universe." There is

inspiration here for knowledge as well as faith and good works in the bosom of the universe. There is room here for unending tasks, since the facets of "sets" (*Einstellungen*) are inexhaustible. The plea is for insight, always, instead of mere definition, for a world organized by judgment rather than one compounded by data of sense and feeling.

The production of the book, written as it was in part on the Dark Continent, printed in Great Britain, aided by the Herbert Wildon Carr Fund of the University of Southern California, and bearing the imprint of Harvard University Press, is symbolic of the work of Hoernlé which ranged over wide geographic areas but was ever mindful of its synoptic sweep. Dr. Robinson, in his editorship, has here performed a multiple task of rounding out the life work of his esteemed teacher, clarifying once again the relative claims of realists, neo-realists, and idealists, and presenting afresh idealism in a strongly entrenched position. Wherever truth, error, knowledge, and mind are discussed, this book should and must be available for reference.

Mary Washington College of the
University of Virginia

KURT F. LEIDECKER

NEW WAYS OF ONTOLOGY. By Nicolai Hartmann. Henry Regnery Co., Chicago, 1952. pp. 145. \$4.00.

The new ontology, says Nicolai Hartmann, avoids two extremes: neither is it materialism, nor does it put the Absolute at the foundation of the world which would lead "to the mere fanciful construction of a *Weltanschauung*" and would resolve all problems. It relies on experience and radically discards "the speculative metaphysical component of the old ontology" (23); it does not contain "an imaginative belief in immortality" (25); it rejects the doctrine of universals as substantial forms which would make teleological even the processes of inorganic nature.

Hartmann accepts the doctrine of emergent evolution. He finds in the world four strata of being: inorganic nature, organisms, psychical processes, and spiritual processes. The stratum of spiritual processes is higher than personal psychical life; it is an impersonal objective spirit which consists of historical processes, of processes of speech, legal order, custom, morality, and science.

Ontology investigates the categories of every stratum. Thus, for example, the specific categories of the stratum of the organic form are "metabolism, assimilation, automatic regulation, and reproduction of individuals." The higher strata rest on the lower ones, but each has its own categories peculiar to itself; thanks to these categories each stratum is autonomous and possesses a certain degree of freedom in relation to the lower strata.

The higher strata cannot exist without the lower strata; the lower strata "are the stronger ones. Strength and height in the order of strata stand in an inverse relationship." (87) This doctrine was elaborated by Hartmann in detail in his most valuable work *Ethik*. Since Hartmann rejects the existence of the Absolute, he thinks that the law of the frailty of the higher strata cannot

be overcome. Therefore, his ontology does not contain the idea of absolute perfection, such as the Kingdom of God. He considers materialism as being nearer to the truth than a philosophy which puts the Absolute at the basis of the world. Here is revealed the fundamental defect of Hartmann's ontology. Emergent evolution is inexplicable unless the world is created by the Supramundane Being, which puts even at the basis of the inorganic nature a creative power capable of raising nature to ever more valuable strata of being.

Hartmann's epistemology is the source of the defects of his new ontology. He tries to overcome Kant's phenomenalism by pointing out that "knowledge is a relation between consciousness and its object," and regards its object "as existing independently of its being known" (135) The possibility of such a knowledge he explains not by the doctrine of immediate perception of the external world, but by the affirmation that some of the categories of knowledge correspond to the categories of being, and this correspondence of knowledge to being is "progressively confirmed in experience and in the practice of life." (140) Religious experience has no place in this epistemology. The ontology connected with this theory of knowledge is bound to follow in the ways of those "scientists" who reject the supernatural principles. Therefore, the new ontology of Hartmann is the old ontology of naturalism.

N. LOSSKY

TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF HUMAN JUDGMENT. By *Justus Buchler*. Columbia University Press, N. Y., 1951. pp. 176. \$2.75.

One of the philosophical devils, perhaps the greatest, is the temptation to oversimplification. If, as Professor Buchler asserts in this very readable essay, man cannot escape from perspective, nevertheless truth, so far as he can conceive it, must be won by the whole man in a community of men, responding both integrally and critically to the entire wealth of cultural as well as scientific heritage. Fracturing of the concrete self, and its integral reaction to its world, began when Platonism, particularly in the Lyceum, split the primitive Greek notion of mind into two disparate parts. The attempt to put it together again, and thus restore the concrete man to his concrete world, is thwarted in English-speaking countries by the paucity and perversity of linguistic resources. "Intelligence" and "mind" still suggest for us a self divided into theoretical and practical, spectator and actor, truth-seeker and value-seeker, impersonal knower and personal agent; and no word is available for the mind as an organic whole which expresses itself in the complete circle of significant meaning which we pervert by the distinctions of thinking, feeling, and volition. How easy it is for us to dichotomize cognition, on the one hand, and the "motor-affective life," on the other. Professor Buchler's essay is a protest against this divisive and simplifying tradition and to give point to the problem, he introduces the neologism "proception," which he defines as a process of "the interplay of the human individual's activities and dimensions, their unitary direction." The person or self, in brief, is an organic unity with an underlying direction of adventure of appropriation; a dynamic process of "a moving

union of seeking and receiving, of forward propulsion and patient absorption." (4) In terms of this concept, it is argued, a clarification and more authentic understanding is needed "of such phenomena as symbolism and language, meaning and representation, communication and method." (vii) The present essay is a propaedeutic to such an undertaking. The judgment, from this standpoint, becomes coterminous with the entire process of conscious life whether of making, doing, or saying (and, we might add, feeling). Every judgment, so we are told, is a pronouncement, and may be assertive; consequently, no sharp line of significance can be drawn between judgments that are assertive and those that are active or exhibitiv. It follows, although the author does not make the point, that judgments are self-judgments, a confession, whether secret or public, of what the person is. The author does, however, acknowledge the role of decision and faith that permeates man's cognitive as well as ethical career. It is stultifying, he points out, to overlook or minimize the operation of predilection or choice in judgment, and it is declared that "faith, in some minimal sense, is part of all query and all validation—even the surest and most advanced like pure mathematics. Faith, whatever its species, is relative confidence in what is unknown or unavailable—belief that a judgment beyond the pale of present validation . . . is valid." (165) This essay, incidentally, is a piece of fine writing.

WILBUR LONG

WAY TO WISDOM. By *Karl Jaspers*. Yale University Press, New Haven, 1951. pp. v-208. \$3.00.

Way to Wisdom originated in a series of radio talks, and in its present form is a greatly condensed and popularized introduction to philosophy. It seeks to clarify for the general reader such questions as: What is Philosophy?; Sources of Philosophy; The Idea of God: The World; The Philosophic Life; etc. Philosophy is defined as "the principle of concentration through which man becomes himself; by partaking of reality." (14) Philosophy has as its source man's wonderment, his doubt of his knowledge, and his sense of forsakenness. Today these are inadequate since communication between men has failed and tension is the result. The source of philosophy today then must be the "will to authenticate communication." The author is continually aware that his language and his concepts are beyond the comprehension of his reader as he will state some proposition and then say, "What does this mean?" Sometimes he is able to clarify, but again he admits paradox and mystery. The "comprehensive" is a favorite term which he uses for that which is manifested in the dichotomy of subject and object, but which is never an object for consciousness. "The Comprehensive conceived as being itself is called transcendence (God) and the world, while that which ourselves are is called being-there, consciousness, mind, and existence." (33) Several methodological consequences flow from this concept, among them the meaning of mysticism; a better understanding of the great metaphysical systems as symbols of being, and the consciousness of the discontinuity of our philosophical thinking.

The most important philosophical principles are not objects for knowl-

edge. God is such. There are unconditional imperatives but they have their source in us and are not imposed from external authority, neither can they be proved, for what we can know is always conditional. Strong protests are often registered against authority of all kinds, especially those which reject science and enlightenment in the interest of revealed faith, yet it is equally clear that science alone cannot know the truth nor reach being. As the premises of science come from the world by sense experience so the premises of faith come from the historical tradition and are guides to the authentic premises. Principles of philosophic faith do not communicate a content since none of them imply an absolute object; they are symbols of an infinity becoming concrete. The author seeks for a view of history which is universal. The "axial age" which he chooses is between 800 to 200 B.C., a period which includes a set of circumstances significant for all men—not alone for Christianity. He fights for the independence of man and the freedom of individuality but recognizes that independence in an absolute sense is impossible. Philosophy is a school of independence, not its possession.

HERBERT L. SEARLES

IDEAS, GENERAL INTRODUCTION TO PURE PHENOMONOLOGY. By *Edmund Husserl*. Macmillan Co., N. Y., 1952. pp. 465. \$4.50.

It is perhaps no mere coincidence that Phenomenology, stemming from Brentano, was a product of the Vienna school which gave us Machian positivism. While these two movements retrace to different sources—the former to Kant and Descartes, the latter to Hume and Hobbes—they are, nevertheless, opposite faces of a single shield. Both were the inspiration of science—the former, arithmetic and geometry; the latter, physics and psychology—and both sought to rediscover and describe the empirical, factual character and content of experience as an absolute datum. Husserl's view, the most radical expression of Phenomenology, may be accepted as the more significant of the two: since it (a) posits the being and role of the mind, the ego, or the concrete self as a synthesizing and noetic agent; (b) reminds us of the diversity of attitudes governing awareness; (c) recalls to our attention the fact that the mind is meaningful and concerned with significance; and (d) warns us not to overlook through the fallacy of false simplicity the wealth and complexity of human experience. Husserl's *bête noire* is still with us, *i.e.*, the psychologistic attempt to explain genetically in terms of the meaningless the wealth of meaningful consciousness. In his own words,

Consciousness is not a title-name for "psychic complexes," for fused "contents," for "bundles," or streams of "sensations," however compactly massed they might be; but it is "consciousness" through and through, the source of all reason and unreason, all right and wrong, all reality and illusion, all value and disvalue, all deed and misdeed. Thus consciousness is *toto coelo* different from that which sensationism takes it solely to be, from what in point of fact is in itself meaningless, and irrational material. . . . (251)

Phenomenology in the broad sense of a description of actual experience

in terms of its content, or what it purports to be, is no doubt preliminary to both metaphysical and epistemological exploration. Husserl, unfortunately, attempted to identify this preliminary and underlying study with a science of logical possibility conceived on analogy of intuitive geometry. He posited as absolutely certain, and prior to any other investigations, in his quest for primary experience or absolute data, a solipsistic Ego enjoying intentional awareness, *i.e.*, a plethora of essences or objective meanings of a logical sort; and he held that all areas of meaning or essence are systematic, governed by necessary laws of ordering, and hierarchical. If the latter is scarcely capable of demonstration, at least in all areas of intentional consciousness, the former is empirically or at least psychologically false. The phenomenological "pure" Ego, self-contained and self-sufficient, reminiscent of Kant's theoretical Mind which postulates by empathy a social world, is a myth derived from Greece. This point has been made recently by such diverse schools of thought as devotees of the *sensum*, by Bergsonians, by pragmatists, by objective idealists, and by the existentialists. The latter group has pointed out that Husserl's absolute "dator" standpoint does not fit the facts of metaphysical crisis-consciousness. A Christian or a gladiator fighting lions in the Roman arena, or a mountain climber who has lost his footing and dangles precariously over a mile-deep chasm, is not merely enjoying the intentional consciousness of the essence of nothing; he is encountering an ontological nothing. Individuality, concreteness, and dramatic actuality are not identifiable with logical essences. The concrete, as James remarked, is not a mere menu, but at least requires, say, one honest-to-goodness raisin. In other words, mathematics is no adequate model, schema, or source of insight into the data of actual experience, not even when concessions are made to fantasy. Husserl really landed in solipsism and never decently escaped from it; precisely the predicament in which his alter ego, the positivist, has found himself. Consequently it cannot be agreed that "the *one* philosophy which as Idea underlies all the philosophies that can be imagined" is Husserlian Phenomenology; nor that this thinker stands on the rock of inerrancy when he deduces from it "universal Idealism worked out as a science." (2) Excesses, however, should not blind us to the service that his position renders in warning us against psychological or physicalistic positivism which distorts experience and is self-defeating. Philosophy rests on catholicity of experience and insight, and Phenomenology is one instrument, if not the only one, that helps to provide us with what we need. The *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie* is a seminal book which belongs to the mainstream of speculative writing. First appearing in 1913, it was translated with rare skill by Boyce Gibson and published in England in 1931. It now appears in a second printing. W. L.

LIVING ISSUES IN PHILOSOPHY. By *Harold H. Titus*. 2nd ed. American Book Co., N. Y., 1953. pp. xi-500. \$4.50.

In several volumes Professor Titus has exhibited enviable skill as a successful writer for beginning students of philosophy. He is sympathetic to the stu-

dent's standpoint, has a knack of clarity, of simplification, and of hitting on the essentials. In addition, he stands in the way of wisdom and catholicity of orientation. The present book, a rewritten revision in twenty-seven chapters of a work that first appeared in 1946, is divided into five parts dealing with speculative cosmology, anthropology and epistemology, types of philosophy, values (including religion), and social fundamentals (including education and a philosophy of history). A useful glossary is appended. Since this writing is crammed full of ideas, it presumably is intended as the basis of a year's course for sophomores. Whether it contains more than the beginner can digest and, consequently, is likely to produce bewilderment, only experience in the classroom can tell. It is useful, incidentally, for laymen who wish a clear and simply written survey of the field.

W. L.

LEIBNITZ AND THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY REVOLUTION. By *R. W. Meyer*. Henry Regnery Co., Chicago, 1952. pp. 227. \$5.00.

Leibniz is the paradoxical figure of the seventeenth century. Although he was a convinced optimist, failure followed all of his schemes at reconciliation in politics and theology. Unrivaled as the most cosmopolitan mind of his age, he wasted his later energies on the futile history of the House of Hanover, and at his funeral the only mourner was his private secretary. Curiously no attempt has heretofore been made in English to portray the whole man; while of the forty volumes of his writings projected by the Berlin Academy only six have been published. The complexity of his contacts, interests, and purposes, indeed, have made him a peculiarly difficult man to get the hang of—dedicated as he was to the reconciliation of past and present, faith and reason, feeling and logic, individuality and community, mathematics and mysticism, science and religion. Locke, among others, is perhaps to be excused, then, when he judged Leibnitz to be a bit "balmy." In the present study by Professor Meyer, an attempt is made to get at the essence of the whole man as he shared in the vital life of his own age, bearing in mind that Leibnitz took his degree in law, not philosophy, and was dedicated to a life of action, not one of professional education and speculation. The underlying thesis of this study is aptly summed up in the following quotation:

Leibnitz is not the detached philosopher of German idealism, reflecting upon the abstract themes of a past metaphysics. He lived and thought in an age of crisis. He was impelled to reflect and to postulate philosophical coherences by contemporary events which, in spite of the passage of time, have lost none of their actual importance. (7)

The concept of the windowless monad reflects the atomized political autonomy of the German states as well as the common aspiration for self-conscious individuality; yet his doctrine of the Kingdom of God formulated the aspiration for universal peace, co-operation, and community. Beneath all is Leibniz's attempt to harmonize the goals of freedom and commitment, politics

and morality, liberty of opinion and religious unity, nationalism and world citizenship. This volume will throw considerable light on a difficult subject. The translation appears to be well done. W. L.

THE PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS OF GOTTLLOB FREGE. By *Peter Geach* and *Max Black*. Philosophical Library, N. Y., 1952. pp. x+244. \$5.75.

These translations perform a genuine service for philosophical readers. They cannot help but widen the appreciation of Frege's clarity and cogency as a philosophical writer as well as consolidate his position as a front-rank figure in the development of modern logic.

The first half of the volume comprises eight selections, published over a period from 1879 to 1919. Chapter I of the *Begriffsschrift* gives a brief introduction to an early formulation of Frege's logical system with its characteristic ideographic symbolism. A discussion of function and concept elaborates the origin of the system in the concept of function in mathematics. A selection on concept and object, although published a half-century ago, sounds remarkably contemporaneous in its remarks on psychology and logic, synonymy of sense, and the dependence of logic on language. The remainder of the first half comprises excerpts on sense and reference, function, negation, a review of Husserl's work on arithmetic, and a critical study of Schroeder's work on the algebra of logic.

The second half of the volume consists of parts of Frege's fundamental work on arithmetic. This includes Frege's thesis that arithmetic is a branch of logic, axiomatic method, the nature of proof, and the principles of definition. A lengthy selection gives Frege's views against the formalists in mathematics. The volume closes with Frege's discussion of Russell's paradox, with the solution that has subsequently been elaborated by Quine and others.

The editors and translators are to be congratulated on this work.
California Institute of Technology

CHARLES E. BURES

GREAT HUMANISTS. By *Lynn Harold Hough*. Abingdon-Cokesbury Press, N. Y. and Nashville, 1952. pp. 220. \$3.50.

Five historically important humanists are discussed at length in this interesting series of intellectual biographies: Aristotle, Cicero, Erasmus, Irving Babbitt, and Paul Elmer More. Dr. Hough's interpretations ably encompass the development and sweep of these men's thoughts, enlivened by frequent portraits of the personalities. His intent appears to be twofold: (1) to show that the most profound humanism ("classical humanism") leads independent man to a belief in God, preferably accompanied by an "... acceptance of the facts and the sanctions of the Christian religion." (10) and (2) to stir his listeners (in the original lectures) and his readers to seek confirmation of his interpretations by reading the original works of the men he has selected as evidence of one above. He probably will succeed in convincing some readers to read the original works, but I doubt that his evaluation will find widespread accept-

ance among philosophers; namely, that "true humanism" will (should?) always lead to a belief in God.

There is no doubt in my own mind that Dr. Hough clearly understands the many meanings of "humanism," but his failure to include adequate evidence of such an insight leads me to think that when he speaks of "true humanism" or "the true humanist" (44, 140-141, 165, and 208) his case is won by definition; he defines humanism in a single way, then extols the virtues of selected representatives of this view. To call such a humanism "true" is, of course, simply to evaluate one meaning over others. One may as well substitute "best" for "true." This book amounts then to recommendation of one particular view of humanism without benefit of comparison.

San Diego State College

ALLAN E. SHIELDS

HUME'S INTENTIONS. By *J. A. Passmore*. Cambridge University Press, N. Y., 1952. pp. ix-164. \$3.75.

In this little volume Professor Passmore of the University of Otaga continues the type of scholarly analysis that he previously employed in his study of Cudworth. In this case the ground has been worked over more extensively but scarcely with the author's peculiar capacity for condensed and comprehensive statement. Hume, in spite of the lucidity of his sentences, is one of the most enigmatic and, indeed, aggravating of modern philosophical writers; scriptural in the sense that almost anything can be found that is sought; aggravating, because beneath the superficial coherence of his work lurks a nest of contradictions, and at times the suspicion, as well, of a certain subtle waggishness reminiscent of Charlie McCarthy. The present study attempts to trace and disentangle the various strands of Hume's thought in a manner at once sympathetic yet critical; and it can be recommended to the attention of those who wish authoritative insight into the mazes as well as the over-all purposes of one of the seminal minds of the modern period. While each of the eight chapters summarizing his viewpoint indicates the ontological presuppositions of our philosopher, these might perhaps have been more forcefully pointed out and summarized had the writer deigned to include a final chapter on "Hume's dogmatism." Professor Passmore concludes:

Hume's achievement . . . must be diversely described; his philosophy will not fit neatly with any of the ordinary categories. He is pre-eminently a breaker of new ground: a philosopher who opens up new lines of thought, who suggests to us an endless variety of philosophical explorations. No one could be a Humean, in the sense in which he could be a Hegelian; to be a Humean, precisely, is to take no system as final, nothing as ultimate except the spirit of enquiry. (159)

W. L.

BERTRAND RUSSELL'S CONSTRUCTION OF THE EXTERNAL WORLD. By *Charles A. Fritz*. Humanities Press, N. Y., 1952. pp. 243. \$4.50.

The speculative career of Bertrand Russell began with a temperamental reaction to the mystical idealism of Bradley, encouraged by G. E. Moore, in the

direction of the common-sense British world and, even more, that of Hobbes. The way was through Meinong and conceptual realism, from which his later studies have steadily moved as far as possible in the direction of nominalism, the tradition of his own country. The outcome is his own Galilean formulation of the method of Descartes and Locke, together with the mathematicism of Leibniz, identified with analysis and logical atomism, but denuded of the principle of wisdom which seventeenth-century thought associated with it. The present study is a penetrating, critical, and sympathetic examination of the more technical aspects of Russell's system, dealing with his mechanism of "constructions" applied to numbers, descriptions, classes, material objects, and physical entities, together with the problem of data and the external world. It is argued that Russell was unable, in the end, to discover any absolute of "hard" data; that he completed the circle of confident naturalism by ending in subjectivism; and that he confused fruitful method with arbitrary metaphysical dogmatism. In brief, he overstated his case, even if he nevertheless holds "a secure position among the first rank of contemporary philosophers." (231) Two of Russell's claims, however, it is maintained, remain valid:

The employment of modern logic as a "suggester of new possibilities," and the use of logical constructions. . . . The use of these two principles is an important and significant contribution, but it is unfortunate that Russell has made claims far exceeding the use of these two principles. His further claims, I believe, are not valid, and the controversy caused by his extreme claim is apt to overshadow the very real importance of what he has contributed to modern methodological technique. (213)

This book is a careful, judicious, and useful introduction to the technical principles of his system. W. L.

STRUCTURE METHOD AND MEANING. Edited by *Paul Henle, Horace M. Kallen,* and *Susanne Langer*. Liberal Arts Press, N. Y., 1951. pp. xvi-306. \$4.50.

The title of this volume of essays in honor of Professor Henry M. Sheffer is derived from the threefold organization of the essays. Those under the heading of *Structure* are concerned mainly with symbolic logic; those classified under *Method* deal mostly with the pure and applied aspects of science and the relations between them; those under *Meaning* are quite miscellaneous and have no easily detected unity of content. Many of the essays in this volume are of a highly technical nature and cannot be discussed in a brief review; others are relatively popular treatments of a great variety of problems, and all are either directly or indirectly connected with the work and teachings of Professor Sheffer. Norbert Weiner discusses the history of mathematics and compares the developments on the Continent and in England. Pure mathematics as distinct from applied was well defined at the middle of the nineteenth century and the chief names were those of Cauchy, Gauss, and Weierstrass. Since that time those worthy of mention are Riemann, Poincaré, and

Hilbert. Today the application of mathematics is not neglected in the search for logical rigor. F. S. C. Northrop deals with a theme for which he is noted and which is developed more fully in other works, namely, "The Importance of Deductively Formulated Theory in Ethics and Social and Legal Science." The importance of paying attention to the assumptions, primitive postulates, and concepts of the philosopher or social scientist making the analysis, and the culture in which his propositions get their meaning, as well as the facts, is stressed. A method for achieving a universal ethical and legal norm for all men is outlined.

C. J. Ducasse studies Francis Bacon's Philosophy of Science in the first two books of *Novum Organum*. He considers the charge made by many writers that Bacon neglected the place of hypotheses in his method of exclusion. He holds the view for which he cites evidence that the method of hypotheses is unquestionably to be found in Bacon's work and which is especially well illustrated in the passage at the end of the *New Atlantis*.

George Sarton in "The History of Science and the History of Learning" discusses the problems connected with the guidance of graduate students in research in the History of Science as contrasted with the History of Learning. The former may easily be accomplished by an *ad hoc* committee, but the appointment of a committee in any area of the History of Learning is unnecessary since it can best be done by the departments most concerned in the period of learning under study.

Donald C. Williams brings the volume to a conclusion with "The Sea Fight Tomorrow" in which he revives Aristotle's problem of the excluded middle in *De Interpretatione* as to whether it is now true that there will be or will not be a sea fight tomorrow. He examines critically the arguments of both Aristotle and C. D. Broad and seeks to show that the problem of time which is so puzzling can be simplified and better understood if time be equated with space. He concludes that past, present, and future are ontologically on a level with one another and with West and South and are equally real.

There is an appreciative preface by the editor Horace M. Kallen, and a foreword by Felix Frankfurter in which the great importance of Professor Sheffer's contribution to symbolic logic, the high quality of his creative imagination, and of his personal qualities of character are celebrated. H. L. S.

ESSAYS ON LOGIC AND LANGUAGE. Edited by A. G. N. Flew. Philosophical Library, N. Y., 1951. pp. vii-206. \$3.75.

This collection of philosophical articles seeks to spread information concerning the linguistic movement in philosophy to the general educated public. The introduction by the editor and nine relatively nontechnical essays should prove instructive to the general reader.

Gilbert Ryle writes on systematically misleading expressions by which he means improper syntactical formulations. J. N. Findlay discusses some puzzles concerning time, and he finds their origins in obscurities of thinking and talking. Paul Edwards takes issue with a thesis of Bertrand Russell that induction

rests on a nonempirical principle. Margaret Macdonald contributes two essays. In one she argues that philosophical use of analogy to correct and enlarge technical and ordinary vocabulary is misuse of language. In the other she finds that metaphysical discussions in the language of political theory misleadingly suggest that there is a single (magical) criterion of political obligation. G. A. Paul contends that before one can ask if there are such things as sense-data, one must consider the varied usage of the term "sense-datum." F. Waismann decides that verification of a statement is a determination of its use, and he outlines the use of regulative principles in the theoretical construction of reality. H. L. A. Hart considers responsibility and rights in terms of ascriptive sentences like "He did it," which admit liability or ascribe responsibility. Finally, John Wisdom analyzes the question whether there are facts of nature to support claims about divine minds, and he finds the solution not so much in misuse of language as in misconnection of feelings unexpressed in language and hence uncriticized. C. E. B.

THE ORIGINS OF EUROPEAN THOUGHT. By *Richard Broxton Onians*. Cambridge University Press, N. Y., 1951. pp. xvii-547. \$9.00.

Behind the literate and systematized conceptions of ancient Europe and the Near East lies that dim era from which these notions drew their seed-hint and sustenance. These origins are as difficult to trace as they are important to know: difficult, because they remove us to an idiom of thinking that is remote from our own and whose content can only be deduced, when more than surmised, from primitive languages; important, because they are the earliest chapter in the history of our own ideas. This study by Professor Onians of the University of London is not a compilation of secondary materials, but is rather an original investigation that comprises, in the words of its subtitle, "new interpretations of Greek, Roman, and kindred evidence, also of some basic Jewish and Christian beliefs." "Kindred" here means Celtic, Germanic, Semitic, Egyptian, Hindu, and other linguistic and cultural areas—fifteen, to be precise. The whole is more than a piece of original investigation; it approximates a monument of patient and creative scholarship, whose conclusions are acknowledged by the author to be of differing worth, from good guesses to an approximation of finality. The book was begun in 1922 with an inquiry into the history of Greek ethics, which subsequently proceeded to the difficult problem of Fate in Homeric and primitive thought, thence to the notion of mind and soul; and, finally, as the years passed, it spread until it covered a wide diversity of subject matter. The meticulous and patient care with which the study has proceeded is indicated by the fact that while it was first submitted to the Cambridge University Press in 1929, it was permitted to be set up in 1934 only and was given a third setting in 1939, with minor items added until 1950.

Aside from a twelve-section appendix which includes such matters as "Liber"; "Ancient Jewish Conceptions of the mind or 'Soul,' the 'Spirit,' the 'Holy Spirit,' the Body, and the Divinity of Christ"; "The Auld Belly-Blind

"Man"; "Finis"; and "Ancient Hindoo Conceptions of the Soul"; the body of the text comprises forty chapters divided into three major sections dealing with "The Mind and the Body"; "The Immortal Soul and the Body"; and "Fate and Time." The opulence of the whole defies brief summarization. Several basic conclusions by the author, however, may be mentioned. The Homeric notion of mind was that of an undifferentiated unity of thought, volition, and emotion (similar to the views of the Hebrews and Chinese). Contrary to common interpretation, following Hippocrates and Plato, which identifies the Homeric seat of consciousness and the organ of mind (the *Phrenes*) with the midriff, Professor Onians turns up considerable evidence to show that it was the lungs. Its correlate, the *Thymos* or breath-soul, the vital principle of thought, feeling, and action, was breath in a broad sense, a liquid and vapor, closely associated with the blood. "Breathing," in Homeric thought, is a general category covering seeing, hearing, and seminal emission. Colors or beauty of objects, for instance, are breathed in through the eyes. *Noos*, apparently not a permanent or major expression of a bodily organ, is associated with the chest, and is related to purposive consciousness; the first hint of semi-spiritual function. The *psyche*, associated particularly with the head, was the life-soul or seed-principal of life—liquid and gaseous, identified with the fluid of the brain and with spinal marrow. In procreation a portion of the individual's *psyche* is yielded to compose a new life, to the impoverishment of parental vitality. A small portion of it was also lost in sneezing. Other points of concentration of *psyche* are the knees and thighs, a fact that explains certain curious Homeric tales and phrases. The Hebrew notion of reproductive seed as oil explains the practice of "anointing" which bestows new or divine life. To hint of the richness of this study, other items, among many more, are: "nectar and ambrosia," "the halo and wedding ring," "baptism," "on the knees of the gods," "in the nick of time," "the horn of plenty," "I drink your health," "elbow-grease," "I am bound to," "the world-egg," "nimbus." This work will undoubtedly be of use to a wide variety of readers and scholars, and is definitive for a knowledge of early Greek thought. W. L.

DIDEROT AND DESCARTES. By *Aram Vartanian*. Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1953. pp. vii-336. \$6.00.

Subtitled "A Study of Scientific Naturalism in the Enlightenment," this is the sixth volume in the publisher's "History of Ideas" series. It shows in convincing detail how and why a rationalistic consistency guided the development of materialistic thought in France under the influence of the *philosophes* and "physiocrats."

The numerous proponents of this movement, the author demonstrates, allowed it to be supposed that English empiricism was mainly responsible for the outlook they developed, while in actuality the decisive influence was the naturalistic aspect of the Cartesian philosophy. When the Newtonian physics at last superseded the Cartesian cosmology, it was brought under the metaphysical limitations of Descartes' "godless" order of efficient causes, despite

the fact that Newton himself had insisted on preserving a metaphysics of final causes.

Apart from this clarifying presentation, the book seems to call needed attention to the problem of the nineteenth century's apparent break with the past in materialistic circles. The naturalism of the French Enlightenment was swamped by, rather than retained as foundational to, the later scientific movement. We are now informed as to how the utilization by some of his followers of Descartes' splitting of the universe was the chief factor. Diderot's thought is taken as typically transitional. It is most instructive to discover that Voltaire, in strange contrast, was forced into a conservative camp.

American International College

HOWARD DAVIS SPOERL

RELIGION AND LIFE

RELIGION IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN CULTURE. By *William Warren Sweet*. Charles Scribner's Sons, N. Y., 1952. pp. 338. \$3.50.

This book by the leading authority on the religion of the American frontier is a sequel to the author's *Religion in Colonial America* and is the second in a series of four volumes on the history of Protestantism, and to a lesser degree other religions, in this country. Dr. Sweet writes to correct what he considers a bias on the part of various adherents of the Frederick Jackson Turner school of history who have overemphasized economic determinism. Interpreting a wealth of materials detailed in notes and bibliography and including unpublished doctoral dissertations, he illustrates the thesis that the seventy-five years after 1765 witnessed an initial decline in religious belief and activity due to deism and the Revolutionary War, but that their closing decades were rich in manifestations of spiritual fervor. This latter vitality was expressed in, and due to, revival meetings, home missions to colonists and Indians, itinerant preachers, new churches, and educational developments along the trans-Allegheny valleys and prairies. Drawing generously upon his earlier writings and his recent researches in this general field, the author shows that the religious impulse underlay and molded most of frontier culture.

The main portion of the book analyzes three subperiods: the revolutionary age, the interval of readjustment after the achievement of independence, and the first four decades of the nineteenth century. Each era is treated in reference to the participating denominations, a technique for which the writer is well equipped as he has published books on several of these groups. Particularly valuable is his exposition of the Plan of Union of 1801 and the manner in which it tended to push Congregationalists into the Presbyterian fold and to lead to the New School schism of the 1830's. Brief but cogent summaries are given of such New England theological influences as those connected with Samuel Hopkins, Nathaniel W. Taylor, Channing, and Bushnell, as well as student missionary movements stemming from Williams, Yale, and Andover,

but the major emphasis remains upon the frontier. Dr. Sweet becomes especially informative in his discussion of such communities as Millerites, Mormons, and the Oneida colony, which belong to this or the ensuing period, and in his treatment of the colleges, notably those in Ohio. Kenyon College becomes alive to the uninitiated reader when the author outlines its beginnings and prints in full its delightful hymn to Bishop Philander Chase, the Dartmouth alumnus who founded it. Citing authorities like Tewksbury, this book presents statistics on the appalling mortality rate of the pre-Civil War denominational colleges; in two states ninety-five per cent of them died, even though the pioneers came increasingly to believe that an educated ministry and laity were not merely endurable but even desirable. Evangelical educators like Charles G. Finney and Lyman Beecher made significant contributions to frontier theological education.

The methodology of the volume involves a minor lack of integration and thereby may confuse the casual reader. Some persons and events are mentioned or characterized as if freshly introduced, when in actuality they have been discussed earlier in similar terms. (See pp. 168 and 107, 206 and 101, 242 and 194, and 314 and 160.) Typographical errors occur in footnotes on pages 206 (incorrectly repeating a date properly given on 101), and 243 (incorrectly stating a date properly given on 321). MacMurray College for Women, in Illinois, is misspelled on page 170. Dr. Sweet's writing of this work seems to have been contemporaneous with that of the first volume of the excellent companion six-volume *History of Methodist Missions* by Wade Crawford Barclay which apparently appeared too late to be included in the comprehensive Sweet bibliography but which is commended in two footnotes under differing titles. That on page 258, *Missionary Motivation and Expansion*, is correct; the overall subject for the first two volumes which is cited on page 277 should be, more accurately, *Early American Methodism, 1769-1844*. These minor discrepancies, however, do not obscure or curtail the values of this important book. Dr. Sweet's host of appreciative readers will look forward to the third volume of this series which will treat *The Age of Controversy* between 1840 and 1880.

EARL CRANSTON

THE POWER OF POSITIVE THINKING. By *Norman Vincent Peale*. Prentice-Hall, N. Y., 1952. pp. ix-276. \$2.95.

This is an unusual book from the standpoint of religious yet scientific views of achieving peace, happiness, and successful Christian living. It stands to lead many lives into stronger and more normal personality while not giving way to mawkish sentimentality or fanaticism. The work is the outgrowth of years of successful counseling in the Marble Collegiate Church Clinic by its famous pastor Norman Vincent Peale. Undoubtedly thousands have already been helped to a firmer mastery of themselves, a triumph over doubts and difficulties and peace in a disordered world. It should be a required reading in any course that seeks to discover the secret of successful living.

R. T. F.

GOD AND NATURE. By G. F. Stout. Cambridge University Press, N. Y., 1952. pp. liv-339. \$7.00.

This posthumous volume is the companion of *Mind and Matter* which Stout published in 1931 and in the title page of which the author called it "the first of two volumes based on the Gifford Lectures delivered . . . in 1919 and 1931." (ix) However, to the time of Stout's death in 1944 he had not prepared the promised volume for publication. In the editorial preface to *God and Nature* Stout's son explains that "it was understood between us that if the lectures had not been published before his death, I was to edit them for publication." (ix)

Stout waged his philosophical battle on the two fronts of New Realism and Absolute Idealism, a twofold opposition which was inherent in his conception of the construction of knowledge. In the *Analytic* he stated that "in the process by which we take cognizance of an object two constituents are distinguishable, (1) a thought reference . . . and (2) a *presentation*" (46) which Stout believed were actually one and distinguishable only as phases of the knowing process. In his *Studies* he explains that "mind and matter are ultimately and essentially distinct, though ultimately and essentially inseparable." (Preface) Furthermore in *God and Nature* he states that "we have to regard the eternal being . . . ultimately distinct from and essentially connected with the universe of becoming" (228) . . . matter is fundamentally coordinate with mind." (230-1) Stout agrees with Bergson that the one absolute psychical life is primarily all that is, and explains that "it consists in a process with two aspects, one by which it attenuates itself, and takes the form of matter, the other by which it concentrates itself as mind, yet without losing its original unity. It is only within this original unity," Stout claims, "that the antithesis of matter and mind has being" (240) and "for me knowing and being are inseparably united as ultimate and coessential aspects of the universe as a whole;" (284) Thus Stout rejects the contention of New Realism in his principle that "the inseparable unity of knowing and being [comprise] the ultimate constitution of the universe" (285) and he denies the assumption of Absolute Idealism that knowing generates the known. The acknowledges that such a position is defensible "only if we take into account the correlation of mind and matter as a duality in unity." (238)

Stout states his central problem as follows: "What account can we give of the logical connection between the primary data of sense and the vast body of knowledge which claims to be derived from and dependent on them," (113-4) although his treatment of data and of knowledge derived from them is out of balance. What he says of the primary data of sense is extensive as well as illuminating, and he concludes it with a chapter on "The Status of *Sensa*," whereas, on the other hand, his treatment of mind as knowing agent is brief and disappointing. Considerable is said about negative theories of mind which the author rejects, but positively he does little more than refer to mind as "the unity of a complex" (291) or a "mind-complex." (277) Although Stout is emphatic about the dual unity principle of the universe, he fails to

apply this same principle to mind which he believes derives its being from the Eternal and Universal Mind. This failure reveals a fatal flaw in his system and requires that his explanation shall employ some less satisfactory principle, that of incompleteness. "The field of finite existence in space and time," he says, "is seen to be by its intrinsic nature incomplete;" (25) "each datum," he claims, "is known as essentially incomplete;" (82) "the self is known . . . in knowing subjective states as essentially incomplete"; (244) "the finite good can be really good, only if it is a partial expression of the one absolute good"; (309) and "starting from the being of the complete good, we may infer the existence of a Universal Mind" (318) This line of argument conforms to logical consistency but it ignores the deeper fact that the dual unity principle which Stout applies to the Universe, applies also to mind. Human minds too reveal a dual unity formula. But Stout fails to consider this fact. First, he makes no mention of any such formula of mind. Second, he equates mind or self with the "I" (226) Third, in his answer to the question about "the relation between knower and Known," (272) he implies that the knower is the "I" and that the known is something external to it, notwithstanding his reference to "a civil strife" (304) in the "one self" (303) That is, he employs the answer of convention and not that of the nature of mind. By nature, mind is a dual unity the same as the Universe. Consider the simplest act of mind in forming a judgment. Here the dual unity principle is inescapable as Joseph explains that in the formation of a judgment, "there are two factors in the being of one." (*Introduction to Logic*, 166) The question then arises, is the form of the products of mind or thought similar or dissimilar to mind's own form? If dissimilar, then the products of mind leave man without a clue to the mind's constitution, but if similar, then mind becomes the archetype of its products and reveals a bipolar formula of dual unity similar to Universe. Stout grants as much where he remarks, "any subject . . . has some cognizance of self" (245)

This is an instructive volume in setting forth the author's views. It sheds light upon them by striking, if not homely, illustrations. And finally Stout has rendered a special service in reconciliation, in showing how mind and sense data are inseparable in the formulation of human experience.

PAUL R. HELSEL

THE CHRISTIAN ATTITUDE TO OTHER RELIGIONS. By E. C. Dewick. Cambridge University Press, N. Y., 1953. pp. x-220. \$5.00.

E. C. Dewick, Hulsean Lecturer at Cambridge in 1949, in a book of great contemporary interest, discusses the attitude, past, present, and future, of Christianity toward other religions. Years of residence in India and Ceylon give him an intimate acquaintance with the East. He adopts as his own the suggestion of Dr. A. C. Bouquet that religion is "fixed relationship between the human self and some non-human entity" (1-2)

He begins by considering the present-day challenge to Christianity from other religions taking up one by one the political challenges erected into religious importance by Communism, Christian Socialism, Nazism, Fascism,

Nationalism, as represented in the phrases "Mother India" and "Mother England" and finally, of Kipling's Imperialism. He calls attention to the fact that while many admit the supremacy of Christianity, they will not admit its superiority. The great barrier to better interreligious understanding lies largely in the Christian emphasis of nonadmission of any religious virtue in other religions and a studied attitude of hostility. Over against this hostility is the "pagan" invitation to co-operation which finds scant response with almost a single exception expressed in the organization founded by Younghusband known as the World Congress of Faiths. Yet he cites many points which promise items of possible agreement such as ideas of atonement, incarnation, the threefoldness of the Divine Nature woven into the texture of other religions and declares:

If Jesus Christ is anything like what His followers have believed Him to be, then we should expect to find in His teaching a continuity with all that the Spirit of God has revealed to men everywhere. And we do in fact find this, not only within the Biblical revelation, but in other religions also. (23-24)

Discussing the apparent decline of losses in Christendom, the author, in our view, does not give due attention to the possible fact that orthodoxy is not necessarily to be the standard of judgment. Statistics of the churches, including the Greek and Roman, do not include the wider circle of the body of the Universal Church. The discrepancy is revealed in the pages that follow in which he shows that Christian institutionalism and dogmatism are now the greatest barriers in the way of success. The way of authoritarianism in religion is almost invariably beset by totalitarianism in politics with which it naturally aligns itself. Furthermore, its dogmatism, illustrated in the "Biblical Realism" of Kraemer and a host of others, has been true neither to the Bible nor to the facts. (47) The true answer to other religions is not theological but ethical where it must be shown as a fulfilment of the partial truths of other faiths. The facts brought out seem to disclose to this reviewer that the very contentions intended to uphold the Deity of Jesus serve rather to deny His whole mission and message. This it does by separating the Divine humanity from the human spirit which it was the purpose of the Incarnation to demonstrate. The greatest argument against Christianity is the record of the Christian Church. (100) After all the Incarnation is not an irruption into the world of a foreign god but the lawful companionship of its Creator and Redeemer. If we possess any goodness, it must be part and parcel of the Divine Goodness, inspired and justified by Divine Grace, a part of His higher creativeness. If there is any moral or spiritual goodness in any human soul, it is of Divine origination, for God is no respecter of persons, but claims His own everywhere in those who seek Him. This is the real Christian message so darkly overgrown as to have become a caricature of religion in many a historic scene. From the ancient rallying prayer of missions, "Gather *them* in," we need to adopt the prayer of Dr. George Matheson, the blind poet-mystic of the Church of Scotland:

Gather us in, Thou Love that fillest all;
 Gather our rival faiths within Thy Fold; . . .
 In diverse forms a common Soul we see;
 In many ships we seek one spirit-land.

Thine is the mystic life great India craves;
 This is the Parsee's sin-destroying beam;
 Thine is the Buddhist's rest from tossing waves;
 Thine is the Empire of vast China's dream;
 Gather us in! (130)

R. T. F.

RELIGION AND ECONOMIC RESPONSIBILITY. By *Walter G. Muelder*. Charles Scribner's Sons, N. Y., 1953. pp. xvii-264. \$3.50.

In our age of fission, we have started upon a course of splitting that seems to have chain reactions wherever we turn. With the mounting pressure of social conflicts, the tensions among and within us become so difficult to bear that release is sought in falling away to opposing sides, and giving up all efforts at reconciliation or unification, by throwing our weight to one extreme in violent antagonism against the opposite extreme. We see this familiar pattern dividing the world into two armed camps of east against west with an iron curtain of suspicion and hostility between the empires. In the dilemmas of social fission, communism is opposed to capitalism, the labor movement versus management, political party against party, the owners who have, against the tenants who have not. Our society in this mid-century is suffering severe shock from these explosive separations that divide and weaken the strength of community.

In his Lowell Lectures, first given at King's Chapel in Boston and then expanded into the present book, Walter G. Muelder faces this contemporary scene and considers how to meet our social crisis. He clearly recognizes that no partial solution offered by one segment of society in isolation from others will be sufficient. Rather we shall need to employ all available resources in one community of mutual responsibility if we are to work through destructive conflicts to constructive fulfilment of our latent potentialities and values. In particular he calls for a working alliance of religious, economic, and ethical resources in the development of a more responsible community, where each person will have a vital part in the creation of a more adequate life for all.

Concern for economic needs is one aspect of the basic respect for human dignity which arises from a religious view of the ultimate worth of every person. Though economic values may be instrumental they are so indispensable to maintenance of life as to support all other values. In the vocations of worker and of management, life attains significance in producing and distributing values for others to enjoy. Property is not to be viewed merely as ownership, but as a network of relationships that bind men together in responsible interdependence through the exchange and maintenance of social goods. Focusing

upon issues often treated in isolated ways he shows economic responsibility as an integral part of the entire culture. Trade unionism, collective bargaining, and the struggle for power affect all of the people and will need to develop a growing ethical responsibility for the whole society and the persons whose values are at stake. Nothing short of a responsible world economy will provide the basis upon which the good life may come to all the people.

The author has drawn widely upon scientific and philosophical research in the socio-economic field. Specifically he expounds a communitarian orientation of personalistic social ethics. He insists that "only a theology friendly to philosophy can be fully relevant to problems of contemporary culture," bringing together the claims of religion and social science. (xiii) Open channels of communication and trade are essential to a world community, and isolationist policies are self-defeating economically as well as in social values. From the viewpoint of ethico-religious responsibility the author opens a new and creative approach to the perplexities of our time. PAUL E. JOHNSON
Boston University

CHRISTIAN FAITH AND THE SCIENTIFIC ATTITUDE. By *W. A. Whitehouse*. Philosophical Library, N. Y., 1952. pp. 149. \$3.75.

Here is a book that raises most of the problems with which a scientific age confronts the typical Christian set of beliefs. The author, a Cambridge mathematician and Christian theologian, seeks the mediation of religious and scientific opinion with the utmost candor. Strange to say, this frankness will likely be unappreciated by both the scientific dogmatist and the religious fanatic, but it cannot be brushed aside. The reason for this is that a revolution has taken place in scientific thought unlike any that has heretofore occurred. The discovery of relativity and quantum mechanics has reduced science to the affirmation of invisible forces which bear no resemblance to matter as heretofore conceived, and the greatest of contemporary physicists proclaim that the ultimate reality must rest in an Intelligent and Transcendent Purpose known only by its activity. This admission points up the possibility of new understandings if science, on the one hand, forsakes its worn-out dogmas, and religion, on the other, has the wisdom and inspiration to seek a new and living expression of belief as a living word in keeping with the early Christian faith expressed in the Fourth Gospel.

It is useless to condemn the scientist for not affirming religious dogma because his science commits him to those things that are observable in orderly patterns, while religion must draw on faith as its very foundation. The author discusses the Holy Spirit as the medium between the world of sense and that of spiritual values but seems, to this reviewer, unduly cautious in discriminating between Holy Spirit and that Spirit which infils and activates all life and creation. There is no way to escape the charge of naturalism which is a bugbear to the ultraorthodox.

As against this, it might be pointed out that if the Divine Intelligence has created the world, it must have been done through orderly processes that

were planned and directed by a transcending, self-conscious Intelligence which is to be identified with God. Likewise if there is to be communion between this Intelligence and conscious human beings, it must be a communion of spirit with spirit through access of the Divine Spirit. How then can we assume that there is a natural spirit differentiated from a Holy Spirit and assert that God created and creates the world and was present in Christ? There are certain "fruits" of the Holy Spirit affirmed in human beings such as love, joy, peace, long-suffering which are the fulfilment of all law.

R. T. F.

CRITICISM AND FAITH. By *John Knox*. Abingdon-Cokesbury Press, N. Y. and Nashville, 1952. pp. 128. \$1.75.

Criticism and Faith is a sequel to Professor Knox's trilogy: *The Man Christ Jesus*, *Christ the Lord*, and *On the Meaning of Christ*. Here the emphasis passes from the interpretation of the Gospel to an analysis of the place and function of the scriptural record with respect both to the Gospel itself and to the on-going life of the church.

Deploing both the "fundamentalist" and the "modernist" attitudes toward historical criticism of the Bible, leading to a cutting down and a fencing off of Biblical truth, and both to unhistorical distortion of the living event, Professor Knox proceeds first to establish the actual basis of the security of the faith. That security lies in the experienced fact of participation in the living Church of the Living Spirit. The preparation for and the pouring out of that Spirit on the fellowship formed by Jesus is the gospel event. The meaning of Christ is first of all meaning for us, and we experience that meaning before we even raise the question of its precise historical rootage. This is, indeed, the emphasis on "the Christ of Faith," but as living event inseparable from the event of the historical Jesus. Our precise historical knowledge of the past historical event is a secondary matter.

Yet it is not, for that reason, important. The authority of the New Testament lies in its virtue of keeping the ongoing Church in close touch with its unrepeatable beginnings. This keeping in touch becomes possible, not by meticulous adjudication of detailed fact-claims, but in the continuing creative interpretation of the record in the largest relevant context.

The study concludes with suggestive examples of the benefits of historical criticism to the preaching of the Gospel. This is the kind of honest, judicious, and searching work which we have come to expect from Professor Knox.

DONALD H. RHOADES

ECLIPSE OF GOD. By *Martin Buber*. Harper and Bros., N. Y., 1952. pp. 192. \$2.50.

While Martin Buber's Jewish existentialism was inspired by a study of Kierkegaard, it is equally Pascalian, *i.e.*, its main theme is the distinction between the God of the philosophers and that of Abraham. It is not clear, however, what the process should be called that discovers the cosmic Thou; it is not philosophy, we are told, and it is not blind religious orthodoxy. To call it "faith," as

this author does, is to hide the problem behind a word that needs considerable elaboration. In the present volume, a collection of independent essays united by the conceptual thread which distinguishes the Thou and the It perspectives or attitudes, the author pursues the question of disappearing faith in the present age; criticizing at length the outlooks represented by such modern thinkers as Descartes, Kant, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, and Heidegger. Characteristically an attempt is made to show that Hermann Cohen was theist, while Jung is not. This volume reads easily and will yield inspirational value; it is free from the technical jargon that contemporary existentialists are wont to employ, and is the sort of book whose sobriety of statement is likely to be useful to those seeking to break through the abstractly conceptual into the concrete and mystical, or face-to-face cosmic standpoint. One observation of the author, however, calls for brief comment, namely, the suggestion that Christianity is essentially an Hellenistic defection towards individualism from the sounder Hebraic standpoint of a "holy people." The fact seems obvious, however, that no such people has ever existed, whether as a racial or ecclesiastical group; and the perpetuation of such a myth tends to support a form of superstition that breeds bigotry and keeps alive atavistic and dated notions. This is true whether it be maintained as a religious or secular-political principle.

W. L.

HIGHER EDUCATION AND THE HUMAN SPIRIT. By *Bernard E. Meland*. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1953. pp. ix-204. \$4.00.

Bernard E. Meland has written a great book with a message of prime importance to our times. He states his problem as a study of "the quality and scope of educational experience in colleges and universities as determined by the kind of thinking that transpires within their halls and classrooms;" (v) but he treats it with a depth that the title fails to express. The timeliness of this work grows out of the nation-wide unrest at the barren results of much modern education; a feeling that students pass through the ordinary courses without achieving those fundamentals that enable them to write a decent English or to gather any pleasure from reading. It will not do to berate our overworked and underpaid teachers, nor yet to lay our educational failures to the distractions of radio, television, and automobiles. If there is a thinning out in educational results, it may quite likely involve not only these but other factors. Perhaps the most disconcerting fact about our schools is the frequent outbreak of lawlessness, destruction of school property, and gangsterism resulting in criminality. Since this latter indicates a moral failure, it gives perhaps the outstanding clue to such an inquiry as Meland suggests.

He notes the extreme secularization of contemporary education which has made it more or less a scandal to mention the spiritual factors of life, mention the name of God, and to substitute the term "morality" for that of religion. But morality is not enough. In order to become efficient it must be deeper than rules and must spring from convictions so deep as to be essentially religious. Morality is pointless without sensitivity to the creative ground of being. The

issue between Dewey and Hutchins narrows down to the problem of how we are to conserve the rational powers of man. The author believes that neither has taken adequate measure of the human spirit. Neither, in the one case, the intellect as an instrument merely of social action nor, as in the other, the exercise of judgment requiring the discipline of analysis can be fully adequate without resort to that appreciative consciousness which is the source of the creative imagination and can be best designated in spite of its frequent misuse in the word "spirit."

Nothing is more important to the structure of character in a person than his affections, for in these lie his creativity as an expression of vitality. (17) "The human consciousness, when it is spiritually informed, is more than a precision instrument, it is a sensitive organism attuned to the immensities." (32) The effect of Dewey's instrumentalism has been to circumscribe the range of man's meaningful activities and to define his spiritual stature as a social being. "Preoccupation with knowledge that yields power has become very acute in our time. It is, in fact, the educational counterpart of our cultural predicament at large, wherein the commitment to power has led to various degrees of dehumanization on so large a scale that the way back from, or the way out of, imminent peril seems virtually denied to this generation." (46)

The author calls for a theory of education which will be in line with the new scientific concept of a dynamic universe. Reality is a perpetual happening, a panorama of flying events which brings it to pass that the rationalizing of experience is always an *a posteriori* act. Every moment, every situation, every experience, and every person has a quality of uniqueness in which one is dealing with an inexhaustible event. At the moment, through the presence of an appreciative consciousness, "Consciousness can become so acute in a high degree of attentiveness that the whole organism will seem to be operating as an intellect." (67) "Creative work, whatever its medium, is never an act of the intellect alone, nor of the bodily feelings in isolation from the mind. It is a highly perceptive fusion of feeling and thought in which the two find their correlation in a creative act." (79)

Exactly this is what has been left out of modern educational theory and can be remedied only by a true recognition of the spiritual as well as the mental and physical stature of man.

This is too important a book and too far-reaching in its implications to be given justice in so brief a review. Plainly, it should be read by every educator and every citizen with a view to the influence of our system of education upon the welfare of our civilization. It is easily the most cogent analysis of our present educational situation that has come to the attention of this reviewer. And, in addition to all that, it bears a particular interest to every individual seeking for himself and society the highest success.

With the fine format of the University of Chicago Press, it is a pity that the proof has been carelessly read. Attuned has been spelled "atuned" throughout; laid "layed" (85); bizarre "bazaar" (110); rout "route" (27); and uninformed "uniformed." (2)

R. T. F.

THE PROBLEM OF EVIL. By *Albion Roy King*. Ronald Press Co., N. Y., 1952. pp. x-221. \$3.50.

The Problem of Evil by Albion Roy King, Professor of Ethics and Religion, Cornell College, has for its subtitle "Christian Concepts and the Book of Job." He suggests three questions of a general nature: psychological, theological, and religious, centering his interest in the theological problem.

The author mentions various Christian concepts which the Book of Job suggests: the importance of the individual rather than the earlier concepts of clan and tribe; God as ruler and founder of the Cosmos; the dualistic problem of Satan's activities and status. At one period Satan is depicted as an "agent of God," not an independent cause of evil. (63) Quite a long digression at this point in the book is an interesting study of the dualism of thought regarding the concept of the Adversary which the author suggests may be either a "provisional dualism," ultimately serving a divine purpose, or a "hopeless dualism" which is a system in which evil is personified and set in eternal and irredeemable opposition to the good, as in the Christian concept of Satan. (68) "It takes a profound theology to create a magnificent rebel." (74) Plato's evil principle was an abstraction not personalized.

Concerning evil in the world, the proposition of God's power and goodness involves a paradox from the viewpoint of strict reasoning. It comes about from the narrowing of the definition of reason to exclude faith. Reason, he observes, in current usage comprehends what we know, not what we must believe purely on faith. (102) The author gives four positive suggestions for meeting the implications of evil: survival after death, the intrinsic value of moral integrity; the disciplinary value of suffering, and the mystic experience of God which is made possible through suffering. Concerning belief in survival after death, the author cannot fix any very definite belief in immortality in Job's desperate soliloquy, yet at times "Eternity keeps thundering in his ears." Even the author's personal testimony (ch. 8) is not too reassuring for faith or a calm facing of death and appearing in judgment before God. (155) The author senses the intrinsic value of moral integrity in Job, a "certain glory in this unwhipped sense of integrity while he faces the superficial criticisms of his friends, yet the very assertion of his strength leads him into the sin of pride." This fact the author suggests is the "Trap set for every good man." (171) The disciplinary value of suffering suggests the pragmatic viewpoint. To accept adversity and self-discipline requires true humility, yet physical pain is not the worst form of suffering. Job's severest trial was the spiritual struggle. His despair at the sense of estrangement from God clouded his inner faith life. (183) Although there is a somber mood in the Book of Job, we catch an undercurrent of hope "straining to hear the melody of a single string on life's lyre" (195)

The mystical experience of God which is made possible through suffering is probably the strongest point in his exposition of Job. There is a more profound answer to the problem of evil than a pragmatic one. Job had lived an exemplary life free from outward misdemeanor, yet apparently too much in

his own strength with what the author calls "hearsay knowledge of God." But when great tragic experiences strike, his perfect life is of little value except as a bulwark of strength to combat his friends and as a suitable approach to God whom he now eagerly longs to know perfectly with the *inner eye*. "Oh, that I knew where I might find Him." (Job 23:3) When finally this inner revelation of God is allowed him he exclaims: "*I had heard of thee . . . now my eyes see thee*." (Job 42:5)

The book abounds in reference material carefully indexed, which shows extensive reading from many sources, much from personalist literature and other literary and theological works. However, better organization with less digression which led to many interrelated fields, would have made the work more significant.

MARIAN GOODLANDER

REFLECTIONS ON LIFE. By *Alexis Carrel*. Hawthorne Books, Inc., N. Y., 1953. pp. 205. \$3.00.

The author of this book died in Paris in 1944 at the age of seventy-one, two weeks after the De Gaulle government had cleared him of charges of collaboration. In the introduction Anne Carrel tells how he worked "deprived of all comforts and weakened by undernourishment" and "with his legs wrapped in a blanket in an effort to fight the cold which he feared so much." She also tells how he wanted to live to complete his work, and adds: "God did not permit it." His heart was too exhausted, and he was mortally wounded by the calumnies of certain envious people, she claims. But she adds that he accepted death "with full knowledge and with the serenity of a Christian." In his tireless activity he had resolved to pass on his knowledge to his "neighbor" before he died. He would have called this book "*The Conduct of Life*." This is the simple, touching story of the tragic departure from earthly existence of a Nobel Prize winner, the author of *Man the Unknown*, veteran of World War I, collaborator with Lindbergh at the Rockefeller Institute, a man who deserves to go down in history as one of the sublime characters of the twentieth century.

This book is filled with Dr. Carrel's profound wisdom. It contains numerous quotable maxims that embody and beautifully express this wisdom. He makes a sharp distinction between man-made laws and conventions and those natural laws that reveal the order of the cosmos and determine man's real relations to it. All of this is developed through nine chapters the headings of which are: "Disobedience to the Rules of Life," "The Necessity of Obeying Natural Laws," "The Fundamental Laws of Human Life," "Good and Evil," "The Rules of Conduct," "Putting the Rules of Conduct into Practice," "Teaching the Laws of Conduct," "Teaching the Laws of Life," and "The Success of Life."

Dr. Carrel is severely critical of eighteenth-century materialistic liberalism and of Marxian economic determinism or dialectical materialism. He is hostile to philosophy, but he is friendly to Roman Catholicism, to mysticism, to belief in God and immortality. France is decadent and the same decadent tendencies are active in all of the western democracies. He condemns mass media of communication and urban development. Our only hope of salvation is for

the gifted and elite persons within western civilization to renew their allegiance to the three basic ethical principles—the conservation of human life, the reproduction of their type of persons, and the spiritualization of all of our institutions.

The book is permeated throughout with Christian pessimism that demands positive action to arrest the widespread disintegration of our society. Dr. Carrel is not a Buddhist pessimist nor is he a follower of Schopenhauer and his disciples. He writes about submen and supermen, but he is not a Nietzschean. He can discover the mote in his brother's eye, and the beam in his own, but he wrote before and during the dark days of the German occupation without ever discerning the light that illuminated the hideouts of the leaders of the French underground. If he had supported them, instead of accepting an appointment from Pétain as head of the French Foundation for the Study of Human Problems, his career might have ended more heroically and less tragically.

D. S. ROBINSON

MERE CHRISTIANITY. By C. S. Lewis. The Macmillan Co., N. Y., 1952. pp. xiv-175. \$2.75.

It is hard to be fair to *this* book by *this* author. In considerable part, it is just C. S. Lewis, and that is praise enough. But in a painfully large part, this book is C. S. Lewis rushing in and about where the experts tread gingerly. The usual cleverness and facility are here, and only occasionally stall. But illumination casts a flickering light. The superficial and uncritical places seem to point now to naïveté, again to carelessness, and sometimes to plain dogmatism. Something of unevenness may be due to the fact that the material was previously published in three separate volumes: *The Case for Christianity* (1943), *Christian Behavior* (1943), and *Beyond Personality* (1945). Yet all three were conceived to present a highest common factor in the common Christian faith and for the special benefit of those on the fringes of being Christian. Whether the fringe-status is a matter of knowledge or of commitment, or both, is not always clear. Particularly it is not clear for whom the section "What Christians Believe" is intended. In what universe of discourse could the discussion of "Putting on Christ," or the "natural self" be considered effective presentation? "The Shocking Alternative"—Jesus as God or madman impostor, will really shock anyone with critical sensibilities. The author need not argue his assumptions, but he ought, in all honest awareness, to state them.

Concerning such ethical or moral matters as wifely obedience to a husband, and the evaluation of divorce, he intersperses penetration and superficiality. Perhaps the best treatment is accorded the subject of "pride" and the hierarchy of sins. The author is evidently much better in dealing with basic human motivation in the raw, than in defending or adjusting to established dogmas of church and society.

There is an unexpected excess of chaff here, but the whole is well worth the winnowing.

D. H. R.

THE ABNORMAL MIND

ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ABERRATIONS. Edited by *Edward Podolsky*. Philosophical Library, N. Y., 1953. pp. viii-549. \$10.00.

Since disvalue, for instance, error or evil, is a profound source of insight into the nature of value, students of philosophy as well as those of psychology will be interested in this psychiatric handbook. A collaborative volume, it is distinctive in its introduction of a novel policy of including about fifty-five rather extended, signed articles reprinted chiefly from technical journals. The result, however, is an unevenness in space allotment in terms of topical importance. The Freudian view predominates, although not exclusively, and occasionally lands in the bizarre. Under "anxiety, dental," for instance, we learn that this universal fear of the dentist's office is one of "sexual excitation which is dammed up." Tooth-losing dreams are related to "the castration symbol." (82) It is not clear that this book is up to editorial standards. Since it is intended for the layman as well as professional psychiatrist, a brief statement of Freudian principles and theory would have been useful. Nor is any adequate principle of selection operative. We look in vain, for example, and at random, for such alphabetized items as delusions, hallucinations, erythrophobia, herostatic, anhedonia, syndrome, dysmenorrhea, leptosomic, hypomanic, satiric (nymphomaniac is discussed but not under the title), narcissism, complex and its major forms (*e.g.*, oedipus, electra, etc.), sex and the erogenous (terms in violent need of definition), inhibition, repression, amimia, invert, symbolism (a very important concept), optimism (pessimism is discussed from the Heideggerian standpoint), incompatibility, multiple personality, conversion hysteria, guilt, narcolepsy and cataplexy (discussed together, but not defined), cannibalism (a Freudian concept), orality (as a term). The article on illusions is very short, and its author accepts the Freudian view that "It is doubtful whether rich and colorful experience is possible without illusions." (276) Some of the items are mentioned or discussed in other articles. Remarks on "normal" or "normalcy"—a critical concept in connection with the field of "aberrations"—would have been welcomed. Unfortunately, there are almost no cross-references. One wonders what informed readers would think a century later of the more extreme Freudian interpretations offered herein. W. L.

WISDOM, MADNESS AND FOLLY, THE PHILOSOPHY OF A LUNATIC. By *John Cusance*. Pellegrini & Cudahy, N. Y., 1952. pp. 254. \$3.75.

This is one of a few writings attempted by mental patients either during or following the acute phase of their illness. It is perhaps the only such attempt on the part of a manic-depressive psychotic. The author is a manic depressive who at the age of thirty-six experienced his first manic state. His mental condition has fluctuated from manic to depressive during the past fifteen years. The author, in his writing, attempts to put into words the meanings he has found and the experiences he has had during the course of his mental illness. Since this is one of but a few such writings, it gives the reader an insight into

what the experiences and the feelings of a manic depressive are like during the various phases of the illness.

The author is undoubtedly a well-educated individual, one with a good background in philosophy and in literature, and is, therefore, able to convey to the reader the feelings of some of his experiences by comparison with some of the writings of philosophy and classic literature. The writer is undoubtedly familiar with the Jungian explanation for certain psychotic experiences. A typical example of this is found on page 18 where he says,

I found in the caves of the unconscious demons and werewolves, strange faces of forgotten gods and devils, while my mind played unceasingly on everything it remembered of myths and magic. Folds of the bedclothes suddenly became the carved image of Baal; a crumpled pillow appeared as the horrible visage of Hecate. I was transported into an atmosphere of miracle and witchcraft of all-pervading occult forces although I had taken no interest whatever in these subjects prior to my illness.

Many of the experiences which the author had during the manic-depressive phases brought to him what he calls intent emotional religious experiences, experiences which he feels are very foreign to the temper of Anglicanism which was the religion in which he was trained as a child. He goes on to say that he believes that this is a typical experience of most manic-depressive psychotics. Much of the book is written with a mystic flavor and, therefore, its value from a research point of view is questionable inasmuch as the semantic problem makes it difficult to know what the author is trying to convey. The book's primary interest is perhaps that of giving the reader some insight into the experiences which a manic-depressive has had but it is questionable whether or not one can infer from the experiences of this person that these are necessarily typical experiences of other manic-depressives or other psychotics.

Another interesting phase of the book is that it gives an insight into the atmosphere of the mental hospital. Inasmuch as the author has spent some years in a variety of hospitals, he is able to give a rather interesting exposé of what transpires in mental hospitals. Much of this is subjective but, nevertheless, does give some interesting sidelights as to the atmosphere and procedure of the typical mental institution. One must keep in mind, however, that the treatment and the experience of this author have transpired in hospitals on the continent rather than in the United States and, therefore, may not be typical or reflect the modern mental health approach in the mental hospital of the United States.

The book makes interesting reading especially for the individual who is concerned with the psychology of mysticism and has adequate background in philosophy and literature to appreciate with the author various concepts derived from such sources. The scientific value of the book, from the point of view of understanding more adequately what to anticipate or what the emotional experiences of the psychotic are, is however questionable.

Pepperdine College

LEONARD V. WENDLAND

THE PHILOSOPHY OF PSYCHIATRY. By *Harold Palmer*. Philosophical Library, N. Y., 1952. pp. ix-70. \$2.75.

The author feels that the basic difficulty in the field of psychiatry is the fact that there is no common vocabulary and there is, therefore, a difficulty in communication between therapists and members of related disciplines. This is in a sense a semantic problem in that terms mean different things to different people and until terms are used in a more or less common way, difficulty will be encountered in communicating concepts, theories, and methods of treatment. Therefore, the author feels that it is important for all psychiatrists and all related therapists to receive some training in philosophy so that they would develop a capacity to define terms in such a way as to be meaningful to other persons. The author feels that only by so doing can the discussions of psychiatrists become communicable and discussible. The author goes on to say (63) that a fundamental importance in all such discussions is a stipulated definition of the soul and human purpose. The major contribution of this little book is the author's attempt to stipulate the basic process of psychiatry. It is the feeling of this reviewer that the author is guilty of the very thing which he intends to point out, namely, that there is need in the field of psychiatry for clarification of terms and of avoiding esoteric concept. L. V. W.

THE WIDE FIELD OF LETTERS

THE CHIEF PLAYS OF CORNEILLE. Translated into English blank verse with introductory study of Corneille by *Lacy Lockert*. Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1952. pp. xiv-387. \$5.00.

As a companion volume to his distinguished translation, *The Best Plays of Racine*, Mr. Lockert now gives us *The Chief Plays of Corneille*—chief rather than best—since Mr. Lockert has added to the traditional "Big Four" (*Le Cid*, *Horace*, *Cinna*, *Polyeucte*), two other plays: *Nicomède* and *Rodogune*, the second of which he includes for its representative, rather than for its intrinsic, merits. In an effort to recapture Corneille's resonant eloquence, Mr. Lockert has quite wisely abandoned the too-elegant heroic couplets of his Racine translation and has substituted "Marlowe's mighty line." A long and judicious introduction discussing Corneille in general and then each of the six plays individually completes the volume.

Mr. Lockert's determination to make Corneille accessible to those who do not have the necessary grasp of classical French to read the original is most laudable, and he succeeds in this difficult and frequently thankless task better than any of his predecessors. Mr. Lockert is fully aware of the gap between classical French and traditional English prosodies, and he is often ingenious and sometimes brilliant in bridging this gap. Yet the uninterrupted reading of the six translated plays is not an altogether enjoyable experience.

The fault, I believe, is less the translator's than Corneille's; and less Corneille's than that of the ethos of his period. The brilliant Corneille scholar, Octave Nadal (one of the few not mentioned in Mr. Lockert's introduction) has said of Cornelian psychology as it reflects the ethos of the age of Louis XIII:

... it presents a closed system whose organization and intrinsic laws constitute a world apart. A privileged society peoples this world, and that is why Corneille's contemporaries—and this state of affairs lasted barely more than thirty years—almost alone recognized themselves therein. (*Le Sentiment de l'amour dans l'oeuvre de Pierre Corneille*, p. 317; quotation translated by present reviewer.)

This psychology, in which the principle of *gloire* (fame, achievement of distinction) is the sole absolute, was already largely incomprehensible to the following generation—that of Racine. And so difficult is it for us today to accept the motivations and reactions which Corneille attributes to most of his characters that modern critics disagree radically in their efforts to rationalize Corneille's presentation. Frequently it is only the magnificent grandiloquence of Corneille's alexandrines—far better adapted to stage recitation than Racine's, and ultimately uncapturable in English—that carries the modern reader along.

It is obvious that Mr. Lockert fully recognized the difficulties of his undertaking; and so, in spite of all reservations, one is grateful to him for having done his job so well and so steadfastly.

ARTHUR KNODEL

THE RESTORATION COMEDY OF WIT. By *Thomas H. Fujimura*. Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1952. pp. 232. \$4.00.

Readers of Restoration comedies can be divided roughly into two general classes. One receives a vicarious thrill from the brilliance of the wit and the freedom of love motives; the other is repelled by what might be called a bawdy exuberance and laxness of morals. In this work, Mr. Fujimura accepts the validity of these two possible interpretations but he then presents a third and relatively new evaluation based on extended research and careful thought. His objective is to approach the plays in the light of their contemporary background instead of accepting them in terms of a twentieth-century moral code which has little or no relation to that of the second half of the seventeenth century. Such a study brings him to the philosophy of Hobbes in particular in whom he finds a believable cause for the skepticism of the age. A redefinition of terms clarifies the meaning of seventeenth-century "wit." Truewit, Witwoud, and Witless become types of actual individuals, often drawn from everyday life. The findings make interesting reading for anyone who is seeking a clearer understanding of the comedies written during the reign of Charles II.

After setting up his standards in chapters entitled "The Nature of Wit," "The Intellectual Background," and "The Aesthetics of Wit Comedy," the author next makes a careful analysis of the plays of three of the best of the dramatists: Etherege, Wycherley, and Congreve. It must be admitted that in the light of the theory developed by the author, the plays take on an interesting new meaning. The only complaint which is likely to be raised is that the list of dramatists does not include at least Farquhar and Vanbrugh. However, the theory is so clearly marked that the interested reader can readily suit it to any author he chooses.

Mr. Fujimura's study is thorough. He has taken into account all of the re-

search and criticism from the period of the Restoration itself down to the present day. Then, on the basis of his own research, his theory practically becomes basic. The style of the writing is admirable, the steps in the development are definite, and the conclusions are certainly worthy of attention. *The Restoration Comedy of Wit* is a splendid addition to the scholarship related to drama.

WALTER M. CRITTENDEN

THE FORTUNES OF FAUST. By E. M. Butler. Cambridge University Press, N. Y., 1952. pp. xvii-365. \$6.00.

Here is a book of intense interest to all lovers of Goethe's *Faust*, and the final volume of Miss Butler's trilogy on the Faust legend. In *The Fortunes of Faust* she gives the history of Faust in literature from Marlowe to Thomas Mann, giving studies of seventeen works and of many others in lesser detail. Thus we have presented in a most interesting way a very complete survey of Faustian literature.

The fact that will impress those who have thought of Goethe's *Faust* as if it were more or less an individual piece of literature is the restraint under which Goethe and these many other presenters of the myth felt themselves to be. The case is not so simple as it would seem. In her first volume, *Myth of the Magus*, Miss Butler traces the myth to its beginning in prehistoric rites of the god-priest-king; in the second volume, *Ritual Magic*, she gave the added meaning of a pact with the Devil, and now she considers the effect on literature of the many *Fausts* that have been written since Marlowe, including those of Lenau, Heine, Valéry, and Thomas Mann. The *Urfaust* of Goethe is, of course, inimitable but the second part of the drama has never been satisfactorily concluded. It does not bear the simplicity, the literary quality of the first part. Nor is it likely that any satisfactory ending will be found until some author comes to terms with Calvary. The author contends that the history of Faust in literature is the story of the conflict between religion and rationalism, that the conflict is not yet resolved and that the two forces are still engaged in a life and death struggle. This is a conflict which neither Goethe nor those who followed after him could meet so long as they felt constrained to follow with some degree of accuracy the original pagan myth. The struggle between religion and rationalism cannot be settled for rationalism. It is as old as the Hebrew Bible. It was the original Satan who seduced man with the fable: If they ate of the Tree of Knowledge they should be as God.

The hold which the legend has had upon the German mind, one is tempted to believe, is not due so much to the immortal literary expression of Goethe's *Urfaust* as to the preparation for its magic laid deep in the forest legends of their ancestors. The same love of the weird it was which found expression in Wagnerian music and in Nietzsche as well. Nowhere else in literature, music, and religion has this aspect of life drawn forth such deep expression. There are those who steadfastly believe that all this too is at the roots of recent German tragic history.

R. T. F.

CLASSICAL INFLUENCES IN RENAISSANCE LITERATURE. By *Douglas Bush*. For Oberlin College by Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1952. pp. 60. \$1.50.

When one listens to a lecturer there are two distinct sensory appeals—through the ear and through the eye. If Douglas Bush could be heard delivering the two lectures published in this little volume, the twinkle in his eyes, the wave of his hand in gesture, the attitude of his body, and the vocal inflections would all add to the understanding. Without these visual aids, the lectures move rather slowly because the style tends toward crowded and lengthy sentences. Indeed, such is a necessity because of the scope of the topic which begins with the Greeks, progresses through the Roman civilization, and on to the uncivilized barbarians who overran Rome. The education of these last barbarians is what Mr. Bush calls the Renaissance as it is reflected in the literature of the fourteenth to sixteenth centuries.

The Classical Renaissance “had three natural stages, discovery, assimilation and re-expression,” says Mr. Bush. These stages are presented and traced rapidly and clearly in the two lectures. The scope is tremendous as can be seen. Scholarship as found in Erasmus and Bede; printing as seen in Manutius of Venice and the Estiennes family in France; science as seen in Copernicus and Vesalius are samples of the forces which are introduced to create a composite whole.

As reading material this volume is too general. As food for thought it presents a veritable banquet. As lecture material, presented by Mr. Bush, it must have been thoroughly delightful. The audience at the Martin Classical Lectures must surely have been pleased with the speaker. W. M. C.

ANDRÉ MALRAUX AND THE TRAGIC IMAGINATION. By *W. M. Frohock*. Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1952. pp. xv-175. \$4.00.

Readers who come to this careful study for an explanation of Malraux's political journey from Left to Right will be disappointed. Malraux's position has been that, while his books belong to the public, his private life is his own business. His silence about his autobiography has encouraged others to fill the vacuum, and so Malraux and the legend about him are difficult to separate. Mr. Frohock reaches one important conclusion that bears on the relation between life and work: that Malraux's novels are “not of historical but of imagined action.”

If we know that the ferocious violence of *The Conqueror* and *Man's Fate* is in these books *because Malraux's fictional world needs to be violent to be complete* (the italics are the author's), and not just because he saw torture, suffering, and death while he was in the Orient, we know something decisively important about his peculiar originality as an artist. (10)

Mr. Frohock's method of exploring his subject is to examine Malraux's major themes, the structure of his novels, his symbols, and even certain key words: *shamanism*, for example.

In an early work Malraux has a young Chinese traveling in Europe announce a theme that re-echoes through his later novels: "in the depths of European man, where it dominates the great moments of his life, there resides an essential absurdity." (28) Absurdity, not man's inability to communicate with man—as some Malraux students believe—is Malraux's theme. "For Malraux . . . the pivotal fact is that Western Civilization places men in an absurd position. In comparison, solitude is a mere by-product: we are isolated from our fellows *because* of our untenable notion of reality." (35)

The effectiveness of Mr. Frohock's method of analyzing the structure of a novel to extract its meaning is best demonstrated by his analysis of *Man's Hope*. The detailed study of the powerful scenes involving first Captain Hernandez and then old Alvear discloses the conflict between Malraux the artist and Malraux the propagandist, for these scenes contradict the propaganda thesis of the novel.

His interpretation of the symbol of the walnut trees leads him to different conclusions about the meaning of *Les Noyers de l'Altenburg* from those reached by other critics. The walnut trees seem to say that "Man's fate is not a derisively ironic phrase. Man has his continuity, and consequently he has a destiny, though an obscure one."

In *Les Noyers* a character is called a "Shaman." As Mr. Richard Chase, in *The Quest for Myth*, described him:

The Shaman is distinguished from his fellows by being deeply neurotic and sometimes epileptic. He is capable of the utmost extremes of depression and mania and of enduring great hardships of self-imposed isolation, through which he attains, in the eyes of his tribe, a supernatural sanction. As an initiate of the shaman caste he may retire to a lonely hut where he subjects himself to the greatest rigors of discomfort and starvation; he has trances, and he emerges from his ordeal having attained, as Radin says, "a new normalcy and re-integration." (138)

With the lead provided by the word "Shaman," Mr. Frohock searches Malraux's novel for the pattern of Withdrawal, Enlightenment, and Return and finds that, with the exception of *Man's Hope*, "every one of Malraux's stories recapitulates two thirds at least, of the experience pattern of the shaman." (141)

By examining the novels for the relation between Malraux and his heroes Mr. Frohock comes to the conclusion that Malraux himself is a shaman:

. . . he calls shamanism the disposition of the individual temperamentally unable to accept the natural order of reality. If Malraux takes such ideas at all seriously, how could he have failed to recognize himself? And what is the habit which I have called the fundamental characteristics of his writing, the habit of juxtaposing with an account of one man's defeat an image somehow suggestive of a man's

victory, but the refusal to "accept the natural order of reality"? The studies of the anthropologists offer him an explanation of his personality, and of the shape of his own career, in terms of the eternally human. (148)

AEROL ARNOLD

FREEDOM AND THE TRAGIC LIFE, A STUDY IN DOSTOEVSKY. By *Vyacheslav Ivanov*. Noonday Press, N. Y., 1952. pp. 166. \$3.50.

Vyacheslav Ivanov (1866-1949), the author of this study, was a Russian poet-symbolist, an eminent scholar, and a connoisseur of ancient Greek literature, mythology, and religion. In his book he shows that Dostoevsky invented a special type of literary creation—a novel-tragedy. Dostoevsky's works are imbued with realistic symbolism leading *a realibus ad realiora*. Ivanov draws on his distinction between two kinds of evil power: Lucifer and Ahriman. The former's hatred for God is full of energy; he seeks to transform the world according to his own plan. Ahriman, on the contrary, seeing the failure of his struggles against God, falls into despondency and seeks to destroy everything and reduce all to nonbeing. Ivanov analyzes Dostoevsky's treatment of these two evil powers. Ivanov's book is replete with many original thoughts, and references to Greek mythology and Greek tragedies. Both its contents and its style bear witness not only to the author's scholarship, but also to his gifts as a poet.

N. LOSSKY

ROBERT BROWNING: A PORTRAIT. By *Betty Miller*. Charles Scribner's Sons, N. Y., 1953. pp. xv-317. \$5.00.

Browning was long regarded as singularly and sturdily independent in his art, in his faith, in his thinking, in the ordering of his life. During the last few decades scholarship has turned up evidence not easily reconciled with this view of him. Creative writers had doubts even earlier. As far back as 1899 Thomas Hardy wrote Edmund Gosse that Browning's character seems *the literary puzzle of the 19th Century*. How could smug Christian optimism worthy of a dissenting grocer find a place inside a man who was so vast a seer and feeler when on neutral ground? (175)

The present volume deals, if not a *coup de grâce*, at least an extremely telling blow, to the earlier interpretation. Uninhibited by what has merely been assumed, and drawing not a little from sources generally inaccessible or quite unknown, Mrs. Miller is outspoken without being unsympathetic. She blends biography with psychological portraiture and, along with keen perception and firm analysis, exhibits sure art in arranging and phrasing. We may tick off a few of her chief revelations.

Browning was far from self-reliant in handling practical affairs. As long as he was with his mother she bought for him every personal belonging he possessed. When he intended a trip she and not he packed his carpetbag. In planning the journey abroad with his bride he blundered about which boats sailed from which ports on what days and under what company's registry. He was unable to calculate the departure of trains from London; the long-

secluded invalid he was marrying had to take over the scanning of timetables and the determining of hour and station.

Until he was thirty-four he depended for monetary support (down to the last farthing) on his father, a man artistically frustrated and by no means wealthy. Confident that through worldly work he could earn his keep if he had to, he never once lifted hand at a job but dipped into the paternal purse for his entire subsistence, the cost of trips to the continent, and the subsidies for all his early publications. How could he take him a wife? That was easy. She would finance both of them indefinitely. True, she could not transfer funds to him beforehand without advertising their prospective elopement. He got round the difficulty by borrowing a hundred pounds—from his father.

He let his fiancée know that she would have other, nonfiscal responsibilities:

I have been accustomed, by pure choice, to have another will lead mine in the little daily matters of life. If there are two walks to take . . . you must say, "*This one*" and not "either." (124-125)

His dependence would not be merely external; it would connect itself with what went on "inside a man." It may be noted that until he was forty-nine one feminine voice after another said, "*This one*" to him. Each voice belonged to a person older than he—his mother, Eliza Flower, Fanny Haworth, Elizabeth Barrett. Some aspects of the domination by his mother and by Elizabeth may be particularized.

Browning, even when grown, could not sit by his mother without having his arm round her waist; his room was next hers and the door ajar; he would not go to bed without her goodnight kiss; he was so bound to her psychologically that when she was ill he became ill—or he and others thought he did. Her religious fundamentalism said nay to his boyish restlessness and greatly affected his beliefs. At fourteen he read Shelley and thereafter his nature was a battleground on which Shelleyan emancipation, struggling against the maternal dogmatism, long had the upper hand. But his mother's death filled him with remorse and plunged him into deeper depression than the death of idealism and thus impaired his later work.

Elizabeth was to; it also slackened his devotion to Shelley's uncompromising

That he rescued Elizabeth from the stifling imprisonment of her sickroom is true. Nevertheless much of the initiative and most of the practical leadership were hers. Not that she would have had it so. Between them went on a desperate struggle, often in the realm of the intangible. "There is no love but from beneath, far beneath" was the concept of each, and each wished to be the one who looked up. One, however, must consent to be worshiped and Elizabeth yielded to Browning's determination to subordinate himself. He prostrated himself before the ideal he created. What seemingly he craved most was the security of "living [in his words to Elizabeth] wholly in your life, seeing good and ill only as you see." (110) For a man reputedly so inde-

pendent this was going pretty far. In theory he would do no thinking and engage in no artistic effort which did not originate in her.

Their actual life together was less idyllic than Browning Clubs have proclaimed. Domestically it did not suit him that their son Pen should be as completely under Elizabeth's thumb as Browning himself had been under his mother's. He did not like for Pen to wear long ringlets and so many feathers and laces that strangers inquired whether the child was a boy or a girl. Nor did he put up with such trumpery longer than he had to. Four days after Elizabeth's demise he announced that Pen now had "short hair, worn boy-wise, long trousers, is a common boy all at once." (237) Artistically Elizabeth did not liberate and inspire as he had foreseen. It is true that during the fifteen years of their married life she wrote her own best poetry. He—to the disappointment of both—could grind out little. Irony decreed that when he bought in a Florence bookstall a "square old yellow Book" she "never took the least interest in the story, so much as to wish to inspect the papers" (246), and that he in consequence did not plan his masterpiece until he was a three-years' widower. Elizabeth gave signs of having sensed the realities of the situation and of knowing that only through death could she save and immortalize their marriage and his art.

This notice dwells more exclusively than Mrs. Miller does upon elements adverse to Browning. The reviewer suspects that even she has focused upon them overmuch. But her disclosures and accompanying comments are so significant as almost surely to lead to a new era in the appraisal of Browning. What the final judgment of scholars and critics will be it would be hazardous to surmise. The directions which opinion is likely to take may be less uncertain. At least there is ground for the conjecture that in coming years Browning will appear less staunch than he has on topics with a personal coloring, but will remain a notable "seer and feeler when on neutral ground."

GARLAND GREEVER

BYRON, SHELLEY AND THEIR PISAN CIRCLE. By *C. L. Cline*. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1952. pp. xi-263. \$5.00.

A member of the English staff at the University of Texas here carefully probes the Pisan period in the lives of Byron, Shelley, and their more or less casual associates. The members of the group had in common a desire to write. Temperamentally they differed so sharply that in several instances contempt or definite dislike resulted. Byron ignored the women—except Countess Guiccioli. He had—for him—considerable admiration for Shelley, with progressively less for the other males. He gave the men a dinner once a week and at Christmas, and somewhat regularly he mounted them on his horses for a ride into the country and practice with his pistols. The evidence produced by Professor Cline does not change our fundamental understanding of Byron, Shelley, Medwin, Williams, Trelawny, or the late-arriving Leigh Hunt. But it lifts John Taafe, Jr., whom Jane Williams nicknamed "False Taafe," from the mists of obscurity and even misapprehension into plain

purview. It also, through its discoveries in regional archives, clears up with approximate completeness the circumstances of the fracas with the dragoon outside and at the city gate. By concentrating upon a brief but important period the volume performs a mopping up operation of scholarship: it makes detailed, if no revolutionary, additions to biographical knowledge of both Byron and Shelley.

G. G.

WALT WHITMAN, THINKER AND ARTIST. By *Arthur E. Briggs*. Philosophical Library, N. Y., 1952. pp. 489. \$4.75.

This is a book by a believer. For many years Dr. Briggs has ranged over the problems of humanity and the principal systems and nostrums. Now he is ready to say with conviction that Whitman's thought is sound and indispensable. Regarding Whitman the artist his conviction is equally favorable, though this phase of the subject interests him less. Like most believers, he is so sure of possessing the true doctrine that his sharpest words are reserved not for the unbelievers but for the heretics, especially for Professor Gay W. Allen, whose *Walt Whitman Handbook* is repeatedly contradicted. "As a critical summary of Whitman lore and propaganda, his book is invaluable. But in the interpretation of Whitman's ideas it bears internal evidence of its fallibility." Dr. Briggs sums up in his second chapter his own contention:

I maintain that Whitman can be understood only if we recognize his preeminence as a pioneer of our latest developments of humanistic philosophy. Not medieval or Christian humanism (Maritain), not any Oriental or Hindu conception of the metaphysical self, not the immanent theistic personalism of the Bowne school, not planetary or cosmic humanism (Reiser, Potter, Bucke), not the transcendental self (Kant, Alcott, Emerson), not historic determinism (Marx), not irrational romantic humanism (Rousseau), not Freudian humanism; but American democratic humanism. Allen tries to identify Whitman with all of these. So approaching Whitman's thought and with such a method as his, how can he escape the effect of his book, which, despite his assertions to the contrary, denies originality to Whitman's thinking?

The originality and significance of Whitman's thought is a synthesis which "finds a place for both Christian and Nietzschean morality, for legalism as well as antinomianism, for Epicureanism and Stoicism, for pleasure as well as duty, for both naturalism and idealism. His synthetic principle is personal humanism." With such an approach it is not surprising that Dr. Briggs finds a harmony in Whitman's celebration of the divine average and his veneration of the great all-inclusive personalities. Comparing Whitman with his contemporaries and successors, Dr. Briggs finds him superior in wisdom to Emerson, Browning, Tennyson, Hopkins, Emily Dickinson, Lindsay, Masters, Sandburg, Hart Crane, Eliot, and Pound—all of whom he briefly examines in his closing chapters.

The book is full of interesting insights and pronouncements. In trying to

relate Whitman to nearly everything and everybody, there is necessarily a good deal of seeming digression, and often Whitman and his critics are quoted with scant attention to context. This makes particularly regrettable the absence of specific references; the book has neither footnotes nor bibliography. These the reader must work out for himself with the aid of such works as Allen's *Handbook*.

B. R. McELDERRY

ENGLISH INSTITUTE ESSAYS, 1951. Edited by *Alan S. Downer*. Columbia University Press, N. Y., 1952. pp. 221. \$3.00.

The English Institute, for several years held every September at Columbia University, has become a notable forum for criticism that is scholarly and scholarship that is critical. The present volume includes nine papers, four of them presented under the heading "Aristotle's *Poetics* and Modern Criticism," four under "Sources and Analogues in Criticism," and a ninth paper on "Critical Implications of *Explication de Texte*." The four papers on Aristotle are on the whole condescending. There is a great deal in the modern literary intelligence not sufficiently provided for in his criticism. Mr. Philip Wheelwright, for instance, says that "three elements of contemporary criticism—the anthropological, the psychological, and the semantic—are handled by Aristotle too superficially for modern critical needs." Mr. Francis Fergusson, in discussing *Macbeth* finds it necessary "to generalize his notion of action . . . to include movements of the spirit in response to sensuous or emotionally charged images, as well as consciously willed purpose." Mr. Reuben A. Brower, discussing "The Heresy of Plot," similarly emphasizes that "action" cannot exist apart from words, and that "action" is therefore colored by words and inseparable from style. "If we want to learn from him," says Mr. Brower, "we must translate his concepts to our purposes, eliminating if possible his liabilities." Mr. Elder Olson concedes that Aristotle developed "not only a permanently true but also an infinitely indefinitely operable poetic method;" but "we cannot legitimately expect it to solve all problems that might be raised concerning all forms of art. . . ." All of these points are substantially true, but it might be possible to arrive at them with less self-consciousness and less critical jargon. Miss Josephine Waters Bennett, in a paper of more traditional idiom, neatly dissociates Spenser from Ariosto and Tasso, finding for him a deeper affinity in Dante. Mr. Frederick W. Sternfield illustrates pointedly from Goethe and Burns his plea for greater exploration of the musical associations and background of poetry. Mr. Harold S. Wilson rejects Professor Thorndike's long-standing analogy between Beaumont and Fletcher's *Philaster* and Shakespeare's *Cymbeline*. Mr. Marshall McLuhan shows how the use of landscape to evoke emotion developed through Coleridge, Tennyson, Ruskin, the French Symbolists, and on to Joyce, Pound, and Eliot. Mr. W. K. Wimsatt, Jr., closes the volume with a particularly cogent analysis of the difficulties of explication and criticism. Our main critical problem, he says, "is always how to unify understanding and value as much as possible, or how to make our understanding evaluative."

In two hundred small pages the reader encounters dozens of the major names in literature from Aristotle to Joyce, a range of treatment and allusion which testifies to the wide reading and agile minds of the contributors. In this sense they are far from the classification of "narrow specialists." The excellence of their thought, however, is too frequently obscured by specialized idiom.

B. R. McE.

THE ART OF THE WRITER. By *Lane Cooper*. Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1952. pp. xii-436. \$5.00.

The desk of any average instructor in English Composition contains perhaps a dozen relatively recent volumes of expository essays which have been collected from present-day authors. The editors of such books attempt to select writings which can serve as models for student use. Each of these volumes is good in its way, and doubtless the students who are required to study them receive something of value. However, if the entire group of such publications were to be destroyed, the writing of expository prose would not suffer, provided Lane Cooper's present book could be retained. This may seem high praise, but the student will surely get more genuine assistance from a knowledge of what Aristotle, Plato, Longinus and other Ancients said on the subject of style than from a reading of the best of the more modern authors. It is, in a sense, exciting to turn from the ancients to Swift, Voltaire, Goethe, Coleridge, Thoreau, and others, and see how they have adapted the earlier principles to the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. But Mr. Cooper did not stop there. Thoughts on style have been gathered from Stevenson, Pater, Brunetière and Harrison to round out the volume, and through a study of the whole, a student can acquire a complete picture of the development throughout the ages.

It was my privilege in the mid-twenties to be introduced to Mr. Cooper's *Theories of Style* [1907]. It was my introduction to the subject of style, and because of the manner of presentation, I was led into more detailed study. It is a delight to find that the same author has, in this 1952 edition, given the materials another boost. Actually, only one addition has been made to the earlier work—selections from Ben Jonson's *Timber, A Discovery*. Mr. Cooper believes this will serve "well at the end, where the student will find that they [added selections] give a proper review and reinforcement for a large part of what is true, good, and useful in the rest of the book." And with this, all that needs to be said is, see *The Art of Writing*.

W. M. C.

THE ORDEAL OF GEORGE MEREDITH. By *Lionel Stevenson*. Charles Scribner's Sons, N. Y., 1953. pp. viii-368. \$6.00.

Do not read this book if you are not interested in carefully chosen words, in crisply clear sentences, in tersely keen criticism of George Meredith's literary productions, and in a sensitive and yet nonidolizing presentation of a man of letters who was also fascinatingly a man of troubles, friends, weaknesses,

and virtues—especially the virtue of a perseveringly vigorous attention to the beauties of nature and the duties of living with integrity.

But if you are, or think that you might be, interested in such things, then this is a book for you. Mr. Stevenson has garnered facts with a fulness unmatched in previous biographies of Meredith. He has presented these facts in the manner indicated above. No previous study of Meredith and his work has conveyed so effectively to the reader not only the difficulties and the attainments of Meredith's life but also the vigorous (though sometimes gloomy) spirit in which he usually worked. Meredith is shown to be a person with certain faults and with certain powers, as literary artist and as social mixer. The powers outshine the faults; and Mr. Stevenson manages to make us both understand and feel a heroism in the labors of Meredith. His work through many years as a reader for Chapman & Hall takes on at times a glow of humanitarian service. His work through many years as editorial writer for the *Ipswich Journal* acquires also a certain glory. The high intellectual concentration that Mr. Stevenson shows Meredith to have exercised in order to achieve his great effectiveness in conversation, brings us a new appreciation of the wise, humorous, and imaginative talker who captivated so many notable nineteenth-century men and women.

Mr. Stevenson, who has already written a book on English poetry of the later Victorian period, and critical biographies of Lady Morgan, Charles Lever, and Thackeray, and who has published several articles on the English novel in the nineteenth century, including a study, contributed to *The Personalist*, of the "intellectual novel," enriches this biography with a large number of pertinent comments on Meredith's interrelations with many poets and novelists. For instance, he points out that Robert Louis Stevenson, before the end of the eighties, had

. . . infected an entire new generation of young novelists with his creed of romantic fiction. Between 1885 and 1889 came *King Solomon's Mines*, *Dead Man's Rock*, *Micah Clark*, *The House of the Wolf*. As filtered through Stevenson's more lucid pages, the Meredithian influence lost its peculiarities of phrase and manner. Nevertheless, Meredith can be nominated as principal begetter of this school of romanticism which opposed the apostles of French and Russian realism through the last twenty years of the nineteenth century. The line of descent from *Harry Richmond* through *Prince Otto* to *The Prisoner of Zenda*, the most arrant romance of them all, is as plain as daylight. (246)

Meredith as philosopher, says Stevenson, belongs in the camp of the idealists rather than that of the mechanistic determinists; he must be aligned "with the creative evolutionists" rather than with "the Darwinist believers in blind chance." (262) Mr. Stevenson properly underlines Meredith's devotion to high personal standards in artistry, as poet and as prose writer. (e.g., 188-189) And if I may cite one other passage, in order to illustrate Mr. Stevenson's

memorably impressive manner of using biographical detail, it is the one wherein he tells of Meredith's first meeting with Carlyle, which Carlyle had arranged because *The Ordeal of Richard Feverel* had pleased the Sage of Chelsea.

Toward the end of the interview, Carlyle paid Meredith what was apparently intended as a compliment: "Man, ye suld write heestory! Ye hae a heestorian in ye."

"Novel-writing is my way of writing history," Meredith answered, and Carlyle chewed over the epigram as though it suggested a new idea to him. (74)

The Ordeal of George Meredith is a work of scholarly information and opinion, made palatable and impressive. WILLIAM D. TEMPLEMAN

THE ALIEN VISION OF VICTORIAN POETRY. By E. D. H. Johnson. Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1952. pp. xvi-224. \$4.00.

The work of the three leading Victorian poets is here considered. Professor Johnson points out that the poetry of each shows a double awareness—a conscious concern for allegiance to his own aesthetic sensibilities, and a conscious concern for effective communication to the contemporary public—or, in other words, a private conscience and a social conscience; or, in still other words, an attitude as an artist and an attitude as a man of letters informing and influencing his fellow men. Johnson opposes the view that Tennyson, Browning, and Arnold, unable or unwilling to maintain the spirit of "bellicose self-sufficiency" held by the Romantic poets, deliberately sacrificed artistic validity in order to communicate with the middle-class morality of their time. He insists that

each of them was ultimately seeking to define the sphere within which the modern poet may exercise his faculty, while holding in legitimate balance the rival claims of his private, aristocratic insights and of the tendencies existing in a society progressively vulgarized by the materialism of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. (xii-xiii)

This book presents a survey of the poetry of the three poets. It is concerned to see how the early poetry of each reveals his "native" tendencies and resources; how the later poetry of each indicates a concession to literary fashions with which he was not in full sympathy; how each managed to retain much integrity as an artist although he became to some degree a public man of letters; and how these three concerns lead to a better understanding and appreciation of the work of each poet.

In the process of giving such a survey Johnson is regularly interesting to anyone who has read Victorian poetry, and is often illuminating. Sometimes a judgment of his is, I think, incomplete or in error—I cite two examples: "the quest for the Grail is, of course, the very hallmark of fealty to the life of the imagination" (48) and "Surely the return of Excalibur to the Lady of the Lake signifies that the time for heroic action has passed." (59)

The conclusion states in part that "All things considered, it is remarkable that Tennyson, Browning, and Arnold should have put so much of themselves into their poetry as they did, and still commanded the admiration of their age." (215) This statement most readers will think not very startling. The chief value of the book lies in its detailed comment on the poems. The book has been based on careful and extended study, and was well worth doing.

W. D. T.

LIBERAL ARTS DICTIONARY IN ENGLISH, FRENCH, GERMAN, SPANISH. Edited by Mario A. Pei and Frank Gaynor. Philosophical Library, N. Y. pp. x-307. \$6.00.

The person who reads for pleasure in the fields of art, literature, and philosophy often needs a concise definition of terms he encounters. His desk dictionary may not include these terms. The larger or specialized dictionary and the encyclopedia may clutter explanation of them with details irrelevant to his purpose. The volume under review attempts to give him what, and only what, he requires.

Its initial section is devoted to English terms. It lists these alphabetically, defines them pithily, and appends to each the equivalent expression in French, in German, and in Spanish. A cross-index then arranges alphabetically the already-cited terms from each of the three non-Anglican languages and indicates the locale of the definitions. Thus the material is so organized that any item can be readily discovered.

Good organization granted, the value of a book of this kind may be determined by two tests.

First, are enough terms listed? The editors of *Liberal Arts Dictionary* have perhaps been too fearful of overinclusiveness. They define *sonnet* and *octave*, but not *octave* in connection with the sonnet, and not *sestet* at all. They define *ode*, *strophe*, and *antistrophe*, but not *epode*. They define *flats* but not *flies* or *pit*, *flash-back* but not *close-up*, *prologue* but not *matinée*, *motion picture* but not *cinema* or *cinematography*, *television* but not *radio*. On the other hand, they are sometimes generous in inclusion: for example, they define *tone* in the arts as a whole, in music, in painting, and in photography; after which for good measure they define ten germane terms, such as *tonality* and *tone scale*. Useful as their present compilation is, the reviewer suggests more items rather than fewer when the book is revised.

The second test is whether the definitions are satisfactory. To the specialist they probably never can be. To the cultural reader also they seem inadequate in such instances as that in which *comedy* is defined as if Dante's masterpiece were unheard of. But they do show thought and care; normally they conduct the reader into right general areas of comprehension. Here is the definition of *personalism*:

A modern term applied to any philosophy which considers personality the supreme value and the key to the meaning of reality. (142)

G. G.

THE BOOK ABROAD

De Persoon. By A. De Wilde. Van Gorcum & Co., Assen, 1951. pp. 240. 6.90 geb.

In *De Persoon*, Dr. A. De Wilde, former student of the late Professor Kohnstamm of Amsterdam who was long on the advisory staff of *The Personalist*, sets forth his description of the philosophy called "Personalism." From his own summary of the book in English, we draw the following information:

In it the author traces the rise of the individualistic idea in the Mediterranean world in which Judaism, Christianity, and Greek philosophy are contributing factors. For years, personalistic intuitions have to express themselves through Greek philosophy. Augustine's philosophy, with an existential formulation, comes to a dead end and Boethius' Greek-minded idea of the person, long dominates the field. Both the Renaissance and the Reformation bring the individual into prominence, the one with a flair to govern the world, the other interested in the salvation of the individual. Descartes led philosophy into rationalism but loses the person in the subjectivism of a "knowing subject" of experience, even more accentuated by Spinoza. Leibniz tries to recover the person through the insufficient concept of the monad. Next comes the *Sturm und Drang* movement involving Herder, Jacobi, Goethe, and Kant. The nineteenth century did not develop Kant's tendencies to a philosophy doing justice to the person.

The end of the nineteenth century shows a clear turn to the living person. Bergson, Freud, Adler, and others, discover in their way the person and its initiative. Dühring's "Personalismus" is a socio-political programme facing the depersonalizing powers of the time. William Stern brings his "entelechical" personalism; Royce, Hocking, and others, their "absolutistic personalism"; Renouvier, Bowne, Ladd, and others, their monadistically strained personalism. . . . With the exception of the divine mystery, man is the most awe-inspiring mystery (ix). The person requires respect. This is its dignity. It is equally due to everybody irrespective of age, sex, virtue, life or death. It cannot be deduced from society or idea; quite the reverse, they derive their value from the person (x). (224)

In his analysis of the consciousness of the ego, the author describes the person as (1) unity; (2) sociality; (3) activity; (4) liberty; (5) concreteness.

For those who have been pleased to condemn personalism as a narrow theological movement restricted to Boston University, this book will bear many surprises. Unfortunately the Dutch language will bar a general reading in America.

R. T. F.

Deutsche Gesamtausgabe edr Werke von Wladimir Solowjew. By Wladimir Szyllkarski. VII Band. Erich Wewel Verlag, Freiburg, 1953. pp. 449. 23:50 DM. Vladimir Soloviev (1853-1900) is the most significant figure among Russian philosophers. He elaborated a whole system of religious philosophy which

explains the vital meaning of the fundamental dogmas of Christianity; he founded a whole school of Russian religious philosophy. In our time, when the whole world begins to split up into two camps—of those who are for God and those who are against Him—Soloviev's philosophy acquires a special value. Therefore, one should applaud the appearance of a German translation of Soloviev's complete works in ten volumes which the publishing house of Erich Wewel has begun to publish. Volume VII, which has just appeared, contains Soloviev's articles on aesthetics, dealing especially with problems of beauty in nature and in art, his original interpretation of the meaning of sexual love, and an article on epistemology.

Soloviev's articles on the drama of Plato's life and on the destiny of Pushkin and Lermontov are chiefly valuable for their definition of the absolute good. Like all of his works, these articles display a fine detection of the admixture of evil to good, and bring out various distortions of goodness. N. L.

Jean-Paul Sartre, Darstellung und Kritik seiner Philosophie. By Hans Heinz Holz. Westkulturverlag Anton Hain, Meisenheim/Glan, 1951.

Most of the books about existentialism appear in Germany and France. In Germany it was the dominating philosophical issue after the first World War; today it is the only one. No German thinker of today is so much in the center of reflections as Martin Heidegger. Recently he was discussed by Professor of Philosophy Karl Loewith in three articles of the periodical *Neue Rundschau*. Loewith analyzed Heidegger's development admiringly and critically at the same time.

Sartre, on the other hand, is spoken about in Europe much more from a political and aesthetical viewpoint than from a philosophical one. Hans Heinz Holz fills this lacuna with his very solid study. Unfortunately his criticism is colored by the prejudice that Sartre has to be interpreted, above all, as a symptom of the ideological situation of a world whose social foundations are going to pieces. Thus he criticizes Sartre from the vantage point of a "philosophy of hope" without saying of what his hope consists. The chapter "Heidegger and Sartre" suffers from the fact that Holz points too much to the Heidegger of recent decades (the so-called positive Heidegger) and not to the more important Heidegger of *Sein und Zeit* who was really the teacher of Sartre.

LUDWIG MARCUSE

A CRITIQUE OF JEAN-PAUL SARTRE'S ONTOLOGY. By Maurice Natanson. University of Nebraska, Lincoln, 1951. pp. 136. \$1.00.

The critique of *L'Être et le Néant* by Maurice Natanson is a more restricted and a more objective, logical criticism. He defends Sartre against attempts to belittle him as a philosopher. But the summary of his very sharp analysis is: "Through the abandonment of true Husserlian phenomenology, Sartre invalidated his inquiry and the resultant ontology because of the lack of a clear and consistent method." The shortcoming of this critique is perhaps that it does not investigate whether phenomenology is a "clear and consistent method."

The author reproaches Sartre for making use of a "psychological method." Natanson uses this expression in the polemic sense in which Husserl and some neo-Kantians coined this word. But this is just the beginning of the problem.

L. M.

Filosofía de la Educación. By Angel González Alvarez. Universidad Nacional de Cuyo, Mendoza, Argentina, 1952. pp. 250.

The present volume represents one of the very few attempts to date to write a philosophy of education upon a metaphysical basis. The discussion is thoroughly organized around six major problems: (1) What is education, its existence and its essence? (2) What is the structure of education, its form and content? (3) What is the educational process? (4) How is the educational process realized? (5) How is the educational process regulated? (6) What are the purposes of education, immediate and remote?

The broad orientation of the philosophy is Thomistic and the remote, final purpose of education theological. One might wish that the author had given some illustrations of how his abstract concepts and analyses would affect the practice of education in schools.

MERRITT M. THOMPSON

Sobre la Filosofía en América. By Francisco Romero. Editorial Raigal, Buenos Aires, Argentina, 1952. pp. 135.

This volume is the first in a projected series entitled *Problemas de la cultura en América* which is designed to unify the political and economic consciousness of the Americas at the same time that it clarifies the outstanding aspects of their culture examined against historical and systematic criteria. As this reviewer has noted earlier, the appearance of books giving broad overviews of the philosophy of the New World would seem to indicate the coming to age of the thought of that area and to fulfil a real need. Referring to a common consciousness already existing, the author says:

That the consciousness exists as a collective entity, is certain, and its existence is confirmed by the fact that certain questions have been posed which presuppose it: for example, the discussions of the unity or diversity of philosophy in the Americas; and those which define, within the Hispano-American circle, opposite tendencies or propensities, one toward regional concentration, and the other universality: fruitful discussions or disagreements which show that our thought is refining and clarifying itself. (8)

The various chapters were originally lectures or articles and cover: contemporary tendencies in Spanish America; the development of thought in Argentina with special reference to the work of notable figures; Latin American philosophers of the twentieth century; various studies of individuals with notable careers in the field of thought; the idealism of Josiah Royce; the personalistic movements; and finally the influence of the discovery of America on general ideas.

While the book is not intended to be a unified and organized whole, it is an enlightening presentation of movements, tendencies, and important figures in the philosophic thought of the New World. M. M. T.

Sciences Humaines et Philosophie. By Lucien Goldmann. Presses Universitaires de France, Paris, 1952. pp. 145. 300 fr.

The natural sciences have quite generally taken the position that their progress is made relative to the degree to which they free themselves from philosophy. "Scientism has attempted to extend this point of view to the biological and human sciences praising a mechanical biology, a behavioristic psychology, an empirical history, and a factual and descriptive sociology." (2) On the other hand, if philosophy really deals with the truths of human nature, the human sciences must be philosophical in order *to be scientific*. The problem of the value or uselessness of philosophy to the human sciences thus becomes central to the discussion in this book which was inspired by the late Émile Bréhier.

Historical and social events in their judgments of value must take into account human coherence or solidarity and the creative force of individuals, rather than the agreement between individual consciousness and objective reality. The historic and human sciences, unlike the physico-chemical sciences, do not deal with facts exterior to man and his activity, but rather with that activity itself. The process of scientific knowledge is itself a human fact, historical and social, and implies a partial identity between the subject and the object of the knowledge. The research worker, in order to find concrete and total reality, must integrate the history of the theories concerning social facts within the study of the facts themselves, and link it to their historic localization and their economic and social substratum. These basic principles are illustrated at length in the history of economic determination, social classes, and intellectual grasp. M. M. T.

La Liberté de la Volonté, Signification des Doctrines Classiques. By Henri Daudin. Presses Universitaires de France, Paris, 1950. pp. 250. 600 fr.

For twenty-five years the author of the present volume has been a professor of philosophy at the University of Bordeaux. Preparing his courses with the meticulous precision which characterizes many European scholars, he never had the time to devote to personal publications. Now a group of his former students, and his widow, have published one of his courses—on the history of the doctrine of free will—based on the notes left by the professor. Some additional editing would have been desirable, for the author sometimes refers to a previous course which has not been published. But this is of minor importance. On the whole the book presents a very penetrating critical analysis of the classical doctrine of freedom of will from antiquity to Kant.

In Greek the term "free" had mainly a political meaning and the metaphysical and ethical problem of freedom was never properly posed in ancient philosophy. According to the author, this is due to the fact that Greek

philosophy considered man only as a part of nature, although in his *Nicomachean Ethics* Aristotle insisted that virtues do not arise in us by nature, for "nothing that exists by nature can form a habit contrary to its nature"; still we are "adapted by nature" to receive the virtues. Daudin shows that the problem of free will starts with Christianity, and, after sketching the position of its precursor Plotinus, he gives an excellent account of St. Augustine's *De Libero Arbitrio*, of Luther's *De Servo Arbitrio*, and of St. Thomas' doctrine. He then analyzes the positions of Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, Malebranche, Locke, Hume, and Kant with remarkable clarity, a wealth of erudition, and an enlightening selection of quotations in the original Greek, Latin, and German versions. Based on a course given during the academic year 1939-40, the volume does not include the latest doctrines of free will—those of the contemporary existentialists, but the new interest in this problem awakened by them gives Daudin's book a particular note of timeliness. ALFRED STERN

Russisches Christentum. By Hans von Eckardt. R. Piper & Co., Verlag, Muenchen, 1947. pp. xi-327.

The culture of Byzantium flourished for more than one thousand years and became one of the great links between Greco-Roman Europe and the Middle Ages. Nevertheless, to this very day, one has paid little attention to this great European civilization. Psellus, "the Aristotle of Byzantium," is not known even by the best informed people in Western civilization. His autobiography has been published only recently in the United States.

Byzantine religion is that creation of those thousand years, besides Byzantine art, which is most alive in the minds of people of today. Hans Eckardt, Professor of Sociology at the University of Heidelberg and director of the Heidelberg Institute of Journalism, describes in this book the story of the Byzantine church under the title *Russian Christianity*.

Eckhardt is not so much interested in Byzantium as in those thousand years of the Russian past that started with the acceptance of Christianity in 988 and ended with the outbreak of the revolution in 1917. He wrote this book because of the opinion that our time has not paid enough attention to "the process of the disappearance of the old religious convictions" in the East. It is debatable whether this book clarifies enough the origin and the meaning of present-day Russian atheism. That would best be done by exposing the political role of the Pope in the history of Russia. But the description itself is full of merits.

L. M.

La Vraie Maçonnerie et la Céleste Culture. By Fabre d'Olivet. Presses Universitaires de France, Paris, 1952. pp. 177.

Fabre d'Olivet, French philosopher and writer of various literary works as well as musical compositions, was born in 1767 and died in 1825. During the last year of his life he planned a new religion to be called "the universal theodocic religion" and founded a church "the *Sanctuaire*" which attracted a

certain number of adherents, all of which was cut short by his untimely death from apoplexy in 1825. That he had actually planned a new religion was a matter of doubt to scholars, although seemingly confirmed by various references in the work of other writers, until the comparatively recent discovery of the present hitherto unpublished text which makes clear and precise the whole matter. The text discovered in the Masonic library of Paris at the close of World War II is a typed copy, but Cellier feels that it is authentic.

The plan itself is a curious blending of Pythagorean number, the animal magnetism of Mesmer, and the substitution of an agricultural symbolism for the Masonic symbolism to which is added a cosmology attributed to the ill-fated Atlantis. The editor says: "One sees that Fabre d'Olivet did not take himself merely as a learned person, even a scholar of genius, he went beyond the greatest writers on sacred and occult matters, such, for example, as Moses himself." (156) The whole structural organization of the plan is indeed amazing.

If the adherents to the new religion that first year were few, today they would be even less, but the work may prove to be of value to those seeking to understand how religions are first formulated in the minds of their historic founders.

M. M. T.

Dekadenz Oder Fortschritt. By Joachim Seyppel. Bronnen-Verlag, Schlehdorf Obb., 1951. pp. 64. 3.60 DM.

The sixty-four pages of *Decadence or Progress, A Study of American Philosophy of History*, are stuffed with quotations. That is very laudable because even the most educated German readers are not familiar with a good many of the thinkers mentioned here; they are not even familiar with their names perhaps.

The table of contents gives an idea of the many philosophers treated in this booklet: (1) Foundations (Origin of Philosophy of History, the Concept of Progress, Parrington's *Main Currents in American Thought*); (2) Progress, Ambition and Contradiction (Le Tocqueville, Henry Ford, *Middletown*, Pioneers of Progress); (3) Aesthetical Protests (Emerson, Thoreau, Mencken, Santayana); (4) Doubleheaded Pragmatism (W. James, Dewey, Kallen, Shafer); (5) From the Animal to the God (Fiske, Hocking, Mathews, H. B. Smith, Taylor, Leavenworth); (6) The Nation (Turner, Partridge, Teggart, J. Frank); (7) New History (Barnes, Robinson); (8) From the Economical Viewpoint (H. George, B. Adams, C. A. Beard, Veblen); (9) Skeptical Interpretation of Progress (H. Adams, Shafer, J. M. Beck, *The Catholic Philosophy of History*, Huntington, A. H. Lloyd, Theodore Roosevelt, Hale, Watson); (10) American "Youth" (Spengler, Keyserling, Dewey, Theodore Roosevelt, Ortega y Gasset, Toynbee, Shafer, Huntington, Danilewsky, Behaviorism).

The shortcoming of this very valuable, very instructive treatise, from the standpoint of the German reader, is the end with its meaningless postulate that the American philosophers of history have to continue the tradition of Vico, Voltaire, Hegel, Spengler, and Toynbee.

L. M.

Geschichte der Philosophie. By Wilhelm Capelle. Walter de Gruyter & Co., Berlin, 1953. pp. 135.

In the famous collection "Goeschen" the second, enlarged edition of *The History of Philosophy, Volume I, Greek Philosophy, Part I. From Thales to Leukippos* has just been published. This little book begins with a good bibliography and an introduction that deals, above all, with three topics: "Meaning and origin of Greek philosophy," "The first period of Greek philosophy," and "The sources of pre-Socratic philosophy."

The presentation is easy, concentrated, and reliable; it is a recommendable introduction for the American student who is able to read German. L. M.

MISCELLANEOUS

THEORETICAL MODELS AND PERSONALITY THEORY. Edited by David Krech and George S. Klein. Duke University Press, Durham, 1952. pp. 142. \$2.50.

This book is a symposium developed around the central problem of theoretic models and personality theory. Psychologists, as well as representatives of other disciplines, are today, perhaps more than ever, reading papers, both theoretic and practical, from the various related fields such as psychiatry, perception, neurology, learning theory, sociology, physiology, and the like. The authors feel that this is a strategic moment to discuss the rules of procedure which will make for more economic and productive contacts between the various disciplines. Nine authors have contributed their thinking to the discussion of this particular topic. Each of the authors gives his conception of the purpose of theory and then indicates how it has specifically influenced his own thinking and research in the field of personality. For instance, Neil E. Miller of the Department of Psychology at Yale University, thinks of a scientific theory as a system of symbols from which one can make rigorous deductions about some of the consequences of different sets of conditions. If the theory is unable to mediate rigorous deductions, it is not a usable scientific theory. It is obvious, therefore, that many so-called theories in psychology failed to meet this criterion. Miller feels that they should be classified as points of view, articles of faith, or intuitions, but not as theoretic models. It is felt by Miller and the other writers that such pseudotheories may have their value in motivating the research of their proponents and, therefore, they may eventually lead to the development of a more accurate theory. The article goes on to specify the use of the scientific theory and the importance of theory in scientific research. The article likewise points out that it is impossible to avoid selecting data without some sort of a hypothesis. When the researcher is faced by an infinite sea of potential facts and data, most of them completely irrelevant, he is forced to make a choice of one of these factors as the point at which he will begin his research work. This point, while it may be a "hunch," is actually a hypothesis.

Ward C. Halstead of the Department of Medicine and Psychology at the University of Chicago, says that, "Concepts are the models through which

we schematize the phenomena of a given domain for purposes of communication and continuing investigation." (119) These concepts or theories are then considered to be good concepts or models insofar as they transcend their particulars and advance the level of adaptation; that is, the level of general scientific understanding. They are bad concepts when they remain unincorporated into the mainstream of scientific knowledge.

George S. Klein and David Krech, in the first chapter, deal with the problem of the personality and its theory. They point out at some length some of the pitfalls in current thinking about personality and behavior in the hope that avoidance of these pitfalls will make for more usable theory and theoretic models of personality. They likewise discussed what form the requirements for a theory of behavior. "It seems to us that any good behavior theory (or "personality theory") must meet two main criteria: It must be a unified theory of behavior and it must be, as is true of any good theory in science, an "explanatory" theory, one which goes beyond describing the phenotypically observable and is capable of generating new deductions." (10) In a sense they attempt to formulate a number of guide signs designed to assess any theory of behavior and to keep it clearly focused on the initial aim or aims which may insure that a scientific product will result from its use.

From the point of view of Ludwig von Bertalanffy of the Department of Biology of the University of Ottawa: "Theoretical constructs are essentially a means of establishing 'laws of nature.' All laws of nature are essentially of a statistical character; that is they are statements about the average of a great number of events." (24)

Further emphasis on the role of neurological ideas in psychology is given by D. O. Hebb of MacGill University. This author would contend that physiologizing is not a substitute for psychology, but an aid to it.

David Rapaport of the Riggs Foundation, Stockbridge, Massachusetts, discusses the conceptual model of psychoanalysis and its contribution to the understanding of personality structure. Basic emphasis is placed upon the dynamics of behavior. The last article is one by Andras Angyal of Boston. This article is somewhat a summary of his book *Foundations for a Science of Personality* (1941) and does not add any significant material beyond that.

This work will appeal to the graduate student in psychology who is interested in research in the field of personality. The book is a rather effective rebuttal to those who would assume that the field of psychology can remain distinct and aloof from the other disciplines which likewise are concerned with the understanding of human behavior, even though human behavior is thought of from a different point of view.

L. V. W.

George Pepperdine College

WAKE UP YOUR MIND. By *Alex Osborn*. Charles Scribner's Sons, N. Y., 1952. pp. xv-277. \$3.00.

The premise of this little volume is, in the author's words, "the more creative we try to be, the more creative we *become*; and the more creative we are, the

more we can get out of life?" (ix) The method advocated is centered about the use and daily exercise of "creative imagination"—"The ability to visualize, to foresee, and to generate ideas," (2)—applied to work, friendship, play, home life, and hobbies. In short, applied to everything we do. The purpose of the book is to encourage and enliven interest in the use of "creative imagination" and to suggest sound psychological habits of mind for the attainment of happiness.

Encouragement and even motivation may be found in this book by anyone who has not yet come upon some good purpose or worthy objective which of itself can bring forth the disciplines and habits of mind suggested here. Added to this, any discussion which has for its underlying theme the formation of character can, when abundantly documented with the thoughts of genius, and lucidly presented, as is Mr. Osborn's volume, reward our attention and interest.

WILLIAM H. ALAMSHAH

ENGLISH DISCOVERY OF AMERICA TO 1585. By *Franklin T. McCann*. Columbia University Press, N. Y., 1952. pp. xiv-246. \$3.50.

This book is an effective correlation of study in the fields of geography, history, and literature. The result is a far more illuminating perspective on the discovery of America than this important and familiar subject has previously received. In a series of ten chapters Mr. McCann has explained the change from medieval concepts of the world to Renaissance concepts. He examines and clearly illustrates how the records of early voyages compelled men of the sixteenth century to revise their picture of the world, and how this new information slowly made its way into the popular literature of the time. As the title suggests, the book is chiefly concerned with English voyages and English records, a reasonable and coherent limitation, but the explorers of other nations are not ignored. The actual state of knowledge provides a fresh approach to such well-known literary works as Barclay's *Ship of Fools* (translation of Brant's *Narrenschiff*), More's *Utopia*, Rastell's *Interlude of the Four Elements*, and Marlowe's *Tamburlaine*, and there is brief mention of many lesser works which helped men of the sixteenth century to realize the implications of geographical discovery. Mr. McCann's style is appropriate to his subject. He savors the quaintness of old accounts, but without condescension. The book is solid without being dull, precise without being laborious. B. R. McE.

MAKING OF THE MEXICAN MIND. By *Patrick Romanell*. University of Nebraska Press, Lincoln, 1952. pp. ix-213. \$3.75.

Most of the histories of philosophy ignore the thought of the western world of the Americas with perhaps an exception or so in favor of a single outstanding figure. While it is true that philosophic thinking in that part of the world rests upon foundations laid in the Old World by the great thinkers from the Greeks on, nevertheless there have emerged individuals and currents of thought which mark the coming of age of cultures having their own right to recognition and making contributions not inconsiderable in themselves. The

present work presents a systematic and briefly comprehensive survey of the thought of Mexico. It might have been assumed that the various revolutionary movements in that colorful and turbulent country had an ideological background, but somehow that fact has been neglected for the most part until this very welcome study.

The book proper begins with "a character sketch of the two Americas" wherein an "*epic* sense of life" is attributed to the Anglo-American and a "*tragic* sense of life" to the Ibero-American, the former issuing in the pragmatic movement in philosophy and the latter in an "existentialism" which "is the philosophy of human *failure* in the ultimate and deepest signification." (25) The author says, however, "I should venture to say that a synthesis or meeting of North and South America is possible on the ground that they complement each other and share a common faith, namely, a humanistic attitude towards life, together with a heroic conception of man." (27)

Mexican philosophic history is analyzed into five principal stages: (1) the Scholastic, (2) the Enlightenment, (3) the Anti-Rationalistic, (4) the Positivistic, (5) the Anti-Positivistic; and these stages are related to the appropriate periods of Mexican social history. The author avoids the error, however, of an overemphasis upon the exclusive causal effect of either the practical or the theoretical factor.

The two most systematic of the Mexican philosophers have been Antonio Caso and José Vasconcelos. The influence of Pascal and also of Bergson is visible in the thinking of these two men. Caso's "Christianization of the world" works out the dualistic strain in the Bergsonian philosophy, Vasconcelos' "aesthetic monism" the mystical. While Caso is remembered as the "first dean" of Mexican philosophy, Vasconcelos is the more original especially in his "peculiar insights into the metaphysical significance of art" (10) The author says of him:

Thus, personality or spirit in the concrete becomes elevated to the basic and ultimate nature of the world, thereby making possible the inference to the personal God of Christian faith. Incidentally, this belief in a Supreme Person, "the whole of wholes," discloses that strain of Vasconcelos' thought which has led him to ally himself in the last few years with the movement of North American Personalism especially as represented by Professor E. S. Brightman of Boston University. (137)

The latter part of the nineteenth century represented the "positivistic stage" of Mexican philosophy corresponding to the *tiranía honrada* of the dictatorship of Porfirio Díaz. The period was one of considerable accomplishment, "but all for the vested interests of the ruling class." (53) The twentieth century has been more notable for the agreement of Mexican thinkers *against* traditional positivism than *for* anything in particular. They have been profoundly influenced by José Ortega y Gasset and have been denominated "perspectivists" from his view that philosophy is the search for a *point of view* rather than certainty. This "generation of *contemporáneos*" is led by Samuel

Ramos and José Romano Muñoz and, following Ortega y Gasset, since 1925 has been strongly influenced by German ideas as they were earlier by the French. "Ortega's perspectivist ideas have been the greatest single intellectual force in the nationalization of the Mexican mind" (184) A new existentialist group is now rising.

In view of the purely conceptual character of so many books in Spanish-American philosophy, Professor Romanell's interweaving of social and political history with philosophical development is notably effective. M. M. T.

GROUP RELATIONS AT THE CROSSROADS. Edited by *Muzafer Sherif* and *M. O. Wilson*. Harper & Brothers, N. Y., 1953. pp. viii-379. \$4.00.

The subject of group relations is one which sociologists have been studying for years. More recently the psychologists have become interested and have made important contributions regarding groups in action. The latest development is a beginning in making an interdisciplinary study of group relations, with psychologists, sociologists, social anthropologists, and others coming together to present papers on group relations and to discuss one another's contributions.

The volume under review is a report of a conference held in 1952 at the University of Oklahoma, dealing with group relations by authorities in this instance from psychology, sociology, and animal behavior. An introduction to the thirteen papers is given by Professor Muzafer of the University of Oklahoma who emphasizes the importance of the interdisciplinary approach to human relations. He also discusses the concept of "reference groups." The relation of psychological traits of persons to group relations is treated by Anne Anastasi. The value of social perception as a factor in group life is presented by Gardner Murphy from one angle and by James J. Gibson from another viewpoint. Leon Festinger analyses "complaint behavior." Mozell Hill discusses social distance in intergroup relations; and Helen H. Jennings, sociometric structure in personality and group formation. Of the remaining papers special reference may be made to the history of the small-group research movement as given by Robert E. L. Paris, and to the roles of leadership in small-group behavior as explained by Launor F. Carter.

As editor Sherif points out in the initial chapter, the subject of group relations has a crucial bearing on the formation of and changes in the attitudes of a person, on the degree of integration represented by a personality at any given time, and on a person's philosophy of life. From the standpoint of the history of philosophy it would be interesting to know what roles group relations have played in the life-experiences of the world's leading philosophers. How far could the differences in their philosophies be accounted for on the basis of having experienced differences in group relations? Can the nature of any person's philosophy of life be explained or understood apart from his group relations?

The gaps that must be eliminated before an interdisciplinary study of group relations can be effectively made are illustrated by Professor Sherif's

suggestion that the concept of "definition of the situation" which has been widely used by sociologists for thirty years or more is similar to the concept of "social perception" which the psychologists have emphasized during the past half dozen years. The difference in the history and nomenclature of these two concepts illustrates the distance that must be overcome before the psychologists and sociologists can work together and present an integrated body of knowledge about group relations for the philosopher to interpret in terms of a larger system of thought.

EMORY S. BOGARDUS

ETHICS FOR POLICY DECISIONS. By *Wayne A. R. Leys*. Prentice-Hall, N. Y., 1952. pp. xiii-428. \$6.35.

This textbook in social ethics follows general principles embodied in a similar work published by the author twelve years ago, although the whole is expanded and completely rewritten, and is illustrated by new problems. Ethics, as he conceives it, is more than an academic exercise: it is, in the words of the subtitle, "the art of asking deliberate questions," or the quest for "good judgment and wise choices." "If policy makers read philosophical ethics for critical questions instead of answers," the opening sentence has it, "they may correct some sources of bad judgment." The volume is divided into two parts concerned respectively with deliberative ethical questions and relevant theory, and policy studies in concrete situations. The former deals with utilitarian calculation, casuistry (custom and law), the Socratic-Platonic principle of consistency with ideals, Kantianism, Stoic power, Aristotle's golden mean, ethical psychologism, Hegelian and Marxist historicism, Dewey's instrumentalism, and the semantic approach. The second section offers a variety of concrete case problems taken from recent American experience, such as school policies in Chicago and Pasadena, the caste problem of Fernwood Park, the Kings and Tennessee projects, the partition of Germany, which illustrate the various theoretical approaches applied to action. "Education," the author remarks in conclusion, "is only half of a program for the improvement of policy decisions. The second half is organization and reorganization of the institutions in which people use their education. Instruction in swimming is wasted if the swimmer is not allowed to go near water. Instruction in team play is useless if there is no team." (359) This attempt to put ethics to work and make it a realistic enterprise is a worthy one. In the end, however, we are left with several handfuls of theories without any coherent order or unifying principle; and the student is likely, in consequence, to conceive of the whole as a useful bag of tricks rather than a unified enterprise. W. L.

MONOPOLY AND SOCIAL CONTROL. By *Henry A. Wells*. Public Affairs Press, Washington, 1952. pp. ix-158. \$3.25.

Monopoly is examined as a problem in the control of the social environment. The basic assumption is that earnings and incomes are indexes of accessibility to economic resources, and that equitable accessibility to such resources is essential for national welfare. Low earnings in relation to cost of commodities would denote a limited degree of accessibility, and, conversely, the concen-

tration of wealth and high incomes within a restricted group of the population would indicate that opportunities of access to resources are limited. Monopoly, then, creates a problem, its gravity depending upon how greatly the accessibility to resources is affected.

The Soviet Union professes to equalize economic opportunity by nationalizing the means of production and distribution. In the United States the traditional concept of economics is the capitalism of free enterprise working under conditions of free competition. Competition is supposed to favor equitable opportunity of accessibility to economic resources. Monopoly capitalism, however, supposedly interferes with freedom of competition and causes inequality of economic opportunity to the weaker elements of the population. Monopoly capitalism is seen as a harbinger of nascent collectivism; that is, monopoly capitalism unchecked would, as a fulfilment of a law of causality, change the American way of life into genuine collectivism as now observed in Russia and elsewhere. But American individualism, the sense of free enterprise, democracy and related values, all tend to offset the influences of monopoly capitalism.

The author appears to have been captured by philosophical conceptions stemming from a "law of causality" which is supposed to determine social changes, his concern being the influence of economic factors in change. Monopoly capitalism is described as a stage leading to collectivism or some form of nationalization of production and distribution, in much the same way that Marx assumed that capitalism would be followed by socialism. In support of his view, the author cites statistics to lend objectivity to the dangers from concentration of wealth and income. There are many objective factors not mentioned by the author, however, which reveal the other side of the profit motive and even the essential qualities of bigness in industry which have made the American economy and the national income the greatest in the world, and the American level of living, on the average, the highest among contemporary nations.

The author gives full credit to the influence of what he calls "enlightened individualism" in American life as a force operating in the framework of the "law of causality." But to draw upon such a law of causality for an analysis of economic trends involving the production and distribution of goods and the maintenance of equitable accessibility to resources essential for national welfare, is no more defensible than Marx's dialectics concerning similar problems.

JOHN ERIC NORDSKOG

ASIAN NATIONALISM AND THE WEST. Edited by *William L. Holland*. The Macmillan Co., N. Y., 1953. pp. viii-449. \$5.00.

This symposium is an outgrowth of the Eleventh Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations held at Lucknow, India, in October, 1950. Its contents consist of an introduction by the editor, three articles based on papers presented at the conference, and a fairly comprehensive summary of the discussions of the various round tables of the conference.

Attention is focused on Southeast Asia. The three articles deal with nationalism in Indonesia, Vietnam, and Malaya respectively. The introduction is an article by itself and constitutes an important part of the book. It not only points out certain general trends on Asian nationalism on the basis of the conference papers and reports, but also supplements the three articles by briefly discussing the growth of nationalism in the Philippines, Ceylon, Burma, China, and India. The authors leave no doubt that nationalism is a major force in Asia today. While the peculiar conditions in each country give rise to special characteristics of nationalism, there are certain observable common trends. Among these are the leadership of the educated minority, the close tie between religion and nationalism, and the readiness to try solutions of social and economic problems on the basis of socialist (but non-Communist) ideas. During World War II the occupation of Japan and the Pan-Asian propaganda of the Japanese greatly stimulated the growth of nationalism in Southeast Asia.

The author on Indonesian nationalism traces the growth of the unitary movement as opposed to the Dutch-imposed federalism and presents a clear picture of the political parties and cabinet changes in these early years of the Indonesian Republic. The writer on Vietnam, himself a Frenchman, deplors the failure of the French government to recognize the strength of non-Communist nationalism in Vietnam and the opportunity thus given to the Communists to pose as the champions of nationalism and thus to win the support of patriotic Vietnamese. He points out that France chose to support Bao Dai because "it was believed that Bao Dai would prove a partner who would make few demands." (212) In the article on Malaya it is pointed out that Malay nationalism is a relatively new development and that the cause of its development has been greatly influenced by racial factors and the problems of Chinese and Indian immigration.

The contributors to the volume have done well to stick to the major theme of nationalism and thus avoid the lack of unity characteristic of many symposia. The volume adds much a clear understanding of nationalism and Communism in Southeast Asia.

THEODORE H. E. CHEN

AMERICAN BEGINNINGS. By *Jarvis M. Morse*. Public Affairs Press, Washington, 1952. pp. ix-260. \$3.75.

This pioneer volume is one of a new series of monographs, *The Annals of American Research*. It is the result of years of just such research by a Yankee who holds three degrees from Yale, has taught history at Brown, and is presently an educational expert in government service in Washington. The work constitutes a "pleasant excursion through early writings on America," particularly the thirteen colonies and the islands from Newfoundland to the West Indies. These writings are almost entirely by men who traveled or lived in the regions involved; in most cases, the authors were Americans through migration or birth.

Dr. Morse examines the hundreds of authors and books on pre-Revolutionary America. In easy running style he introduces the writers through brief

interpretive biographies with special reference to their interests and place in history. He names and discusses their books and articles, often with quotations and summaries, classifies them either as simple narratives, controversial literature, provincial histories, or "Imperial" histories, explains their objectives, biases, and methodologies, and evaluates them for accuracy, atmosphere, style, and historicity. He makes no attempt to be a second Winsor or Jameson, but he fills a gap not hitherto occupied by historians.

The author does not delay long upon the familiar chronicles of explorations before the settlement of Virginia and Massachusetts. More wisely, he treats the historical writings of colonists from John Smith and William Bradford onward. There is not much to add concerning these two celebrities and their most well-known successors like the Mathers, Penn, and William Byrd II, but Morse offers to the average reader much light concerning such picturesque and usually unknown figures as Captain Benjamin Church, Samuel Penhallow, Cadwallader Colder, John Oldmixon, Daniel Horsmanden, and William Smith. He studies his historians regionally and sequentially, and also under more original headings pertaining to maritime adventures, intrigues, insurrections, Indians, tolerance and magnanimity, and social and religious outlooks.

William Douglass of the mid-eighteenth century is presented as one of the first colonials significantly to survey America as a whole; he and other contemporaries stressed the thesis that the colonies and the mother country must be studied together, a view which twentieth-century historians take for granted. Happily for the present-day trend toward Anglo-Americanism, the author reaches his climax in his analysis of Thomas Hutchinson, great-great-grandson of Anne Hutchinson and royal governor of Massachusetts in the decisive years just before 1774. For objectivity, breadth of vision, lack of prejudice or rancor, Hutchinson emerges as the most discriminating and authoritative historian of the colonial era. Posterity awards him as a historian the greatness which his contemporaries denied him as an administrator.

Despite a number of slips in minor points like spelling, punctuation, and typography, this suggestive book affords a guide to scholarship and cultural background which the philosopher or clergyman can well afford to follow.

E. C.

A NEW DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN HISTORY. By *Michael Martin* and *Leonard Gelber*. Philosophical Library, N. Y., 1952. pp. vi-695. \$10.00.

Again the Philosophical Library leads in the publication of useful books. Now to the long list of reference works is added the *New Dictionary of American History* which will be helpful in locating men, measures, and dates that are met in daily reading but which do not come readily to mind for the average person. However well versed in American history the individual may be, there is scarcely anyone who will not find this work, which can be accommodated on any desk, a time-and-patience saver. It will not altogether take the place of a many-volumed encyclopedia, but it will go a long way toward

filling the bill for the man who is pressed for time and who needs but the brief reminder of salient facts. Such was our unstinted admiration of this book until one of the family sought information by chance at pages 231-233, to read the following bits of misinformation: Under the title "Freedman's Bureau Act" we read, "A bill which was vetoed by President Johnson in February 1856." With the caption "Fremont," we read that Fremont led three expeditions into Oregon Territory and that "the third expedition reached California *December 1945*."

Such lack of proofreading makes a reference work useless. In addition to this, we meet on page 233 the muddled statement: "Since 1816 the United States has had a policy of high protectionism with the exception of the period since 1934 when the reciprocal tariff policy was one of the *Fourteen Points* of President Wilson in 1918."

We hope the Philosophical Library can make corrections before many sales.

R. T. F.

PROBLEMS AND PRINCIPLES OF SCHOOL AND SOCIETY: AN OUTLINE. By *Frank C. Wegener*. Wm. C. Brown Co., Dubuque, 1953. pp. ix-197. \$3.50.

The professor of philosophy of education works under a difficulty that the professor of philosophy does not have. The former must usually include within his department the history of education and the social aspects of education. Furthermore he must often assume that one course in his department is all that most teachers in training will take. How to cover so wide a range and yet give a course of substance is no easy task. The present work is frankly an exploratory syllabus or course manual designed to help the professor solve the problem. The author clearly recognizes the constructive aspect of the situation which is the central place that philosophy holds with reference to all other fields. Thus a peculiar advantage accrues from the necessity to correlate philosophy with the other theoretical aspects of education and also to see its basic character in the more immediate problems of educational practice. Philosophy as thus taught avoids an abstract irrelevance to life situations which is sometimes attributed to it. The title of the manual gives a tacit recognition to the fact that the philosophy of education for some years has found its orientation in the place of the school as a social institution. This view does not, however, undervalue the concepts and principles of historic philosophies. Thus Part I, Introductory Considerations, is definitely designed to give a basic philosophic foundation to the course, while Part III, Philosophical Patterns of School and Society, gives the broader overview of philosophic schools and points of view. The central portion, Part II, The Problems of School and Society: An Outline, is organized around areas of social concern and focuses theoretical considerations down to social action looking at the problems from the sociological, historical, theoretical (authoritative sources), philosophical, educational, and operational angles. Study aids and bibliographies are adequate and helpful. The methodology suggested, while rightly built around problem

solving, strikes a happy balance between the proved older techniques and the newer approaches without overemphasizing any of them.

On the whole this manual represents another step in the improvement of the quality of teaching in philosophy and includes a variety of helps which should prove invaluable to the instructor asking the question: What shall I teach in the philosophy of education?

M. M. T.

GROUPS IN HARMONY AND TENSION. By *Muzafer* and *Carolyn W. Sherif*. Harper & Bros., N. Y., 1953. pp. xiii-316. \$3.50.

This treatise contains both an integration of recent studies that have been made of intergroup behavior and a report on an experimental design involving a selected number of boys in a vacation camp who were divided into two groups and studied first in terms of how and why they established relationships in each group, and second, in terms of what intergroup behavior patterns they developed when they were brought together in competitive activities.

Intergroup behavior is defined as "that behavior which the members of an in-group reveal collectively or individually, toward out-groups and their members as a consequence of influences stemming from their group membership." It is pointed out that the degree of interdependence of groups bears a direct relation to the extent and nature of their functional dealings with one another, and that the conditions of harmony between groups are based on the practices and norms that function within groups. Social distance scales are discussed as means of measuring prejudices, and "reference groups" (the groups to which a person would like to belong) are treated as "anchoring groups" in this highly stimulating work on intergroup behavior. E. S. B.

CHRISTIAN FAITH AND SOCIAL ACTION. Edited by *John A. Hutchison*. Charles Scribner's Sons, N. Y., 1953. pp. 246. \$3.50.

In 1930 a small group of American religious leaders met to discuss the relevance of the Christian faith to contemporary society. As a result the Fellowship of Socialist Christians came into being. The group included men like Reinhold Niebuhr, John Bennett, Francis Perry, and others. As a result of maturer thinking and deeper insight into the problems inherent in modern society and the role of the Christian faith in such a society, the name was changed in 1947 to the Frontier Fellowship. While this fellowship is socialist in principle, it does not wish to be identified with either Marxism or pacifism.

The present volume is a festschrift in honor of Reinhold Niebuhr. It was written without his knowledge, by a number of friends and former students, and that is the reason his essay is included here. While it is impossible to deal with all of the essays, we would like to single out three essays which, in the opinion of this reviewer, are very valuable contributions to the problem of Christian ethics in modern society. Kean's essay "The Contemporary Cultural Crisis" is a realistic appraisal of the present dilemma of modern man. Kean attributes this crisis to the advance of modern technology which began with the Renaissance, continued through the Industrial Revolution, and reached

its zenith in the twentieth century. This brought about the depersonalization of man. Modern man felt himself devoured by the machine he created for himself. He began to look for some sort of security even if it meant an escape from reality. Three types of escapism thus came into being: (1) the "peace of mind" school, made popular by some religious thinkers; (2) literary existentialism, represented by men like Heidegger, Sartre, Marcel, and others; and (3) the rise of atomic science, which roused men out of their romantic slumber and shattered their easy-going optimism concerning the nature of man.

Paul Lehmann's essay "The Foundation and Pattern of Christian Behavior" is an important analysis of the meaning and content of Christian ethics, which, says Lehmann, is (1) a "koinonia" ethics. "The koinonia is a fellowship of working together for the gospel." The type of ethic is concrete and contextual. It starts from the fact of the empirical Church, which is the koinonia of believers, and issues in society in its varied relationships. (2) Koinonia ethics is an indicative ethics rather than an imperative ethic, as emphasized, for instance, by Brunner. The question is: can there be a purely indicative ethic without a divine imperative? What about obedience to God's demand, which is a necessary concomitant of faith? (3) Koinonia ethic is social rather than individualistic. This is in consonance with the Biblical view of man, which regards man to be a true individual insofar as he is a member of a covenanted people. The social sciences would also accept this view of man, that is, that he is essentially a *socius*.

Paul Tillich's essay "The Person in a Technical Society" throws a great deal of light on man's position in modern society. Man the *homo sapiens* has become the *homo faber*. This has given rise to certain elements in modern society which tend to dehumanize man altogether. Tillich would not wish, however, to return to a more simple society. He suggests that "the person as a person can preserve himself only by a *partial nonparticipation* in the objectifying structures of technical society." This partial withdrawal is not an escape from society, but is the starting point for an attack on the dehumanizing power in a technical society. The answer to man's predicament is a retreat to the New Reality which is to be found in Jesus the Christ.

This symposium should prove valuable to those who are concerned with the preservation of the person within a depersonalized society. LOUIS SHEIN
Carleton College, Ottawa

MOSCOW AND CHINESE COMMUNISTS. By Robert C. North. Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1953. pp. ix-306. \$5.00.

This well-documented volume on Chinese communism presents a clear narrative beginning with the early years of the communist movement in that country. Facts carefully gathered from Chinese, Japanese, Russian, German, as well as English sources are skilfully woven together into a continuous story written in a very readable style.

Actually the author has given an interesting history of Chinese commu-

nism. Only one chapter is devoted to the current scene in China. Throughout the narrative the author sticks to one central theme: world communism is guided by well-planned "Bolshevik strategy and tactics" and Chinese communism is only a part of world communism. He shows how in every stage of its growth Chinese communism was directed from Moscow and how such internal developments in China as the changing relations between the Chinese communists and the Kuomintang were closely tied up with the general pattern of the world communism as laid down by the Kremlin or the Communist International. When Moscow miscalculations resulted in failures, Chinese leaders were purged as scapegoats. In all official declarations the Chinese communists have always paid tribute to the wisdom and unerring guidance of Moscow. Mao Tse-tung, despite his occasional assertion of independent judgment "has always worked within the framework of world communism." (269)

In his interpretation of factual data the author has been able to free himself from (a) the wartime illusion that these Chinese communists really wanted a democratic coalition government and (b) the early impressions which misled so many people to think that these Chinese communists were more interested in social and economic reform than in the class struggle of the proletarian revolution. It is pointed out that the new regime in China is dedicated to the pursuit of the class war at home and abroad just as the land reform and any other program sponsored by the communists is used primarily as a weapon of class warfare.

In his concluding chapter, the author reiterates that although the communists may change their tactics from time to time, they cannot be expected to abandon their ultimate objective of world-wide communism. World communism, he warns, cannot be defeated by military methods alone. The West should recognize the fundamental "driving forces" in Asia and help the peoples of Asia (and Africa) to satisfy their deep yearnings.

THEODORE H. E. CHEN

PRINCIPLES OF COOPERATION. By *Emory S. Bogardus*. Cooperative League of the U. S. A., Chicago, 1952. pp. vii-68. 50¢.

This little booklet begins with a brief analysis of the five levels of cooperation from "reflexive" and "instinctive," classified as subhuman types, and "survival," "getting ahead," and "other centered" cooperation on the human level. This is followed by a treatment of the main principles of cooperation as expressed and illustrated by the cooperative movement in various parts of the world and first formulated by the Rochdale Cooperative Association in England. The seven principles discussed are: 1. Democracy, 2. Voluntarism, 3. Autonomy, 4. Equity, 5. Mutuality, 6. Universality, 7. Evolution.

Finally, there is a brief account of educational methods in which the theory and techniques of the cooperatives educational program is discussed. A bibliography of selected readings is appended.

H. L. S.

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- FAITH AND CULTURE. By *Bernard E. Meland*. Oxford University Press, N. Y., 1953. pp. vii-229. \$3.75.
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- PRINCIPLES OF CO-OPERATION. By *Emory S. Bogardus*. Co-operative League of the U.S.A., Chicago, 1952. pp. vii-68. 50¢.
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